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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN RETIREMENT SECURITY 
Hung Yee Fong 
Supervisor: Olivia S. Mitchell 
The first chapter “Investment Patterns in Singapore’s Central Provident Fund 
System” investigates how plan participants in a national defined contribution system 
invest their pension accumulations. I find that only a small fraction of participants elects 
to invest in outside investment products like professionally-managed mutual funds. 
Simulation results using cost data from over 200 funds demonstrate that the minimum 
hurdle rate of return a fund must generate is about five percent a year. Accordingly, 
more policy attention can be devoted to lowering fund commission charges and 
rationalizing the investment menu offered to participants.  
In the second chapter “Longevity Risk Management in Singapore’s National 
Pension System”, I evaluate the money’s worth of life annuities and discuss the 
implications of the government entering the insurance market as a public-sector 
provider for annuities. I find that commercial insurers offer competitively-priced 
annuities with money’s worth ratios averaging 0.95, which are on par with those in 
other developed countries. On the other hand, the new annuities launched by 
government under an annuitization mandate are estimated to provide money’s worth 
ratios exceeding unity. This will benefit annuitants on average but implies that the 
annuity mandate will be expensive for the government if current pricing continues.  
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The third chapter “Beyond Age and Sex: Enhancing Annuity Pricing” assesses 
how adopting more detailed pricing schemes may help reduce adverse selection in 
annuity markets. Prices of standard annuity products in the United States do not 
currently reflect buyers’ personal characteristics other than age and sex. I show that 
several readily-measurable risk factors can significantly increase explained variability 
in mortality outcomes in a proportional hazards framework and use them to construct 
alternative pricing schemes. Simulation results show that more detailed pricing may 
help reduce adverse selection in annuity markets because shorter-lived groups are made 
much better off (and thus enter the market) while longer-lived groups are made only 
slightly worse off (and thus remain in the market). 
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CHAPTER 1 
Investment Patterns in Singapore’s Central Provident Fund System1 
 
 In the four short decades between 1990 and 2030, the global tally of persons age 
60+ will burgeon from 500 million to almost 1.5 billion individuals. As much of this 
demographic aging will take place in Asia, it follows that retirement systems in Asia 
will come under substantial pressure. This paper focuses on one of Asia’s most famous 
retirement programs, Singapore’s national defined contribution program known as the 
Central Provident Fund (CPF).  Our goal is to review how workers are allocating their 
retirement saving across the various investment options made available under the CPF, 
and to assess whether alternative investment choices might enhance retirement saving. 
In particular, we address four questions:  
 What fund choices are currently available for workers covered by the CPF, 
and how do people allocate their retirement saving?  
 How do these investment patterns vary according to participant characteristics, 
and how do they compare to those in other countries? 
 How do investment options outside the government default investment pool 
compare, in terms of fees and charges?  
 What policy conclusions may be derived regarding the current investment mix 
provided for retirement saving?  
                                                            
1 This chapter is published in the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance (Cambridge University 
Press). See Benedict SK. Koh, Olivia S. Mitchell, Toto Tanuwidjaja, and Joelle HY. Fong, 2008, 
Investment patterns in Singapore's Central Provident Fund System, Journal of Pension Economics and 
Finance, Volume 7(1), pp. 37-65. 
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 In what follows, we first outline the structure of Singapore's retirement system, 
focusing on the links between the national mandatory provident fund structure and other 
types of asset accumulation in the nation. Next, we show how government policy has 
influenced asset accumulation and investment patterns. 2  Subsequently, we explore 
several questions about asset allocation patterns by demographic attributes. Last, we 
assess how the fees and charges associated with investing in a CPF unit trust can impact 
the investment return over various time horizons.3 Since workers who default their 
money to the CPF fund receive a guaranteed 2.5% return on his Ordinary Account and    
4% on his Special Account, this means that hurdle rates for money market and equity 
funds are rather substantial. These high hurdle rates help explain why few CPF account 
holders invest outside the default government investment pool. On the other hand, 
inertia probably explains why many employees let their funds sit in bank accounts 
earning low interest rates, rather than opting for either the CPF fund or other permitted 
investments. 
 
1.1 Investment Patterns 
The CPF in Singapore was first established in 1955 as a forced savings 
program;4 half a century later, it has evolved into a wide-ranging social security system 
                                                            
2 This paper does not focus on decumulation patterns; these have been studied by Chen et al. (1997; 
1998); Doyle et al. (2004), and Fong (2002). 
3 In the United States, a unit investment trust generally refers to a fixed, unmanaged portfolio of income-
producing securities. Shares in the trust are sold to investors who received capital gains, dividend 
payments and interest at regular periods. A unit investment trust is typically considered a low-risk, low-
return investment. Unit trusts in Singapore are more comparable to mutual funds in the US. 
4 Low and Aw (1997) trace the historical roots of the Singaporean CPF; see also Low and Aw (2004).  
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covering 3.1 million CPF members, of whom 1.46 million are active (as of 12/06).5. 
Since its inception, the CPF has been a defined contribution plan financed by mandatory 
levies on employees’ regular monthly earnings up to an earnings cap. Contribution rates 
and caps have varied over time, with current rates amounting to between 8.5% and 33% 
of salary depending on the employee’s age, and the ceiling is set at $4,500 per month6 
(in 2006; see Table 1.1).   Initially all contributions were held in a single account, but 
over time additional accounts were created. Of most interest for our purposes, the 
Ordinary Account (OA) and Special Account (SA) concepts were introduced in the late 
1970s; the former is intended for financing of home purchases, insurance premiums, 
education expenses, and other saving, while the Special Account, created in 1977, is 
mainly targeted toward old-age saving. The Medisave account, introduced in 1984, is 
designed to be spent on medical care expenses and catastrophic illness insurance (see 
Figure 1.1).  
 [Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 here] 
 Total CPF contributions vary with age, and so too does the breakdown of the 
allocations across accounts. Currently young workers (≤ 35 yrs old) have 6% of their 
total contributions dedicated to the Medisave account, 22% of their totals to the 
Ordinary Account, and 5% to the Special Account.  By contrast, older workers 
(age >55-60) contribute 18.5% of covered pay split 8%, 10.5%, and 0%, respectively, 
across the three accounts.  Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2 depict the time pattern of OA and 
SA contribution rates for a “prime-age worker” in the 35-45 age range. Such an 
                                                            
5 Active CPF members are persons with at least one contribution in the current or preceding three months. 
6 The exchange rate as of December 2006 was S$1=US$0.64. 
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individual would have had to contribute 10 percent of covered earnings in the 1950s to 
the single pooled account, with the rate rising steadily to 37 percent by 1979 when the 
Special Account was created. Thereafter, the non-medical savings portion of the CPF 
for this prime-age group of workers – that is, just the OA and SA combined elements – 
rose to 46% of covered pay by 1983, and then fell to the mid-to-low 30’s over the 1990s. 
By the end of the 1990s, in response to the Asian financial crisis, the CPF savings 
contribution for OA and SA combined was slashed to 23%, and it now stands at 26% of 
covered pay.  
 [Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2 here] 
 The flow of funds into the CPF over time has resulted in substantial asset 
accumulation by scheme participants. Contributions to the OA, SA, and Medisave 
accounts total S$16.1B and CPF balances stand at S$119.8B (12/05), or about three-
fifths of Singapore’s GDP that year.7 As shown in Table 1.3, the growth rate of the CPF 
asset pool has averaged over 7% per annum since 2003.  
 [Table 1.3 here] 
 When the CPF was first established, the Provident Fund Board centrally directed 
all investible funds and a government-set rate of return was paid on the assets. This 
annual percentage return was set in 1955 at 2.5%, a figure that rose to 5% in 1963, and 
peaked at 6.5% in the mid-1980s (see Table 1.4). Thereafter, the return was gradually 
reduced to around 2.5-3% through the mid-1990s. The SA rate was set at 1.25 
percentage points above the OA/Medisave rate in mid-1995, and raised to 1.5 
percentage points in July 1998. There has been no change in the OA and SA rates since 
                                                            
7 Singapore’s 2005 GDP at current market prices was S$194.2B (Source: www.singstat.gov.sg). 
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mid-1999; the annual OA rate is 2.5% and the SA return is 4%. As explained by the 
CPF Board, the actual return paid for the Ordinary Account is the higher of this floor, or 
the “market-related interest rate (based on the 12-month fixed deposit and month-end 
savings rates of the major local banks)”. 8 For the Special and Retirement Accounts, 
members earn additional interest of 1.5 percentage points above the normal CPF interest 
rate. 9  In other words, the Board guarantees a relatively safe minimum nominal return, 
and it also offers participants the possibility of upside potential should the bank rate rise.  
As shown in Table 1.4 (Panel B), the Medisave account return was raised in October 
2001 to the SA rate, to help members build up the Medisave balance faster.   
 [Table 1.4 here] 
 Since the system’s inception 50 years ago, the “default” investment under the 
Provident Scheme has always been the CPF fund, so that workers would earn whatever 
rate of return was set by the CPF Board as explained above. Nevertheless, over time, 
participants have been permitted to use some of their OA and SA assets for other 
purposes.  In 1968, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew introduced the Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS), which permitted workers to borrow against CPF 
accumulations for the purchase of public housing built under the auspices of the 
Housing Development Board (the government authority controlling most of the island’s 
                                                            
8 See http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Int-Rates/Int-Rates.htm. 
9 Asher (1999) notes that this rate is set as a weighted average of the 12-month deposit rate (80%) and 
last-month savings deposit rate (20%) subject to a minimum 2.5% nominal return, revised quarterly.  He 
also argues that actual CPF returns probably returned 5% on average, on an internationally invested asset 
pool of about S$60B over the last decade, though no firm data are provided on the investment mix and 
returns of the CPF portfolio. 
 
6 
 
housing stock). 10  In 1978, CPF savers were permitted to purchase shares in the 
Singapore Bus Service Scheme, and in 1981, private home purchase was permitted with 
CPF funds. As of 1986, members were allowed to purchase commercial properties with 
their CPF savings and also to move into the Approved Investment Scheme arrangement 
(CPF Board 2005e). Subsequently, in 1993, the Board instituted an Investment Schemes 
(IS) approach which further widened the range of permissible assets in which CPF 
savers could invest.  At first members were permitted to invest only a portion of their 
OA and SA savings in approved assets, but the portion was raised to 100% for the SA 
as of 2001.11   
 The range of products in which CPF members can invest is quite diverse. In 
2006, for instance, OA funds could be invested in fixed deposits, corporate bonds, 
property funds and equities traded on the Singapore stock exchange, bonds guaranteed 
by the Singapore government, Statutory Board bonds, annuities and endowments, 
investment-linked insurance products, unit trusts, exchange traded funds, fund 
management accounts and gold. Portfolio limits apply to specific asset families; for 
instance, as noted in Table 1.5, a participant can invest only up to 10% of his investible 
saving in gold, and only up to 35% of his investible saving in shares, property 
funds/REITs, and corporate bonds.  A slightly narrower set of investment products has 
been allowed for Special Account monies; the list most notably excludes fund 
management accounts, shares, property funds/ REITS, corporate bonds, gold, 
investment-linked insurance products, unit trusts and exchange traded funds in the 
                                                            
10 See McCarthy et al. (2002), CPF (2005e), and Low and Aw (1997) for further discussion of the 
housing loan arrangements. 
11 For details see http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/investment/CPF-Invscheme.htm.  
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Higher Risk category of the CPFIS Risk Classification System. The list of financial 
service providers currently allowed under the CPF Investment Scheme appears in Table 
1.6. Mandatory savings are made to three accounts, namely the Ordinary, Special, and 
Medisave funds.  At year-end 2005, CPF members held some S$120B (or about 
US$74B) allocated roughly half to the Ordinary Account, 17% in the Special Account, 
29% in a medical care savings account, and the rest in “Retirement and Other” (see 
Figure 1.3). Total cumulative contributions to the CPF scheme since inception stood at 
S$268.8B (as of 05 Financial Year End).  
 [Tables 1.5 and 1.6, and Figure 1.3 here] 
 Table 1.7 and Figure 1.4 show, on a cumulative basis, that some 59% of OA 
savings have been utilized for housing and 12% for investment. This implies that about 
29% of cumulative contributions have remained in the OA fund, where they currently 
earn 2.5% annual (nominal) interest.  The reverse is true for the funds in the SA, where 
account holders have left the bulk of their saving (80%) deposited with the CPF. A 
possible explanation for the strong tendency of investors to leave their SA money with 
the CPF is that the SA has traditionally paid a higher return compared to the OA. In 
addition, account holders may be less willing to assume higher risk for their retirement 
accounts. Further detail on how CPF members deployed their funds over the years is 
provided in Figure 1.5.  It shows that the bulk of the CPF saving (44%) has gone to the 
purchase of residential and investment properties. A sizeable portion (29% of 
cumulative CPF funds) remains in the OA and SA earning guaranteed interest. 
 [Table 1.7, and Figures 1.4 and 1.5 here] 
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 Currently, about 55% of active members invest in the CPFIS scheme in their OA 
accounts, though only about 10% of total accumulated saving has thus far been devoted 
to investment instruments and insurance linked products. Panel A in Figure 1.6 shows 
that, of funds in the CPFIS-OA investment scheme, 63% is held in insurance products,  
25% is invested in shares and 11% is in unit trusts. Interestingly, the negligible 0.64% 
held in other instruments such as fixed deposits, bonds, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), 
gold, property funds, and fund management accounts, suggests that most investors do 
not fully utilize the menu of investment options they have been offered. Panel B in 
Figure 1.6 shows that in the CPFIS-SA investment scheme, on the other hand, most 
participants held insurance products to the tune of 86% of their saving. Remaining 
funds (14%) were invested primarily in unit trusts.  In other words, the asset allocation 
patterns of OA and SA monies have been starkly different to date:  participants seem 
prepared to take more risk with their OA funds compared to their SA saving.  It would 
appear that the SA funds are put in a separate “mental account” targeted to retirement 
and are not generally actively managed.12 
  [Figure 1.6 here] 
 
1.2 Asset Allocation Patterns in CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) 
 Next we develop a more detailed view of CPFIS asset allocation patterns, 
focusing on age, sex, and income patterns; the analysis is based on aggregate data as 
                                                            
12 The data in Figures 1.7-1.10 refer to a September year-end, which differs from the December year-end 
data given in CPF Annual Reports.   
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individual-account records are not available for research. 13  Figure 1.7 shows that 
participants who elected to invest outside the CPF default fund committed most of their 
funds to three investment instruments, namely, insurance products, shares, and unit 
trusts.  Both men and women devoted similar percentages of their money to unit trusts, 
and both invested less in instruments such as gold, bonds, fixed deposits, ETFs, and 
property funds. Yet men tended to be slightly more proactive in their investments: they 
invested 28% of their funds in shares, compared to 21% for women. Conversely, 
women were more likely to opt for insurance products (68%), compared to men (60%). 
This is similar to US research on retirement account holders, which finds that higher 
income men tend to seek riskier investments and trade more in their accounts (Mitchell 
et al. 2005).   
 [Figure 1.7 here]  
 It is also of interest to ask whether investment behavior becomes less risky as 
workers age. Only a partial picture is available as we have information only on the 
CPFIS-OA accounts but not participants’ entire portfolios.  Nevertheless, Figure 1.8 
shows that CPF investors appear more rather than less devoted to risky investments as 
they age. Thus, the mature (56+) age group commits a higher proportion to stock 
investments and less to insurance products, compared to younger age-groups. We also 
find that the youngest workers are more likely to delegate portions of their saving 
accounts to investments managed by professionals, as seen from their higher holdings 
                                                            
13 These tabulations as of 2004 were kindly provided by the CPF Board. To date no data have been made 
available on the broader investment portfolios of individual investors; accordingly we can report asset 
allocation of investors in the CPF-IS scheme but we cannot link the IS accounts to CPF holdings to 
ascertain workers’ overall portfolios.  Future research will attempt to match individual records to evaluate 
the larger picture of IS versus non-IS holdings. 
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of unit trusts (14%); by contrast, the mature group tends to invest more heavily in shares 
on their own.  In data not shown, older women prove slightly more conservative, 
investing more in insurance products than men. These general patterns again conform to 
US findings, where higher income, older men are more likely to hold riskier portfolios 
as compared their female and younger counterparts - and trade more, as well, often to 
their detriment (Mitchell et al. 2006). 
 [Figure 1.8 here] 
  Another perspective is offered in Figure 1.9, which displays investment scheme 
asset allocation patterns by risk category and participant salary levels.  We group the 
CPFIS products into three, namely insurance products, relatively less risky products 
(bond and fixed deposits), and relatively more risky products (which include shares, 
unit trusts, exchange traded funds, gold and property funds).14  The income categories 
we tabulate focus on low earners (earning less than S$1,500/mo.), low-middle (S$1500-
3,500/mo.), high-middle (S$3,500-6,000/mo.), and high (S$6,000+/mo.).15 Here we see 
that low and lower-middle earners are less likely to hold risky investments, with at least 
70% of their CPFIS portfolios held in insurance products. As salary levels rise, the 
fraction in insurance products falls, first to 63%, and then to under 50% for the highest 
earners. Conversely, higher-earners hold between one-third and half of their investment 
accounts in risky forms, a finding consistent with international research (Mitchell et al. 
2005).  
                                                            
14 In future work we hope to disaggregate the insurance products into investment-linked products, which 
are likely more risky than endowment funds.  
15 Retirees and non-retirees with no monthly earnings are excluded as the data do not allow us to 
distinguish between these two groups. 
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 [Figure 1.9 here] 
 Overall, the observed regularity is that people who move their funds to the 
CPFIS system tend to buy insurance products, and this holds across age, sex, and 
income groups. This is not due to preferential tax treatment on income received from 
insurance products, since investment profits and interest earned from investments, most 
dividends, and income received from CPFIS annuities paid directly as cash, are 
currently not taxable.16 Rather, it may be that in Singapore as elsewhere, insurance 
agents are successfully able to emphasize the joint appeal of protection and investment 
(especially for investment-linked insurance products), which seems particularly 
attractive for CPF money that cannot be accessed until the age of 55. 
 
1.3 Analyzing the Impact of Fees and Charges for CPFIS Options 
 As noted above, additional investment choices have been added over the years, 
to the menu of funds into which CPF participants may invest their mandatory savings. 
As of 2006, there were some 400 investment portfolios on offer to CPF participants.  
Naturally, this additional diversity of fund choices imposes on participants the 
responsibility to devote more attention to the risks and benefits of diversifying outside 
the traditional CPF fund managed by the government. Diversification into other assets 
outside the traditional CPF portfolio also brings with it the potential for high 
management fees and commissions associated with having many small funds.  
 With such a rich offering of investment options, it is of interest to inquire 
whether CPFIS participants have been successful in growing their retirement saving. 
                                                            
16 As per mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV.htm. 
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Recently the story has not an encouraging one, as shown in Table 1.8 (for Fiscal Years 
2004-2006).  Here almost half of CPFIS-OA investors (48%) incurred losses from 
investing on average, while one-third realized profits equal to or less than the default 
OA rate of 2.5%. Only one-fifth of the investors made net realized profits in excess of 
the OA interest rate.  This poor investment performance has not gone unnoticed by 
policymakers. Indeed Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long expressed concern in 2005 
regarding the CPFIS scheme, pointing to high investment fees and expenses as an 
explanation for low returns: 
“[W]e must help CPF members to earn better long term returns on their 
savings. Over the years, we have opened up the CPF Investment Scheme 
(CPFIS) and given members considerable latitude to invest their CPF 
savings as they judge best. However, this has not always worked out as well 
as we hoped, because the options available to the members are not well 
tailored to their needs, and it is difficult to educate members adequately on 
how to plan for their long term needs. Almost three-quarters of the members 
who invested under CPFIS from 1993 to 2004 would have been better off 
leaving their savings with the Board. In particular, those who invested in 
unit trusts and investment-linked products (ILPs) have generally received 
mediocre returns. One important reason why CPFIS returns have been 
mediocre is the high cost of investing. For example, the annual cost to 
investors in a retail unit trust in Singapore is typically double that of the US. 
This is because the market is fragmented, many of the unit trusts and ILPs 
are small, and the overheads and fees are high.” (CPF 2005f). 
 
 [Table 1.8 here] 
 To explore the range of charges levied under the CPF investment schemes, we 
assembled Table 1.9 from the CPF Board’s website, which presents a rather bewildering 
array of fees for different investments and a wide diversity of front end commissions, 
back end loads, and annual service charges. For instance, the holder of a unit trust may 
pay sales charges, transaction fees, service charges, annual fund operations fees, 
performance fees, and sometimes redemption charges. Purchasers of investment-linked 
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insurance products also pay transaction and service fees as well as sales charges, 
expense ratios, performance fees, and redemption charges. Compared to the US 
institutional market, there would appear to be far more diversity and complexity in the 
Singapore case (Mitchell 1998).   
 [Table 1.9 here] 
 As these may be perplexing to many participants, we next turn to an evaluation 
of how such costs can impact the return of retirement savings for a typical CPF-IS unit 
trust investor over different time horizons.  Our strategy is to isolate the impact of costs 
from returns, allowing us to compute the rate of return that an investor requires so as to 
‘cost-recover’ the expenses over different time horizons.  Accordingly, in what follows, 
we develop a “hurdle rate” notion which asks what the investor’s net return would have 
to be, after costs, so the investor would do better than simply defaulting his money into 
the government-run fund. Specifically, we simulate the effect of transaction costs on an 
investment of $1 held for 1 year (short term), 5 years (medium term), and 10-20 years 
(long-term), after subtracting cost components of the unit trust investments. In the 
simulation, we assume that the prices of unit trusts remain unchanged so the change in 
the fund position reflects solely cost impacts; we also assume that management fee and 
other annual operating costs are fixed at the current average rates relevant to the four 
fund types appearing in Table 1.10: equity, balanced, income and money market funds 
(based on Mercer’s risk classification system). 17  Average costs by fund types are 
                                                            
17 Different unit trusts may have different investment objectives, different styles of management and 
different levels of equity risk depending on their portfolio allocation.  This is recognized by Mercer 
Investment Consulting, CPF Board’s consultant, which has developed a risk classification system for the 
CPFIS that assigns various risk levels to permitted investments. The unit trust or ILP with a greater 
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presented in Table 1.10 from a sample of 235 unit trusts representing 97% of the CPFIS 
unit trust universe (as of 30 June 2006). 
 [Table 1.10 here] 
 These average transaction costs by fund type are applied to a $1 investment held 
for various time periods assuming the fund earns a zero rate of return.18 For year 1, we 
apply both the one-off sales load and annual operating costs, where the sales load 
comprises both front-end and back-end sales charges, while operating costs include fees 
for management, custodian, trustee, administration, and other major fees paid by the 
unit trust out of the fund’s net asset value; the performance fee is excluded.19 Thereafter 
annual charges are subtracted as relevant. Table 1.11 (Panel A) summarizes the results, 
where we see that the $1 investment steadily eroded by annual operating costs assuming 
zero returns. For the 10-year holding period, the $1 invested in the average equity fund 
would be predicted to shrink to $0.772, sliding further to $0.626 by Year 20. Expenses 
are lower for income funds: the same $1 invested there would be worth $0.874 in Year 
10 and $0.781 by Year 20. Using these results, we next compute the annual rate of 
return required for the investor to ‘cost-recover’ for each fund type, which appear in 
Table 1.11 (Panel B).  Not surprisingly, a longer holding period is beneficial in that a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
proportion of its assets invested in the more volatile stock market will have a higher equity risk. Based on 
its level of equity risk, a unit trust or Investment Linked Product is assigned one of the four risk 
categories. 
18 Of course investors may consider both fund performance and costs simultaneously, though doing so 
may be distortive since fund performance is uncertain and fluctuates widely, while transaction costs can 
be estimated with a fair amount of certainty. 
19  These are estimated using the total expense ratio publicly reported by Investment Management 
Association of Singapore (IMAS). Expense ratios are supposed to be calculated according to IMAS 
guidelines (see IMAS 2005), and they are furnished by fund management companies and insurers and 
made available to the public through the quarterly Performance and Risk Monitoring Reports for CPFIS-
included funds published by Standard & Poor / CPF and found on IMAS website. 
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lower rate of return is needed to ‘cost-recover.’ This is mainly because the one-off sales 
loads are spread over a longer period.  
 [Table 1.11 here] 
 To complete the picture, we then compute the minimum hurdle rate of return 
that a fund must generate if it is to beat the guaranteed returns attainable by leaving 
one’s money in the government-managed account, currently, 2.5% and 4% for OA and 
SA monies, respectively. Results for CPFIS unit trusts are provided in Table 1.11 (Panel 
C), where over a 1-year period, the OA hurdle rate ranges from 3.3% for money market 
funds, to 9.4% for equity funds.  Over a 20-year period they range from 3.2% for the 
money market funds to 4.8% for equity funds. For SA account holders over the same 1-
year period, the hurdle rate is 4.8% for money market funds and 10.9% for equity funds. 
Over a 20-year time frame, it is 4.7% for money market and 6.3% for equity funds. 
Such high threshold returns may rationalize why so many CPF accountholders leave 
their investible funds in the default OA and SA accounts. 
 
1.4 Lowering Costs for CPFIS Investors 
 In recent years, steps have been taken to better inform members about 
investment options and expense ratios. For instance, the Investment Management 
Association of Singapore (IMAS) recently published standardized cost formulae across 
funds (www.fundsingapore.com). Nevertheless CPF members must still factor in 
additional investment costs not commonly wrapped into expense ratios, including back- 
and/or front-end loads, annual asset-based and fixed charges, and wrap fees; these have 
yet to be collated into an easy-to-understand format.   
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 In late 2005, the CPF Board announced several requirements for funds seeking 
to be newly included in the CPFIS menu; one change was such funds would be required 
to meet a higher relative performance standard than previously required, such that the 
fund had to have a minimum of a 3-year performance record that could not fall below 
the top 25 percentile of funds in a global peer group.20 As this standard exceeds the 
older benchmark of top 50 percentile, it is likely to represent an improvement over past 
practice. Nevertheless, some degree of subjectivity remains as the evaluators take into 
account the fund managers’ capabilities, the fund’s investment philosophy, the quality 
of the fund’s research and analysis; and the way the fund constructs and implements its 
portfolio. Furthermore, funds already on the CPFIS permitted list are not held to these 
new standards. A second change adopted by the Board in late 2005 was the explicit 
introduction of expense ratio targets for the first time. The expectation is that: “[t]he 
CPF Board will therefore …(induce) lower cost ratios, enhance transparency to help 
members make informed choices, and encourage consolidation among the funds to 
achieve greater economies of scale.”21 Specifically, any new fund must have an expense 
ratio below the median of existing CPFIS funds in its risk category. In practice this 
implies that so-called ‘higher risk’ funds investing mainly in equities will be held to a 
cap of 1.95 percent of assets per year; ‘medium to high’ risk funds holding both equities 
and bonds must charge less than 1.75 percent of assets; ‘low to medium’ risk funds 
investing in bonds or fixed income must charge less than 1.15 percent pa; and ‘lower 
risk’ funds (money market funds) cannot exceed an annual expense ratio of 0.65 percent 
                                                            
20 See CPF (2005d), though it is not easy to determine which specific funds constitute each global peer 
group by asset class/strategy. 
21 Source: CPF (2005f). 
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(CPF 2005d). While a full-scale comparison of these expense ratios with international 
charges is beyond the purview of this paper, it is clear that the CPF costs are still not on 
the low side. For instance, a recent review of US fund expenses found that the asset-
weighted average expense ratio for stock funds was 1.13 percent, and for bond funds at 
0.9 percent in 2005 (ICI, 2006) – and these figures include a pro-rata share of front-end 
loads. Furthermore, most US investors held their money in lower-cost funds. 
Consequently, adopting an expense target as in Singapore is a positive step, though 
focusing on the median fund charge in Singapore, exclusive of front end loads, may still 
produce costs that are high by developed-country standards.  
 The issue of fees and charges remains one of national concern, as evidenced by 
a recent CPF Board statement that in the future, front load charges will be capped at 3 
percent (as of 7/1/07) in addition to the already announced expense ratio caps (from 
1/1/08) (CPF 2006a). This is a significant reduction from the 5 percent front load often 
charged by CPFIS funds in the past, and these changes represent positive steps to bring 
the cost of CPF Investment Scheme nearer to developed country standards. 
 
1.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 Singapore has one of the world’s lowest fertility rates (at around 1.2 per 
1,000),22 and longest life expectancies (over age 80 at birth),23 so this nation is aging 
quickly. Indeed, in the next two decades, it will overtake all but Japan in its fraction of 
population elderly. Accordingly, it is valuable to assess how the Singaporean Central 
                                                            
22 The Singapore fertility rate in 2000 was reported as 1.2 by the US Census Bureau (www.census.gov).  
Singaporean sources place it a little higher, at around 1.6, but declining (SDOS 2006).    
23 See for instance, Clark (1999).  
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Provident Fund (CPF) might become more effective in building retiree wealth.  Thus far, 
it appears that the bulk of workers’ saving (44%) has gone to purchase homes, leading 
to an asset rich, cash poor phenomenon (McCarthy et al. 2002).  We have also shown 
that contributors tend to default their remaining saving to the CPF government-managed 
investment pool. The few participants who elect outside investment products tend to be 
high-income males, rather than lower paid workers and women.  High expenses and 
fees, as well as inertia, rationalize why few CPF account holders invest outside the 
default government investment pool. 
 More attention could be devoted to lowering fund expenses and commissions in 
the CPFIS system. It would be useful to aggregate the myriad of data on fees, expenses, 
loads, wrap fees, and other charges as they are dispersed across numerous websites and 
expressed in different terms depending on the specific product in question.  It could be 
helpful for the CPF to develop a single easy-to-use web calculator making these 
comparisons simpler. For instance, a drop list could illustrate for each fund the 
component costs over a range of holding periods. It would be useful to show itemized 
costs well as an all-in annualized cost, for the various products projected over various 
periods (e.g. 1, 5, 10, 20 years).  
 It might also be beneficial to streamline and rationalize the investment menu 
offered to participants.  Currently more than 400 funds are offered to CPF investors, but 
this list includes few index-linked funds, ETFs, or life-cycle funds, and no inflation 
protected instruments are currently on offer. 24  Furthermore, while new funds are 
                                                            
24  It would also be of interest to offer inflation-indexed bonds, as these make good sense for the 
retirement decumulation phase (Brown et al. 2000). 
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screened for cost efficiency, more stringent criteria might be adopted to screen out 
under-performing existing funds at regular intervals.  
 It might be useful to consider consolidating participants’ investments to bring 
about more competition to drive down costs.  One interesting development in this 
context is the advent of low-cost Life Cycle funds which might be adopted as the 
“default” investment mix for otherwise naïve or underconfident investors. Employees 
could then be automatically defaulted into a balanced fund based on their age, unless 
they actively select some other investment portfolio. In Chile, for instance, pension 
managers offer up to five funds, ranging from “Fund A” which holds 80% of the 
portfolio in equities, to “Fund E” which holds 100% fixed income; “Funds B-D” hold 
intermediate percentages in equities.  Active workers may elect up to two funds at a 
time offered by a single money manager, and they will be automatically transitioned to 
more conservative portfolios as they age, unless they elect otherwise (Arenas de Mesa 
et al. forthcoming). A low-cost Life Cycle approach might be useful in the Singaporean 
case, in view of many affiliates’ inertia regarding investment choices.  
 It could also be useful and important to educate CPF investors regarding capital 
market risk and return, as the government seeks to streamline the range of investment 
choices and bring down expenses.  The US experience with investment education 
suggests that even relatively well-educated subjects can have a hard time understanding 
and acting on information regarding mutual fund charges (Choi et al. 2005; Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2006).  To the extent that individual investors are poorly equipped to make 
investment choices in their retirement accounts, this will place greater burden on 
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policymakers’ shoulders to fashion the best possible environment for strengthening 
retirement security. 
 Finally, policymakers may seek to restrain the amount of retirement saving 
going into property purchases so that CPF participants have sufficient funds to finance 
their retirement years. An alternative may be for the financial sector to spur the growth 
of reverse mortgages permitting homes to be pledged to financial institutions, in return 
for a retirement annuity; this is made complex by the fact that most (85%) homeowners 
purchase housing development flats (public housing) on leasehold from the government. 
Another option might be to allow homeowners to freely rent out their apartments for 
income; while steps are being taken in this direction, numerous restrictions remain on 
the use of these apartments, including rental. Removing these restrictions may alleviate 
the asset rich, cash poor syndrome. 
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Table 1.1:  Annual Earnings Ceiling for CPF Contributions 
 
Year Salary Ceiling 
2006 $4,500  
2005 $5,000  
2004 $5,500  
2003 $6,000  
2002 $6,000  
2001 $6,000  
2000 $6,000  
1999 $6,000  
1998 $6,000  
1997 $6,000  
Source: CPF Annual Reports, various years (http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/cpf/about-us/ann-rpt/ann_rep 
ort.htm). 
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Table 1.2: Contribution Rates to CPF Ordinary and Special Accounts over 
Time: % of Covered Earnings (workers age 35-45)  
 
 
Notes: 
° Single pooled account 
* Maximum contribution increased from $450 to $600 per month 
** Maximum contribution increased from $2,500 to $3,000 per month 
Source: CPF Annual Report 2005 and http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Con-Rates/ 
ContriRa.htm. 
 
 
 
  
As of 
Ordinary   
Account (OA) 
Special  Account 
(SA) 
OA + SA 
Together 
 Jul-55 ° 10 0 10 
 Sep-68 ° 13 0 13 
 Jan-70 ° 16 0 16 
 Jan-71 °   20 0 20 
 Jul-72 °   24 0 24 
 Jul-73 °  26 0 26 
 Jul-74 °  30 0 30 
 Jul-75 ° * 30 0 30 
 Jul-77   30 1 31 
 Jul-78   30 3 33 
 Jul-79   30 7 37 
 Jul-80   32 6.5 38.5 
 Jul-81   38.5 4 42.5 
 Jul-82   40 5 45 
 Jul-83   40 6 46 
 Jul-84   40 4 44 
 Jul-85 **  40 4 44 
 Apr-86   29 0 29 
 Jul-88   30 0 30 
 Jul-89   30 2 32 
 Jul-90   30 3.5 33.5 
 Jul-91   30 4 34 
 Jul-92   29 4 33 
 Jul-93   29 4 33 
 Jul-94   29 4 33 
 Jan-99 23 0 23 
 Apr-00 23 2 25 
 Jan-01 23 6 29 
 Oct-03 20 6 26 
 Jan-05 20 6 26 
 Jan-06 20 6 26 
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Table 1.3: Contributions and Balances in the CPF  
 
A. Member CPF Annual Contributions and Year-End Account Balances Through Time 
(S$ Billions) 
 
Year Contributions ($B)  Account Balances ($B) 
1993 10.4 52.3 
1994  11.3 57.6 
1995  13.5 66.0 
1996 14.6 72.6 
1997  15.9 79.7 
1998 16.0 85.3 
1999  12.8 88.4 
2000 14.1 90.3 
2001 18.3 92.2 
2002 16.2 96.4 
2003 15.9 103.5 
2004 15.3 111.9 
2005 16.1 119.8 
Source: CPF Annual Report, 2005. 
 
 
B.  Member Balances by Account: 2005 
 
 S$B % 
 Ordinary Account $58.6 49% 
 Special Account $20.1 17% 
 Medisave Account $34.8 29% 
 Retirement Account & Others $6.4 5% 
Total Members’ Balance $119.8 100% 
Source: CPF (2005a). 
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Table 1.4:  CPF Interest Rates over Time 
 
A.  CPF Interest Rate Paid on All Accounts: 1955-1995 
 
Year Interest Rate Per 
Annum (%) 
Year Interest Rate Per 
Annum (%) 
1955 – 1962 2.5 Jan-Jun 1989 3.1 
1963 5 Jul-Dec 1989 3.39 
1964 – 1966 5.25 Jan-Jun 1990 3.77 
1967 – 1969 5.5 Jul-Dec 1990 3.88 
1970 – 1973 5.75 Jan-Jun 1991 4.85 
1974 – Feb 1986 6.5 Jul-Dec 1991 4.54 
Mar-Jun 1986 5.78 Jan-Jun 1992 4.59 
Jul-Dec 1986 5.38 Jul-Dec 1992 3.31 
Jan-Jun 1987 4.34 Jan-Jun 1993 2.62 
Jul 1987 – Dec 1987 3.31 Jul 1993 – Dec 1994 2.5 
Jan-Jun 1988 3.19 Jan-Jun 1995 3.1 
Jul-Dec 1988 2.96   
    
 
 
B. Higher CPF Interest Rates Paid Mid-1995 onwards for Special, Retirement, and 
Medisave Accounts  
 
Year Interest Rate Per Annum (%) 
From 1 July 1995 Ordinary and 
Medisave Accounts 
 Special and 
Retirement Accounts 
Jul-Dec 1995 3.82 5.07 
Jan-Jun 1996 3.52 4.77 
Jul 1996 – Jun 1998 3.48 4.73 
Jul-Dec 1998 4.29 5.79 
Jan-Jun 1999 4.41 5.91 
Jul 1999 – Sep 2001 2.5 4 
From 1 October 2001 Ordinary 
Account 
 Medisave, Special and 
Retirement Accounts 
Oct 2001 – Dec 2006 2.5 4 
Notes: 
1. The Special Account, Medisave Account and Retirement Account were introduced in July 1977, April 1984, and 
January 1987 respectively. 
2. From 1955 to 1976, CPF interests were credited and compounded annually. 
3. From 1977 to 1985, CPF interests were credited quarterly and compounded annually. 
4. From 1986 to present, CPF interests are computed monthly and compounded and credited annually. 
5. From 1 July 1999, CPF interests are reviewed quarterly. 
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Int-Rates/Int-Rates_Arc.asp 
 
25 
 
Table 1.5: Financial Instruments Available for Investment in the CPF Ordinary 
and Special Accounts 
 
CPFIS-OA CPFIS-SA 
Full Ordinary Account savings can be invested in: 
Fixed Deposits 
Singapore Government Bonds 
Statutory Board Bonds 
Bonds Guaranteed by Singapore Government 
Annuities 
Endowment Insurance Policies 
Investment-linked Insurance Products 
Unit Trusts 
Exchange Traded Funds 
Fund Management Accounts 
Full Special Account savings can be 
invested in: 
Fixed Deposits 
Singapore Government Bonds 
Statutory Board Bonds (Secondary 
Market only) 
Bonds Guaranteed by Singapore 
Government 
Annuities 
Endowment Insurance Policies 
Selected Investment-Linked 
Insurance Products* 
Up to 35% of investible savings# can be invested in: 
Shares 
Property Funds (or real estate investment trusts) 
Corporate Bonds 
Selected Unit Trusts* 
Selected Exchange Traded Funds* 
  
Up to 10% of investible savings# can be invested in:   
Gold (currently only UOB offers new gold 
investments)   
Notes: 
# Investible savings refer to the net Ordinary Account balance after withdrawals for education and 
investment. 
* Those found in the lowest three tiers of the CPFIS Risk Classification System Table unless otherwise 
stated. The risk classification tables for unit trusts, investment-linked insurance products and exchange 
traded funds can be found at www.cpf.gov.sg/cpf_info/Benefits/Asset/Assetenh.asp. 
Annuities, endowment insurance policies, investment-linked insurance products must be offered by 
insurance companies included under CPFIS.  For endowment policies, maturity date must not be later 
than the member's 62nd birthday. Unit trusts and investment-linked insurance products must be managed 
by Fund Management Companies included under CPFIS.  Fund managers are required to invest according 
to the Investment Guidelines set by CPF Board. Exchange traded funds must meet guidelines set by CPF 
Board and be listed on the Singapore Exchange-Securities Trading. Fund managers of fund management 
accounts are required to invest according to the Investment Guidelines set by CPF Board. Shares of 
Companies, Units of Property Funds or Property Trusts and Corporate Bonds (CPFIS-OA only) must be 
offered by companies incorporated in Singapore.  Also, they must be fully paid ordinary or preference 
shares or corporate bonds listed on the Singapore Exchange-Securities Trading (SGX-ST). 
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV.htm 
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Table 1.6: Service and Product Providers Included Under the CPFIS  
 
Other Companies  Fund Management Companies 
Fixed Deposit Banks:  
1. DBS Bank Ltd 
2. Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
Ltd 
3. United Overseas Bank Ltd 
 1. Aberdeen Asset Management Asia Ltd 
2. ABN AMRO Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd 
3. AIG Global Investment Corporation (Singapore) 
Ltd 
4.  Alliance Capital Management (Singapore) Ltd 
5. Allianz Global Investors Singapore Limited 
6. APS Asset Management Pte Ltd 
7. AXA Rosenberg Investment Mgmt Asia Pacific 
Ltd 
8. Capital International Research & Management 
Inc 
9. Commerzbank Asset Management Asia Ltd   
10. Credit Agricole Asset Management Singapore 
Ltd 
11. DBS Asset Management Ltd2 
12. Deutsche Asset Management (Asia) Ltd 
13. Fidelity Investments (Singapore) Limited 
14. First State Investments (Singapore)2 
15. Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
16. Henderson Global Investors (Singapore) Ltd 
17. HSBC Investments (Singapore) Ltd2 
18. ING Investment Mgmt Asia Pacific (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd 
19. INVESCO Asset Management Singapore Ltd 
20. Legg Mason Asset Management (Asia) Pte Ltd 
21. Lion Capital Management Ltd 
22. NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd1 
23. Prudential Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd 
24. Schroder Investment Management (Singapore) 
Ltd2 
25. SG Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd 
26. State Street Global Advisors Singapore Ltd 
27. Templeton Asset Management Ltd 
28. UBS Global Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd  
29. UOB Asset Management Ltd2 
 
  
Insurance Companies: 
1. American International Assurance Co Ltd 
2. Asia Life Assurance Society Ltd 
3. Aviva Ltd 
4. AXA Life Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd 
5. Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd 
6. HSBC Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
7. Manulife (Singapore) Pte Ltd   
8. NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative 
Ltd 
9. Overseas Assurance Corporation Ltd 
10. Prudential Assurance Co Singapore Pte 
Ltd 
11. UOB Life Assurance Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Investment Administrators: 
1. dollarDEX Investments Pte Ltd 
2. iFAST Financial Pte Ltd 
3. Navigator Investment Services Ltd 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
Notes: 
1. Can only manage investment-linked insurance sub-funds under CPFIS unlike the rest of the FMCs 
which can manage unit trusts, ILP funds/ sub-funds, exchange traded funds and fund management 
accounts under CPFIS. 
2. FMCs which offer Fund Management Account services. 
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV-Asset-Enhance.htm.   
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Table 1.7: Cumulative Use of CPF Funds as of End 2005  
 
Fund Balances and Total Withdrawals Amount (S$B)  
Fund Balance: 119.78
OA 58.57 
SA 20.05 
Medisave  34.76 
Retirement & Others 6.40 
  
Education Scheme Withdrawal 0.50
 
Investment Schemes Withdrawal 27.90
CPFIS-OA 22.91 
CPFIS-SA 4.99 
  
Special Discounted Shares Scheme 1.92
  
Property Scheme withdrawal  
(public, residential & non-residential properties 
schemes) 
117.38
Note: Net amount withdrawn under Medishield, Medisave, Home Protection, Dependent Protection, 
Minimum Sum, Section 15 & 25 withdrawals not included. 
Source: Data kindly provided by the CPF Board. 
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Table 1.8:  Realized Profits/Losses for Investments Held Under the CPFIS 
Ordinary Account (FY04-06) 
 
 FY 2006 FY 2005 FY 2004 3-year  
 1 Oct 05 - 
30 Sept 06 
1 Oct 04 - 
30 Sept 05 
1 Oct 03 - 
30 Sept 04 
average 
Members who made net realized profits 
in excess of the OA interest rate of 2.5% 180,000 147,000 128,000 
% 23% 19% 17% 20%
  
Members who made realized profits, 
but equal to or less than OA rate 257,000 250,000 240,000 
%  32% 33% 33% 33%
  
Members who made realized losses 362,000 363,000 370,000 
% 45% 48% 50% 48%
Note: Constructed from CPFIS Profits/ Losses for the Financial Year ended 31 September 2005 & 2006. 
Source: CPF (2005c) and mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/D324F161-1F6A-4699-A6BA-C5ACA0E11C 
5F/0/IE_re portpl.pdf. 
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Table 1.9: Charges Incurred for Investments under the CPFIS 
 
Type of Investments Agent Bank's Charges (under CPFIS-OA) 
Other Charges1 
(under CPFIS-OA & CPFIS-SA) 
   
Fixed Deposit (FD) Transaction Fee 
$2/FD placement/refund of 
proceeds upon FD maturity or 
termination 
Service Charge 
$2/FD/quarter, min. charge 
between $2-5. 
Other Charges 
NA 
Shares, Bonds (incl. 
Statutory Board 
Bonds) & Listed 
Property Trusts/ 
Funds traded on 
SGX 
Transaction Fee 
$2-$2.50 per lot, max of $20-$25/ 
transaction 
Service Charge 
$2/counter/quarter, w. min. charge 
between $2-5. 
Broker's commission2 
0.4-0.5% of trade contract value, 
subject to min of $40/trade 
Central Depository (Pte) Ltd’s fees 
1) Clearing fee of 0.05% on trade 
contract value, subject to max of 
$200. 2) $0.50/transaction 
Singapore 
Government Bonds 
& Statutory Board 
Bonds traded 
through bond-
dealers 
Transaction Fee 
$2-$2.50/lot, max of $20-$25/ 
transaction  
Service Charge 
$2/counter/quarter, w. min. charge 
$2-5. 
Bond-Dealer's Charges 
$0-50 per transaction 
Investment-linked 
Insurance Products 
Transaction Fee 
Between $2-$2.50/transaction. 
Service Charge 
$2/policy/quarter, w. min. charge 
$2-5. 
Sales Charge 
Between 0-5% (reflected in bid-offer 
spread3) and 1- 5.75% of premium 
paid and/or $0-$150/ single premium 
policy 
Expense Ratio4 
0.3-4.4% of NAV5 
Redemption Charge  
0-7% of NAV and/or $0-$42.75. 
Annual Performance Fees  
0-20% of excess returns over 
benchmark for underlying fund.  
Insurance Administration /Coverage 
Charges                 
$0-5/month per policy. 
Surrender Charges  
0-4% of the surrender value.  
Endowment Policies  
and Annuities (Single 
Premium Type) 
Transaction Fee  
$2-$2.50/transaction. 
Service Charge  
$2/policy/quarter, min. charge of 
$2-5. 
Total Distribution Cost (TDC)6  
1-6.2% of Single Premium 
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Type of Investments Agent Bank's Charges (under CPFIS-OA) 
Other Charges1 
(under CPFIS-OA & CPFIS-SA) 
   
Unit Trusts7 Transaction Fee 
$2-2.50/lot, max of $20-25/ 
transaction. 
Service Charge 
$2/unit trust fund/quarter, min. 
charge between $2-5. 
 
 
Sales Charge 
0-5% (reflected in the bid offer 
spread) of initial amount invested.  
Expense Ratio8  
0-7.1% of NAV  
Redemption Charge  
0-6% of NAV 
Annual Performance Fees 
0-30% of excess returns over 
benchmark for unit trust 
Notes: 
1These charges are estimates only and may not be exhaustive. CPF members are advised to check with the product 
providers on the full range of charges payable. Charges also exclude GST, unless otherwise stated. 
2Broking fees are fully liberalized now and the charges depend on the broking houses. The broker's commission 
mentioned is the range that majority of the broking houses are charging. 
3Bid-offer spread is the difference between the price at which the product is offered for sale ("offer") and the price at 
which the product provider will redeem the product ("bid") 
4Includes Annual Management Fees which range from 0.10% to 1.85% of NAV 
5Net Asset Value (NAV) is the total market value of the securities in a fund's portfolio divided by the number of units 
currently outstanding 
6Total Distribution Cost (TDC) refers to the total costs that an insurance company is expected to incur and includes 
commissions and cost of benefits and services paid to the distribution channel 
7Generally, online fund distributors charge lower front-end fees than brick-and-mortar distributors like banks and 
brokerages. 
8Includes Annual Management Fees which may range from 0% to 3% of NAV. 
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV.htm. 
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Table 1.10: Sales Loads and Expense Ratios for CPFIS Unit Trusts 
 
Risk category Type of fund # Funds Average sales load 
Average 
expense ratios 
Higher risk Equity 167 4.9% 2.07% 
Medium-high risk Balanced 26 4.8% 1.93% 
Low-medium risk Income 39 2.1% 1.12% 
Lower risk Cash 3 0.1% 0.71% 
Total N Funds  235  
Note: The sales load comprises both front-end and back-end sales charges. Annual operating costs 
comprise fees for management, custodian, trustee, administration, and other major fees paid by the unit 
trust out of the fund’s net asset value, and is estimated using the total expense ratio publicly reported by 
Investment Management Association of Singapore under its Fund Information Service website 
(www.fundsingapore.com). 
Source: Authors' computations using fund prospectuses and IMAS-reported expense ratios as at 30 Jun 
2006. 
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Table 1.11:  Simulation Study of Impact of Fund Expenses by Fund Type for 
Alternative Holding Periods 
 
A.  Fraction of Value Remaining After Expenses Assuming Zero Investment Return, by Fund 
Type and Holding Period  
 
Fund type Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20
Equity 0.931 0.857 0.772 0.626
Balanced 0.934 0.864 0.784 0.645
Income 0.968 0.925 0.874 0.781
Money market 0.992 0.964 0.930 0.866
 
B.  Percentage of $1 Investment Eroded by Expenses Assuming Zero Investment Return, by 
Fund Type and Holding Period (%) 
 
Fund type Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20
Equity -6.9% -3.0% -2.6% -2.3%
Balanced -6.6% -2.9% -2.4% -2.2%
Income -3.2% -1.5% -1.3% -1.2%
Money market -0.8% -0.7% -0.7% -0.7%
 
C. Minimum Investment Return (Hurdle Rate) Required to Beat CPF Default Interest Rate on 
Ordinary Account (OA) and Special Account (SA), by Fund Type and Holding Period 
 
Fund type 
Hurdle rates for OA Hurdle rates for SA 
Year 1 5 10 20 1 5 10 20
Equity 9.4% 5.5% 5.1% 4.8% 10.9% 7.0% 6.6% 6.3%
Balanced 9.1% 5.4% 4.9% 4.7% 10.6% 6.9% 6.4% 6.2%
Income 5.7% 4.0% 3.8% 3.7% 7.2% 5.5% 5.3% 5.2%
Money market 3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7%
Notes: This simulation study assumes that the prices of unit trusts remain unchanged so the change in the 
fund position solely reflects cost impacts on a $1 investment over 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, and 20 years. 
Costs include the one-off sales load and the annual operating costs for each of the four fund types as 
presented in Table 1.10. The sales load comprises both front-end and back-end sales charges. Annual 
operating costs comprise fees for management, custodian, trustee, administration, and other major fees 
paid by the unit trust out of the fund's net asset value, and is estimated using the total expense ratio 
publicly reported by Investment Management Association of Singapore (IMAS) under its Fund 
Information Service website (www.fundsingapore.com). The performance fee is excluded from the total 
expense ratio. 
Source: Authors' computations using fund prospectuses and CPF (2006). 
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Figure 1.1:  Central Provident Fund Overview  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Low and Aw (2004). 
CPF 
Members’ Individual  
Accounts 
Ordinary Account 
(OA) 
Special Account 
(SA) Medisave Account 
Retirement 
& others Account 
CPF Investment 
Scheme-OA 
Other purposes:  
• Education 
• Home Ownership 
• Family Protection 
CPF Investment 
Scheme-SA 
Other purposes: 
• Retirement 
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Figure 1.2: Contribution Shares to CPF OA and SA Accounts over Time: % of 
covered earnings (workers age 35 -45) 
 
 
 
Source: Table 1.2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
 J
ul
-5
5 
°
 J
an
-7
0 
°
 J
ul
-7
2 
°  
 J
ul
-7
4 
° 
 J
ul
-7
7 
 
 J
ul
-7
9 
 
 J
ul
-8
1 
 
 J
ul
-8
3 
 
 J
ul
-8
5 
**
 
 J
ul
-8
8 
 
 J
ul
-9
0 
 
 J
ul
-9
2 
 
 J
ul
-9
4 
 
 A
pr
-0
0
 O
ct
-0
3
 J
an
-0
6
 Ordinary Acct  Special Acct OA+SA
 
35 
 
Figure 1.3: Balances in Specified CPF Accounts 
 
 
 
Source: Table 1.7.  
Retirement & 
others Balance
5%
Medisave 
Balance
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SA Balance
17%
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Figure 1.4: Portion Invested and Balance Remaining in CPF Ordinary and Special 
Accounts 
 
A. Portion of Balance Remaining in OA Account vs. Portion Used for Investment 
   
B. Portion of Balance Remaining in SA Account vs. Portion Used for Investment 
 
 
Source: Table1.7 
OA Balance
29.45%
CPFIS-OA
11.52%
Property 
withdrawal
59.03%
SA Balance
80.07%
CPFIS-SA
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Figure 1.5: Cumulative Use of CPF Funds (OA and SA combined) 
 
 
 
 Source: Derived from Table 1.7. 
CPFIS-OA
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Figure 1.6: Allocation of Investments across CPFIS Accounts  
 
A. CPFIS Ordinary Account 
 
 
 
B.  CPFIS Special Account  
 
 
Note: For CPFIS Ordinary Account, “Others” include fixed deposits, bonds, ETFs, gold, property funds, 
and fund management accounts.  For CPFIS Special Account, “Others” include fixed deposits and bonds 
only. 
Source: CPF (2005c).   
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Figure 1.7: Investment Patterns in CPF Ordinary Accounts by Sex 
 
A. Men 
 
  
 
B. Women 
 
 
Note: “Others” include ETFs, gold, fixed deposits, bonds, and property funds. 
Source: Data kindly provided by CPF Board; values as of Sept 30, 2005. 
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Figure 1.8: Investment Patterns in CPF Ordinary Accounts by Age 
 
A. Young Adult (21 - 35 years) 
 
B. Middle Age (36 - 55 years) 
 
 
C. Mature (≥56 years) 
 
Notes: “Others” include ETFs, gold, fixed deposits, bonds, and property funds. 
Source: Data kindly provided by CPF Board; values are as of Sept 30, 2005. 
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Figure 1.9: Investment Patterns in CPF Ordinary Accounts by Risk Type and 
Income 
 
  
  
   
 
Note: Participants with positive income only are included. Risk level of insurance products cannot be 
evaluated. 
Source: Data kindly provided by CPF Board; values as of Sept 30, 2005. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Longevity Risk Management in Singapore’s National Pension System25 
 
While defined contribution (DC) pensions have enjoyed varying degrees of 
success during the accumulation phase, proponents of the DC model now confront the 
larger question of how participants will manage their capital throughout the payout 
phase so as not to run out of money in retirement.  Not surprisingly, governments have 
become involved in this decision, as in the case of Switzerland where annuitization is 
the default payout modality; given a choice, most retirees elect to annuitize (Bütler and 
Teppa 2007). The U.K. has a long history of annuitization for those holding private DC 
pension accounts, yet retirees have substantial leeway over how much to annuitize and 
when (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, 2004). And in Chile, workers have long been 
given a choice between phased withdrawal and annuitization when they claim their 
pensions (Mitchell and Ruiz 2010).   
In contrast to such flexibility over annuitization, the Central Provident Fund 
(CPF) of Singapore has recently announced that retirement assets held by its citizens in 
the national defined contribution plan must be mandatorily annuitized so as to better 
protect retirees against the possibility of outliving their wealth. At the same time, the 
government has decided to enter the insurance market as a provider for these annuities. 
This paper evaluates the money’s worth of privately-offered annuities prior to the 
                                                            
25 This chapter has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Risk and Insurance (John Wiley and 
Sons). See Fong, J.HY., O.S. Mitchell, and B.SK. Koh, 2011, Longevity Risk Management in 
Singapore’s National Pension System, Journal of Risk and Insurance, Forthcoming. 
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reform, discusses the impact of the government mandate, and assesses how the entry of 
the government as an annuity provider is shaping the nation’s insurance markets.  Our 
results are of interest for several reasons. First, the CPF is widely acknowledged as one 
of the world’s largest – and arguably most successful – defined contribution schemes. 
Accordingly it is valuable to see how this system is handling the challenges of a rapidly 
aging population. Second, we seek to determine whether market failure – i.e. low value-
for-money annuities – prompted the government to enter the insurance market as an 
annuity provider, and whether the new government-offered annuities will provide 
greater value to retirees.  
We show that competitively-priced life annuities were offered by private 
insurers in Singapore prior to the reform, with money’s worth ratios in the 0.88-1.05 
range for males – on par with those in many other countries.  Moreover, adverse 
selection costs were reasonable, on the order of 3.3 to 5.6 percentage points. The new 
government-offered annuities are estimated to provide money’s worth ratios exceeding 
unity, benefitting annuitants on average but also implying that the annuity mandate will 
be expensive for the government if current pricing continues. 
These findings are relevant to the current debate about how to best deploy 
annuities to manage longevity risk, within the context of a defined contribution scheme. 
On the positive side, mandating annuitization can reduce loads and adverse selection 
and can help retirees better manage the risk of outliving their income, as detailed by 
Emms and Haberman (2008) and Horneff et al. (2008). Yet on the negative side, 
mandating can also pose challenges. For instance, making annuity purchase compulsory 
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produces utility losses for less risk-averse retirees.26 Also, if left to private annuity 
providers, market distortions can arise: for instance, in the U.K. Murthi, Orszag and 
Orszag (2000) describe falling annuity yields, high markups on annuities, and ‘mis-
selling’ incidents, which they attributed to a captive yet privately-run insurance market. 
By contrast, the Singaporean approach shows that a national government can both 
mandate and provide a risk-pooling scheme. Yet there are also risks in government 
provision, in that private insurers may be crowded out in the process. Indeed in 
Singapore, all but one of the eight private insurers stopped selling CPF-compliant 
annuities between 2007 and 2009. Whether this crowd-out effect is short-term or 
permanent remains an open question and an important one to address in future research. 
 
2.1 Background 
Established in 1955, the Central Provident Fund is the mainstay of Singapore’s 
old-age system. It is one of the world’s largest defined contribution schemes with about 
3.23 million members; the program also faces a rapidly aging population due to one of 
the world’s lowest fertility rates (1.29 per female) and longest life expectancies (80.6 
years at birth).27 The government of Singapore has recently introduced the concept of a 
national longevity insurance scheme to address the challenges of increasing life 
expectancy given population aging (CPF 2009a). As of 2013, annuitization, rather than 
the current phased withdrawal approach, will become the mandatory vehicle for a 
portion of CPF retirement saving under the auspices of the regulatory public agency 
                                                            
26 See for example, Mitchell et al. (1999) and Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2003). 
27 Figures for 2007 year-end from the Singapore Department of Statistics (SDOS 2008a).  
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known as the CPF Board. Under the CPF LIFE scheme, new annuity products began to 
be offered in September of 2009.  
Prior to this reform, the government had established the concept of a Minimum 
Sum (MS) which required participants at age 55 to set aside for retirement a specific 
dollar value of assets from their total CPF accumulations;28 excess accumulations could 
be withdrawn as a lump-sum.29 This Minimum Sum had to be preserved to age 65 
(previously 62) before any drawdowns were permitted, and the default decumulation 
option after that was a phased withdrawal scheme paying benefits over about 20 years 
(or until the balance was exhausted).  This framework exposed participants to 
significant longevity risk, since about half of all age-65 members would be expected to 
outlive their assets (CPF 2008). Those having the full Minimum Sum amount in cash 
could voluntarily buy a life annuity from private insurers, but this group was a small 
fraction of the total. Among the active members who turned 55 in 2008, only about one-
third had accumulated the required MS (CPF 2009b). And only one in six eligible to do 
so actually elected to buy an annuity from private insurers under the MS Scheme,30 
perhaps because the phased withdrawal payout of S$790 was higher compared to an 
average monthly annuity payment of S$520.31 Another reason might be costs; indeed 
                                                            
28 The required Minimum Sum is set by the CPF and increases each year.  It was S$80,000 in 2003, 
S$99,600 in 2007 and it is expected to be about S$134,000 in 2013 (CPF 2008 and 2009b).  
29 If a member’s total balance is higher than the Minimum Sum, any remaining balance can be withdrawn 
as a lump sum. If the total balance is less than the Minimum Sum, the following withdrawal rules 
currently apply to members who reach age 55 between 1/1/2010 and 6/30/2010:  if the balance ≤ $5,000 
one may withdraw everything; if $5,000 < total balance ≤ $16,667 one may withdraw $5,000 and set 
aside the remainder in the Retirement Account; and if $16,667 < total balance ≤ $167,143 one may 
withdraw 30% of the balance and set aside the remainder in the Retirement Account (CPF 2009c). 
30 See Fong et al. (2010). 
31 This applies to a member with the full Minimum Sum of $99,600 at age 55 (as of 2007) (CPF 2007). 
Under phased withdrawal, he could draw down his balance plus interest via monthly payouts of $790 and 
the flow would continue for 20 years at which point the balance is likely to be exhausted. 
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Prime Minister Lee suggested as much in stating that “frankly speaking, the returns 
have not been very attractive, (and) the costs have been high.” (SPMO 2007).  
In 2007, the Singapore Government convened a National Longevity Insurance 
Committee (NLIC) to study the feasibility of the national longevity insurance scheme. 
After extensive hearings and review, it concluded:  
“The operation of the scheme will involve significant mortality and 
investment risks over a very long time horizon….The committee notes the 
difficulties that some annuity providers abroad had run into when 
various risks were not properly managed. In some circumstances, 
provider risked insolvency as they were unable to meet liabilities... 
Members of the public have therefore expressed a preference of the CPF 
Board to administer the scheme due to the favorable CPF interest 
rates.…participants will need to have confidence in this national scheme 
to provide for their retirement, the operator must engender public trust 
and have strong administration capability.” (CPF 2008).  
 
In other words, the Committee argued that the government should offer annuities due to 
greater public trust and perhaps greater efficiency, and indeed it is possible that a 
government-run pooling scheme could benefit from better annuity pricing through 
economies of scale and lower administrative loads. Furthermore, if it could become the 
primary provider, it could pool sufficient annuitants such that the average mortality risk 
of the pool would decrease. Mitigating these advantages include concern about whether 
the public sector would have sufficient in-house expertise and might crowd out 
commercial insurers. In any event, in February 2008, the government mandated life 
annuities and also required the CPF Board to operate a national longevity insurance 
scheme that would “give Singaporeans confidence that the scheme will be properly 
administered” (CPF 2008). Personnel from the Ministry of Manpower and the CPF 
Board devoted almost two years to design the system, consulting industry professionals 
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in the process. The launch of the pilot program in September 2009 was accompanied by 
intensive public education through the media, road-shows, and pamphlets, and it 
generated substantial interest: since launch, over 30,000 members committed about 
S$1.5 billion to the CPF LIFE scheme (CPF 2010). 
In what follows, we assess whether unattractive annuity yields and high costs 
were, in fact, problematic in the Singaporean context and thus might rationalize 
government provision. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
A large literature focuses on measuring the money’s worth of annuities in 
Western countries. Consistent with that opus, we define the money’s worth ratio (MWR) 
of a payout annuity as the ratio of the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of 
annuity payments to the initial premium (Mitchell et al. 1999). Whereas a fairly priced 
annuity with no loadings will have a MWR of unity, in the real world, privately-sold 
annuities have MWRs of less than one due to administrative costs and adverse selection.  
Adverse selection occurs in a voluntary market since those who elect to purchase a 
payout annuity tend to live longer than those who do not; adverse selection raises prices 
for all those who do purchase. Adverse selection costs are computed as the difference 
between the MWRs using annuitant versus population survival tables (Mitchell et al. 
1999).  Many prior studies have used the MWR notion to measure value for money in a 
range of annuity products including constant and rising payout products, joint-and-
survivor annuities, and annuities with guarantee periods (cf. Mitchell et al. 1999; Brown 
et al. 2001; Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, 2004; Thorburn et al. 2005). 
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The annuities offered under the Singaporean CPF scheme are somewhat 
different from products on offer elsewhere, as they include a guaranteed amount if the 
death of the insured occurs in a specified time frame. Specifically, when the insured 
dies, the beneficiary receives the guaranteed amount of the single premium plus accrued 
interest (if any) less total amount of annuity payouts already made (if positive).32 The 
refund, which is a lump-sum payment to the beneficiary, provides an element of capital 
protection.33 Accordingly, the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of a nominal 
annuity with a guaranteed amount may be written as follows:  
EPDV ൌ 	෍ ݌௧ ௔ ∙ ݍ௔ା௧ ∙ ݒ௧ାଵ	ܩ௧ାଵ 	൅	෍൫ ݌௧ ௔ ∙ ݍ௔ା௧ ∙ ݒ௧ାଵ	ܩ௧ାଵ ൅ ݌t a· ݒ௧ܣa൯
ஶ
௧ୀ஽
,			(1a)
஽ିଵ
௧ୀ଴
 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	ܩ௧ାଵ ൌ max	ሼ0, ݌ݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉	 ൅ ܽܿܿݎݑ݁݀	݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	 െ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܽ݊݊ݑ݅ݐݕ	݌ܽݕ݋ݑݐݏ 
	ݎ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁݀	݌ݎ݅݋ݎ	ݐ݋	ݐ݅݉݁		ݐ ൅ 1ሽ. 
In Equation (1a), ܽ is the age at which the annuity is purchased, ݐ represents the number 
of months beyond the annuity start date, ܣ௔ refers to the fixed monthly nominal annuity 
payout for the individual purchasing the annuity at age	ܽ, ݒ௧ is the nominal discount 
rate at month ݐ based on a riskless term structure, and ݌௔௧  is the probability that an 
individual of age ܽ survives after ݐ	months. To account for the guarantee amount and 
the deferral period, we also define ܦ to be the deferred period (expressed in months), 
ܩ௧ାଵ is the death benefit at time ݐ ൅ 1, and ݌௔௧ ∙ ݍ௔ା௧ is the probability of an annuitant 
                                                            
32 Accrued interest is accumulated from age 55 when the premium is paid to the point where payouts start 
(at age 62 in 2007). Not all annuities incorporate the accrued interest component in the guaranteed 
amount on death.  Accrued interest ranges from 0% to 2.5% per annum in 2007; see Table 2.1. 
33 This is somewhat similar to the money-back annuities available in other countries. For example, value-
protected annuities that were introduced in the U.K. in 2006 feature partial money-back option where the 
lump-sum death benefits are permitted up to age 75, and are taxed (Boardman 2006).  
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age a surviving to ݐ months and then dying between month	ݐ and month	ݐ ൅ 1. The first 
term in Equation (1a) captures the guarantee amount to the beneficiary if the insured 
dies during the deferral period, while the second term reflects benefits paid to the 
insured if he lives to the point when payouts start. Alternatively, the formula can be 
more neatly presented per Equation (1b) where the first summation accounts for the 
death benefit arising from the money-back guarantee, and the second summation 
captures the annuity benefit over the lifetime of the individual: 
EPDV ൌ 	෍ ݌௧ ௔ ∙ ݍ௔ା௧ ∙ ݒ௧ାଵ	ܩ௧ାଵ 	൅	෍ ݌t a· ݒ௧ܣa	,																																							(1b)
ஶ
௧ୀ஽
	
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
To implement the EPDV valuation for Singapore, we use the newly released 
population mortality tables from Singapore Statistics (SDOS 2008b) having a limiting 
age of 100; we then cohortize the population tables (as cohort mortality tables are 
unavailable) using period life tables. Thus having a year 2007 period life table, we 
compute: 
ݍො௫ሺ2007 ൅ ݐሻ ൌ ݍ௫ሺ2007ሻ ൈ ሺߚ௫ሻ௧,																																																																										(2) 
where ݍ௫ሺ2007ሻ is the annual mortality rate for age x in year 2007, ݍො௫ሺ2007 ൅ ݐሻ is the 
estimated annual mortality rate for age ݔ  in year ሺ2007 ൅ ݐሻ, and ߚ௫  represents the 
estimated annual mortality improvements for an individual aged ݔ extrapolated from 
mortality changes between 1990 and 2005. As in previous studies, mortality 
improvement rates are projected from the abridged period population tables for 
Singapore published by the World Health Organization (various years).  
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Little is publicly known on actual annuitant mortality experience in Singapore. 
Insurance industry practice and previous research including Fong (2002) has adopted 
the UK annuitant mortality experience with adjustments for local conditions, similar to 
what is done in Australia. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) in its capacity 
as insurance regulator requires firms to employ the UK a(1990) Ultimate Tables rated 
down five years for reserves and liability valuations pertaining to annuities sold (MAS 
2008a).34 Accordingly, we use the a(1990) tables with a five-year setback to estimate 
the annuitant experience for our valuation year, and then we cohortize the resulting 
annuitant tables.35 We compute cumulative survival probabilities from the cohort tables 
as follows: 
݌௔ ൌ 	ෑ൫1 െ ݍ௔ା௝൯
௧ିଵ
௝ୀ଴
,																																																																																																		(3)௧  
where ݌௔௧ is the cumulative probability of a person aged ܽ surviving for ݐ years, and 
ݍ௔ା௝ is the probability of a person age ሺܽ ൅ ݆ሻ dying within the year. These cumulative 
survival probabilities are sex-specific and calculated on a monthly basis to match the 
frequency of the annuity payouts. In addition, we apply a uniform distribution of deaths 
(UDD) assumption to reflect mortality patterns in Singapore. We justify using UDD for 
fractional ages within a year due to the lack of variation in Singapore's weather (so 
                                                            
34 The Sixth Schedule of the Insurance Regulations 2004 stipulates that insurers may employ the rates in 
the UK a(90) tables with a five-year setback to value their annuity liabilities. Previously, Insurance 
Regulations 1992 required insurers to employ the a(1990) tables with a two-year setback. The a(1990) 
tables are constructed based on UK annuitants’ mortality experience from 1967-70 with mortality 
improvements projected to 1990.  By applying the 5-year setback, we effectively age the tables to Year 
2007 and then cohortize for the MWRs. 
35 As a robustness check, we verify that our calculations yield a lower mortality for annuitant cohort than 
the population cohort; for instance, a 65-year-old male in the general population has a mortality of 
0.01028 compared to 0.00933 for an annuitant.  
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death rates are unlikely to vary seasonally). 36  We match the limiting age of the 
population group with that of the annuitant group by extrapolating population mortality 
estimates to the common maximum age of 117 to properly capture the longevity tail risk 
in the population group.37 This improves comparability between the two groups by 
ensuring that a person drawn randomly from the population also has some probability of 
survival leading to annuity payouts even at the tail end, rather than being curtailed at 
100 years of age.  
Figure 2.1 compares the cumulative survival probabilities we derive for the 
general Singaporean population and for annuitants.  The Figure shows the probability 
that a 55-year old man (or woman) will survive to various ages given mortality rates for 
the population at large, as well as those for annuitants. Not surprisingly, the average 55-
year old annuitant has a higher survival probability at all ages, implying some adverse 
selection costs to be discussed below.38 
 [Figure 2.1 here] 
The EPDV calculation requires a term structure of interest rates; we judge the 
Singaporean Treasury bond rates as most appropriate since the MSS annuities are 
viewed as capital protected. Prices and yields of the Singapore Government Securities 
                                                            
36 Various actuarial assumptions could be used for fractional ages within a year, including a uniform 
distribution of deaths, a constant force of mortality, or a hyperbolic pattern (Bowers et al. 1997). Prior 
studies on MWR have not explicitly specified assumptions for fractional ages within a year (e.g. Doyle et 
al. 2004). For a plot of our values of ݌ହହ௧ ∙ ݍହହା௧  derived from the UDD assumption, see Appendix 
Figure 2.1.  
37 We use population period tables from Singapore Statistics. These tables had applied the Coale-Kisker 
method to project mortality at higher ages, using a separation factor of 0.5 (SDOS 2008b). Given qx for 
ages 85 -99, we back out the death rates (mx) and observe that the change in mx between each age interval 
is constant at about 9.3%. Extrapolating this constant graduation rate, we then derive the qx for ages 100 -
117.  
38 Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) attributed these mortality differences largely to socio-economic, or 
passive, selection effects. 
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Treasury bonds obtained from MAS (2008b) are used to compute the riskless spot rates 
to proxy the yields on hypothetical zero coupon bonds. 39  To obtain the full term 
structure, we then linearly interpolate between intervals where spot rates are unavailable, 
for instance between the 7- and 10-year spot rates.40   
 
2.3 Results: MWRs for Voluntary Private Annuities   
Prior to the mandatory annuity reform, plan participants with sufficient cash 
could voluntarily purchase a life annuity from 7-9 insurers participating in the market; 
the firms included some international players with Singaporean offices (e.g. AIA, 
Prudential, and HSBC Insurance), as well as several local insurers.41 This program 
promoted annuity purchase among CPF participants; Fong (2002) estimated that as at 
2000, about 87 percent of all Singapore annuitants had purchased their policies through 
this scheme. The annuity premium equaled the prevailing Minimum Sum for the year, 
and insurers were free to determine participant payouts and guarantee amounts. In 2007, 
for instance, in exchange for a lump-sum premium at age 55 of S$99,600, monthly 
annuity payouts beginning at age 62 varied as outlined in Table 2.1. The nine annuities 
on offer by eight commercial insurers were similar in that the standard deviation in 
                                                            
39 The first year rate is derived from the 1-year Treasury bill; thereafter, the 2, 5, 7, 10, 15 and 20-year 
Treasury bond rates as of 2007 are used to estimate the riskless spot rates. Our annual spot rate ranges 
from 1.4% to 3.44%. Since maximum duration available is only 20 years, we then extrapolate the last 
spot rate into the future, yielding a nominal riskless term structure of interest rates on Singapore’s 
Treasury bonds. 
40 See Appendix Table 2.1 for a list of key inputs compared to those used in two earlier money’s worth 
studies for annuities in Singapore. 
41 As at Dec 2007, three insurers accounted for almost 80% of the total market share for individual 
annuity policies, inclusive of annuity purchases using non-CPF pension saving (MAS 2007). In particular, 
a home-grown co-operative, NTUC Income, has long been the market leader with 58% market share and 
about 38,000 annuity policies in force as at end 2007. Great Eastern Life and UOB Life have 
approximately 11% market share each, higher than that of AIA (8.5%) and Prudential (1.6%).  
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payments was only about five percent. All annuities had fixed nominal payouts; two 
also promised a non-guaranteed annual bonus payment depending on the insurer’s 
performance. Level monthly payouts ranged from S$495-559 for males and S$441-514 
for females; the guaranteed amount upon death was at least the premium S$99,600 and 
several annuities paid interest of 0.5-2.5%.  
 [Table 2.1 here] 
Using these annuity quotes in Equation (1) generates the desired MWRs 
reported in Table 2.2. Here we see that, per premium dollar, the typical male annuitant 
would have anticipated receiving an average of $0.947 and the female $0.955 in 2007. 
It is also of interest that the NTUC Income co-operative offered the highest money’s 
worth ratios of 1.047 (males) and 1.081 (females); these exceeded the private insurer 
average by 10.5 and 13.1 percent, respectively.42  We measure the cost of adverse 
selection as the difference in the MWR using population versus annuitant tables.  Our 
values of 3.3–4.1 percentage points (or cents per $1 premium) for males and 4.2–5.6 for 
females are comparable to the U.K. figure of 4.6 reported by Finkelstein and Poterba 
(2002) but below the 6 and 10 percentage points found for Australia and U.S. 
respectively (Doyle et al. 2004; Mitchell at al. 1999).  In terms of proportion, we see 
from the Table that adverse selection costs accounted for about 47% of the total 
loadings, which is quite reasonable compared to other countries. For example, in the 
U.S., Brown et al. (2001) found that roughly half of the cost of purchasing a voluntary 
annuity could be attributed to adverse selection. 
                                                            
42 NTUC Income is a non-profit oriented co-operative for the Workers’ Union. This result is consistent 
with NTUC Income’s mission to return the majority of profits to policyholders (NTUC Income 2009). 
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 [Table 2.2 here] 
The reasonable adverse selection costs observed in the private annuity market in 
Singapore may be partly attributed to the unique characteristics of the MS Scheme 
annuities. For one thing, the premium guarantees contribute significantly to reducing 
adverse selection; indeed in results not reported here in detail, removing the embedded 
guarantee would increase adverse selection by 20-26 percent. Also important is the 
deferral period on these annuities (between ages 55 and the benefit-claiming age). 
Without this, adverse selection would have been higher by 9-13 percent.  In any case, 
the annuity marketplace prior to the most recent reform offered relatively competitively 
priced products, by world standards, with reasonable adverse selection costs.  
 
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
As noted earlier, annuitant mortality rates for Singapore are derived from UK 
annuitant tables, due to lack of annuitant experience in Singapore. To evaluate how 
sensitive our results are to variations in mortality, we modify the tables to allow life 
expectancy to vary by two years on either side of our base case annuitant estimates, 
dated from the year of purchase. The mortality of a 57-year-old then represents a +2-
year adjustment and the mortality of a 53-year-old represents a -2-year adjustment. 
Results in Table 2.3 (Panel A) show that lightening mortality by two years exacerbates 
adverse selection, while the opposite holds when mortality is made heavier. In addition, 
the adjustments make slightly more difference to the adverse selection results for males 
than females. We also explore sensitivity to interest rate variations. The Singapore 
government bonds were used to derive the riskless term structure. The spot rate on the 
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20-year bond (3.44%) was used as a proxy for the long-term interest rate for periods 
beyond 20 years. Sensitivity testing using 50 and 100 basis points around the central 
case shows that money’s worth values are sensitive to these changes, as Table 2.3 
(Panel B) indicates. In any event, our estimates of adverse selection remain robust. 
 [Table 2.3 here] 
 
2.5 Results: MWRs for Mandatory Annuities  
Under the new CPF LIFE scheme introduced in 2009, participants may either 
purchase a private annuity or select from a menu of government-offered annuity 
products called the CPF LIFE plans. Initially the intention was to provide a dozen 
different payout options outlined in 2008, but the menu was later pared back to four 
plans in 2009 after public feedback suggested that too much choice was confusing.  The 
final four are known as CPF LIFE Basic, LIFE Balanced, LIFE Plus, and LIFE Income. 
Table 2.4 presents illustrative payouts for the various LIFE plans as the government’s 
proposals evolved, for an annuity premium of half the estimated Minimum Sum or 
S$67,000 in 2013.43 For that premium, benefit payouts were initially set to be quite 
generous: in six of the 12 original plans proposed in early 2008, monthly payouts would 
have ranged from S$560-650 for males and S$540-590 for females. By September of 
2009, when the final LIFE plans were launched, promised monthly payouts had been 
adjusted downward to about S$524-636 for men and S$500-553 for women.  
 [Table 2.4 here] 
                                                            
43 By 2013, the prevailing Minimum Sum is expected to be about S$134,000 (S$99,600 in 2007). The 
CPF estimated that of the approximately 35,000 active members in the 2103 cohort of members turning 
age 55, about 60% will have at least S$67,000 in cash in their Retirement Accounts (CPF 2008). 
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Table 2.4 also shows the ‘annuity component’ expressed as a percentage of the 
annuity premium. That is, the CPF LIFE products split the premium paid into a term 
and an annuity component. The first covers payouts from age 65 to the vesting age 
which differs across the plans; any unused balance from the term component and 
interest from it is fully refundable to one’s heirs. The annuity component finances 
payouts from the vesting age to death with no funds passed on to the beneficiary. Thus 
the four finalized LIFE plans provide a range of trade-offs, balancing providing for 
oneself and leaving a bequest for one's beneficiaries. In practice, the transition from the 
term to the annuity component is purely procedural and does not affect monthly benefits 
to any CPF member in receipt, with the interest from the annuity component being non-
refundable to individual participants as it funds the CPF LIFE scheme. In other words, 
interest forfeited represents participants’ opportunity cost of joining the LIFE plan. This 
cost is factored into the money’s worth computations by means of a guaranteed amount 
Gt that falls as the retiree ages. While the LIFE Plus and LIFE Income plans both feature 
only an annuity component, the LIFE Plus product permits some bequest whereas LIFE 
Income allows none.44 A retiree who opts for the LIFE Income product received a 
higher monthly payout while alive, making the product most appealing to unmarried or 
childless individuals.  By comparison, the LIFE Basic plan provides for the highest 
bequest amount in exchange for the lowest monthly payouts by allocating most to the 
term component. The LIFE Balanced plan provides an intermediate mix.  
                                                            
44 The bequest on the LIFE Plus plan is the unused portions of the annuity component (which in this case 
is equal to the premium paid). Refund equals premium paid less annuity payouts already made. Members 
who join CPF LIFE may not withdraw unless they have medical grounds of shortened life expectancy, or 
if they are leaving Singapore and West Malaysia permanently with no intention of returning to either 
country. Members are also not allowed to change their LIFE plans after joining the scheme (CPF 2009d). 
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Since these annuities are being mandated, we generate money's worth values 
using Singapore population mortality tables. Results in Table 2.4 show that the 
government LIFE plans offer excellent value-for-money to annuitants. 45 For instance, 
using the riskless term structure with a long-term rate assumption of 3.44 percent, 
MWRs range from 1.24-1.31 for males and 1.26-1.34 for females. These values are far 
above those provided by the privately-provided life annuities where it will be recalled 
that mean MWRs were 0.947 for men and 0.955 for women (using annuitant mortality).  
It might be thought that the interest rate environment in Singapore is unusually low, so 
we recomputed the MWRs using a higher long-term rate of 4.44 percent (close to the 
yield of the longest-term 10-year bond in 1998); under these circumstances, the MWRs 
appear in brackets in the last four rows of Table 2.4. The higher interest rate assumption 
still yields MWRs of 1.10-1.15 for males and 1.09-1.14 for females. 
Looking at the patterns of benefit values, it is interesting to note that the LIFE 
Income (sans bequest) and LIFE Plus (low bequest) plans provide higher MWRs than 
do the other two plans, implying a small penalty if participants elect a plan that includes 
bequests.  Also it is apparent that as the design was fine-tuned over time, MWRs were 
dialed down; perhaps policymakers realized that the early pricing was overly generous. 
Yet even so, MWRs of the CPF LIFE payouts remain at or slightly above unity, 
                                                            
45 Based on communications with the CPF Board, we also assume interest rates are compounded and 
credited annually to the Retirement Account (RA), but if the member dies in any month, any interest 
earned up to that point in time is immediately credited and so refunded. Even when a member reached 
vesting age, any unused balance in the RA continues to earn interest. If the member adds top-ups to the 
RA, this also forms part of the principal and earns interest. On death, any unused balance in the RA is 
refunded. For the original 12 plans, the extra 1% earned on the total MS is allocated pro-rata to the RA 
and pooled interest based on the component balances for each month. However, for the final four plans, 
the extra 1% earned on the total MS is allocated entirely to the RA. Finally, if the member dies after 
vesting age, any unused balance of the annuity component (except for the LIFE Income plan), will be 
refunded to his beneficiaries. 
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compared to the lower values of private insurer annuities that had been available. The 
government’s higher payout results in part from lower administrative loads compared to 
those levied by private insurers, and in part from less adverse selection due to the 
compulsory annuitization (though above we had indicated this was relatively small in 
Singapore).46 A long-term rate assumption set closer to historical norms also generates 
MWR values closer to one.   
As the administrator, the CPF Board determines the premium and payouts with 
advice from independent actuarial consultants, so the new design may intentionally 
include a small subsidy to CPF members so as to jump-start the new scheme. Indeed the 
government has offered a sign-on bonus (called the L-bonus) for the first five cohorts of 
members joining CPF LIFE for whom the scheme is voluntary.47 Also our computations 
assume constant nominal payouts though in fact, payouts may vary in the future, 
depending on the future evolution of interest rates and mortality.  Though the CPF 
Board can adjust payouts periodically to reflect actual mortality experience and 
investment return, it is noteworthy that it has assured members that adjustments will 
usually be small so that nominal payouts are anticipated to remain relatively stable over 
time (CPF 2009d).48  
                                                            
46 Similarly, in the U.S. context, Abel (1986) showed that because the U.S. Social Security system is 
compulsory, it is immune to adverse selection and a fully funded system can offer a rate of return equal to 
the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. 
47 The L-Bonus is targeted at lower and middle-income CPF members age 46-50 in 2008. It is given to 
these members when they enroll in the CPF LIFE scheme at age 55. In fact, the LIFE Plus plan, which 
provides a higher monthly payout and leaves less bequest for beneficiaries has proven most popular in the 
pilot launch (CPF 2010); over half of the members selected it. In addition, more than S$60 million of 
LIFE Bonus (L-Bonus) has been given to about 70% of the members for joining the scheme.  
48 Responding to members seeking to join CPF LIFE ahead of the official launch date of 2013, the CPF 
Board began offering LIFE plans in September of 2009 to members born in 1954 or before.  Inasmuch as 
annuitization is not yet mandatory, this first phase of CPF LIFE operates on a voluntary opt-in basis 
(from 2013, annuitization will be mandatory). Younger members will be auto-included in the LIFE 
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
A topic of substantial interest to international policymakers is whether a national 
annuitization scheme should be administered by the private or the public sector.49  
Having a single provider can reduce costs through economies of scale, and a 
government-run scheme may be perceived to be safer by retirees than private insurers 
which may face bankruptcy (Babbel and Merrill 2007). In the Singaporean case, the 
Civil Service is regarded as one of the most efficient bureaucracies in the world with a 
high standard of discipline and accountability (Heritage.org 2010) and the fact that the 
CPF has traditionally paid interest on annuities at a rate pegged to the 10-year 
Singapore Treasury bond plus 1 percent with a 2.5 percent floor implies that citizens 
tend to view such returns as risk-free (given the AAA rating of government bonds). It is 
therefore interesting that the annuities offered by Singapore’s CPF LIFE scheme appear 
to be priced very favorably to the consumer compared to other developed countries (see 
Table 2.5). Our preliminary evidence therefore could indicate that Singapore has been 
able to pass cost savings from scale economies and onto annuitants. 
 [Table 2.5 here] 
It is also worth noting that, while CPF members may still buy life annuities from 
a private insurer, few firms appear to be able to compete. That is, there were nine 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Balanced plan if they have at least $40,000 cash savings in their Retirement Account as of age 55. 
Members with less than S$40,000 can opt-in if they wish (CPF 2009d).  The cut-off for auto-inclusion 
into CPF LIFE was selected to balance the level of monthly income and the percentage of active CPF 
members automatically included. At S$40,000, it is estimated that some 70% of active members will be 
automatically included from the first cohort (i.e. those who turn age 55 in 2013; CPF 2009f).   
49 Here we do not take up the question of whether mandatory annuitization is welfare enhancing, a topic 
explored in some detail by Brown (2003).  
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private insurance companies offering annuities in 2007, but only one remained by late 
2009. The withdrawal of insurers from the annuity market may be of concern to 
policymakers if product innovation and pricing pressure requires competition among 
product providers in the industry. In addition, by marketing both life insurance and life 
annuities, insurers would be expected to benefit from some natural hedging across the 
two products. It is possible that private annuity providers could refocus their business 
outside the CPF scheme for retirees seeking to annuitize non-pension wealth. Also since 
the amount that CPF members can annuitize via the CPF LIFE product is capped at the 
stipulated Minimum Sum amount, wealthy individuals could still turn to commercial 
annuities. Moreover, the life annuities currently offered by the government are nominal 
and not inflation-adjusted and hence retirees may find some benefit from inflation-
linked payouts, not currently available under the CPF LIFE system.  
These findings are also of interest in nations where governments are 
increasingly concerned about annuitization in defined contribution plans. For instance, 
in the U.S. 401(k) pension marketplace, few retirees convert their assets into insured 
payout products and instead take their money as a lump sum (Brown et al. 2001).  In 
response, to protect against longevity risk, some have proposed making annuitization 
the default payout mechanism from a defined contribution pension.  For instance, Gale 
et al. (2008) recommend that 401(k) assets be automatically directed into a “trial” 
payout product unless the retiree affirmatively elects not to participate. After 24 
monthly payments from the automatic payout plan, the retiree could either do nothing 
and be defaulted into a permanent income distribution plan, or elect an alternative 
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distribution option. By making it easier for retirees to purchase lifetime income plans, it 
is anticipated that these would become a better value for the average consumer. 
We conclude that Singapore’s recent move to mandate annuities under the 
national defined contribution pension system represents a logical step toward national 
longevity risk management. By establishing the government as an annuity provider, the 
CPF Board may have taken advantage of scale economies and reduced the pricing 
impact of adverse selection, given that the latter was found to be quite a substantial 
proportion of total loadings. Furthermore, the aggressive annuity pricing is creating 
public buy-in for the new mandate, while indirectly working to compensate less risk-
averse individuals in terms of foregone equity premium. One offset may be that private 
insurers have been crowded out, in part because the CPF-designed product pays 
participants more than what commercial insurance companies had offered.  Without 
competition, it is unclear whether annuity pricing will continue to be attractive and 
whether product innovation will continue in Singapore. Related questions, as yet 
unsettled, have to do with whether favoring annuity payments over payments to 
survivors is politically sustainable, and how long the government will be able to 
continue subsidizing payouts. 
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Table 2.1: Monthly Nominal Payouts for Life Annuities purchased at the 
Minimum Sum of S$99,600 (2007; S$ per month; entry age of 55) 
 
 Company & Product 
Monthly payout Guaranteed amount on 
death (less annuity 
payments) Male (S$) 
Female 
(S$) 
    
Non-participating Annuities    
Asia Life Assurance 505.47 454.47 Premium. 
American International 
Assurance (AIA) 
530.87 513.94 Premium. 
 
Aviva 559.00 507.00 Premium + accrued interest 
compounded at 1% p.a. to 
commencement date of 
annuity. 
Great Eastern Life (GE Life I) 535.35 484.30 Premium + interest 
accumulated at 0.75% p.a. to 
age 62. 
Great Eastern Life (GE Life II) 
[Note: This product includes 
long term care benefit.] 
494.26 440.73 Premium + interest 
accumulated at 0.5% p.a. to 
age 62. 
Overseas Assurance 
Corporation (OAC) 
535.35 494.26 Premium + interest 
accumulated at 0.75% p.a. to 
age 62. 
Prudential Assurance 518.44 449.87 Premium. 
Sub-average 525.53 477.80  
    
Participating Annuities    
HSBC Insurance 474.00 
(541.58) 
458.00 
(525.58) 
Premium + interest 
accumulated at 2% p.a. to age 
62. 
NTUC Income Co-op 523.50 
(591.08) 
490.25 
(557.83) 
Premium + interest 
accumulated at 2.5% p.a. and 
bonuses to age 62. 
Sub-average 498.75 474.13  
    
Overall Average 519.58 476.98  
        
Source: Authors’ computations from CPF (2007). 
Notes: p.a. denotes per annum. Monthly payouts for a nominal deferred annuity purchased at age 55 with 
payments starting at age 62. The single premium is the Minimum Sum of S$99,600 for members age 55 
(7/07-6/08).  The MS Scheme currently guarantees named beneficiaries a given amount in the event of 
annuitant’s death equal to the (positive) difference between the guaranteed amount and annuity payments 
made. Previously (in 2000) most MS annuities were guaranteed for a certain period so if death occurred 
during the guaranteed period, remaining annuity payments would be converted into a lump sum paid to 
beneficiaries. Bonus rates depend on company performance; NTUC Income’s annual bonus rates were 1-
3.5% historically (NTUC 2009) and a 2% bonus is used in NTUC Income benefit illustrations. Original 
payouts without bonus expressed without brackets; figures in brackets incorporate bonus component 
assuming an annual projected bonus rate of 2%.  
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Table 2.2: Money’s Worth Ratios and Adverse Selection Costs for Nominal Life 
Annuities Offered by Private Insurers under the CPF Plan (2007) 
 
Company & 
Product 
Male Female 
Pop. 
MWR 
Ann. 
MWR 
Adverse 
Selection 
Pop. 
MWR 
Ann. 
MWR 
Adverse 
Selection 
Non-participating Annuity     
Asia Life Assurance 0.861 0.896 3.47 0.840 0.885 4.44 
AIA 0.907 0.943 3.62 0.943 0.995 5.20 
Aviva 0.943 0.982 3.98 0.930 0.981 5.14 
GE Life I 0.910 0.947 3.71 0.893 0.941 4.78 
GE Life II 0.846 0.879 3.34 0.818 0.860 4.22 
OAC 0.907 0.945 3.74 0.908 0.957 4.98 
Prudential Assurance 0.879 0.915 3.62 0.833 0.876 4.37 
Participating Annuity     
HSBC Insurance 0.933 0.969 3.59 0.969 1.021 5.20 
NTUC Income Co-op 1.006 1.047 4.09 1.024 1.081 5.61 
Mean 0.910 0.947 3.69 0.906 0.955 4.88 
Source: Author’s computations, see text. 
Notes: “Pop.” refers to the general population group and “Ann.” refers to the annuitant group. Money’s 
worth ratios are in decimals and adverse selection costs are in percentage points. Computations pertain to 
a CPF participant who purchases the MS Scheme annuity at entry age 55 for a premium of S$99,600 and 
starts receiving payouts at age 62. The term structure of interest rate uses derived spot rates for 1, 2, 5, 7, 
10 and 20-year bonds with linear interpolation between years. 
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Table 2.3: Robustness Analysis for Nominal Life Annuities Offered by Private 
Insurers under the CPF Plan (2007) 
 
A. Sensitivity to Alternative Mortality Assumptions 
 
Male Female 
Mortality rates Ann. Pop. AS Ann. Pop. AS 
2 years lighter 0.962 
0.901 
6.05 0.972 
0.901 
7.11 
Base case 0.939 3.80 0.951 5.03 
2 years heavier 0.917 1.57 0.929 2.86 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
 
B. Sensitivity to Alternative Long-Term Interest Rate Assumptions (±0.5% and ±1%) 
 
Long-term 
interest rate 
Male Female 
Ann. Pop. AS Ann. Pop. AS 
2.44% 1.067 1.010 5.70 1.110 1.033 7.69 
2.94% 0.998 0.951 4.66 1.024 0.961 6.22 
3.44% (base) 0.939 0.901 3.80 0.951 0.901 5.03 
3.94% 0.889 0.858 3.10 0.889 0.849 4.07 
4.44% 0.846 0.821 2.51 0.837 0.804 3.28 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Notes: “Pop.” refers to the general population group and “Ann.” refers to the annuitant group. This 
analysis uses the average annuity payouts (with bonus) of the private annuities given in Table 2.1. For the 
base case of 3.44%, the MWR values of this pseudo average-payout annuity are slightly lower than the 
mean of the individual MWR values reported in Table 2.2 because the individual computations 
incorporate interest accrued during the deferral period where applicable. 
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Table 2.4: Illustrative Payouts and Money’s Worth Ratios of CPF LIFE Plans 
(annuity premium of S$67,000; various dates) 
 
 Male Female 
LIFE plans Monthly payout (S$) 
Annuity 
component MWR 
Monthly 
payout (S$) 
Annuity 
component MWR 
Proposed LIFE plans (as at February ’08):    
Refund 90  560 6% 1.306 540 8% 1.350 
Refund 85 590 13% 1.315 560 16% 1.361 
Refund 80 610 24% 1.331 570 28% 1.371 
Refund 75 630 41% 1.341 580 45% 1.374 
Refund 70 640 66% 1.323 590 68% 1.370 
Refund 65 650 100% 1.284 590 100% 1.311 
 
LIFE plans (as at June ‘09):    
LIFE Basic 519 6%* 1.264 496 8%* 1.308 
LIFE 
Balanced 556 24%* 1.313 515 28%* 1.355 
LIFE Plus 590 100% 1.308 531 100% 1.332 
LIFE Income 632 100% 1.287 549 100% 1.313 
 
LIFE plans (as at September ‘09):    
LIFE Basic 524 8.6% 
1.240 
[1.099] 500 13% 
1.255 
[1.088] 
LIFE 
Balanced 
561 30% 1.252 [1.110] 520 35.5% 
1.270 
[1.098] 
LIFE Plus 594 100% 
1.315 
[1.149] 535 100% 
1.340 
[1.142] 
LIFE Income 636 100% 
1.294 
[1.119] 553 100% 
1.322 
[1.118] 
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. Payout data obtained from CPF website (CPF 2008 and CPF 2009e).  
Notes: The default plan offered at each point in time is bolded. Computations pertain to a CPF participant who joins 
the LIFE plan at age 55 for a premium of S$67,000, and starts receiving payouts at age 65. In particular, the 
parameter inputs generating this set of illustrative payouts in the CPF web calculator assume the Singaporean worker 
was born June 1958 (so he is age 55 in 2013); AV=“More than S$11,000”; AI=“More than S$54,000”. The premium 
paid is split into a term component and an annuity component. The term component funds payouts from age 65 to the 
vesting age; vesting age differs across plans. The annuity component, expressed as a percentage of the annuity 
premium, funds payouts from the vesting age to death. The reported payouts are indicative only; actual payout will 
depend on actual CPF interest rates and mortality experience. CPF interest is computed monthly, reviewed quarterly 
and, compounded and credited annually. Figures marked with (*) are estimated. Money’s worth ratios are computed 
using the riskless term structure of interest rate with long-term interest rate assumption of 3.44% and assume constant 
payouts over the participant’s lifetime. The assumed CPF interest rate is 4% with the statutory additional 1% paid on 
the first S$60,000. The guaranteed amount refunded to the beneficiary upon the annuitant’s death is the unused 
amounts left in the annuitant’s CPF retirement account (term component plus any interest earned) and the unused 
amount of the annuity component (if refundable). MWR in brackets [ ] are based on an alternative long-term interest 
rate assumption of 4.44%.   
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Table 2.5: International Comparison of Money’s Worth Ratios 
 
Country Study Valuation Date 
MWR (65-year old 
male; annuitant 
mortality) 
Cost of Adverse 
Selection as % 
of Total 
Loading 
US Friedman and 
Warshawsky (1988) 
1983 0.868 35.0% 
US Mitchell et al. 
(1999) 
1995 0.916 54.3% 
UK a Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002) 
1998 
1998 
0.988 
0.962 
91.1% 
62.0% 
Singapore Fong (2002) 2000 0.933 13.0% 
Singapore Doyle et al. (2004) 2000 0.947 4.7% 
Australia Doyle et al. (2004) 2000 0.939 49.7% 
Singapore b This study 2007 0.947 41.1% 
 2008 - 2009 1.10 - 1.15 - 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: All the MWR values reported for Singapore are based on a 55-year old male instead of a 65-year 
old male. Total loading is defined as one minus money's worth of annuity for an individual from the 
general population. 
a Results are reported in separate rows for the U.K. voluntary, and compulsory, annuity markets 
respectively. Data in both markets are drawn from annuities offered by commercial insurers. 
b Results are reported in separate rows for annuities offered by commercial insurers, and new annuities 
offered by the CPF Board, respectively. MWR values for the latter are based on September 2009 LIFE 
plan payouts and a long-term interest rate assumption of 4.44%.   
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Appendix Table 2.1: Assumptions used in Money’s Worth Computations for Life 
Annuities under the CPF MS Scheme 
 
This Table summarizes the data and results for various studies that assessed the 
money’s worth of life annuities offered by private insurers under the CPF Minimum 
Sum scheme. The three main inputs used in the money’s worth computation are annuity 
quotes, annuitant and population mortality rates, and interest rates. 
 
 Fong  (2002) Doyle, Mitchell, and Piggott (2004) This study 
Valuation Date 2000 2000 2007 
Sample chosen Subset of 8 non-
participating annuities 
& 1 participating 
annuity. 
Subset of 5 non-
participating annuities 
with a 15-yr guarantee 
period or similar. 
All MSS annuities:  
7 non-participating & 2 
participating annuities. 
 
Model MWR model with 15-
year certain. 
MWR model with 15-
year certain. 
MWR model for annuities 
with guaranteed amount. 
See Equation (1) in text. 
Mortality  
Assumptions 
  
Annuitant a(90) with 2-year 
setback; limiting age 
used is 109. 
a(90) with 2-year 
setback; limiting age 
used is 109. 
a(90) with 5-year setback; 
limiting age used is 117. 
Population Derived from 1960 
and 1990 Ordinary 
Male and Female 
Lives Tables 
(Singstat). Limiting 
age of 99. 
Abridged life tables for 
Singapore (World Health 
Organization). Limiting 
age of 100. 
2007 complete life tables 
for Singapore resident 
population (Singstat), plus 
extrapolate from age 100 
to limiting age of 117. 
Interest Rate 
Assumption 
Flat interest rate 
(proxy by the 10-year 
Government bond 
yield of 4.6%). 
Term structure (yield 
curve with long-term 
rate assumption of 
4.76%). 
Term structure (yield 
curve with long-term rate 
assumption of 3.44%). 
MWR results for  
55-year-old Male 
  
Annuitant  0.997 0.947 0.947 
Population 0.986 0.945 0.910 
Adverse 
selection 1.10 0.26 3.69 
    
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. 
Notes: A total of 13 MSS life annuities were offered in July 2000 of which 9 were flat-rate annuities, 2 were 
participating annuities, and 2 were increasing annuities. The increasing annuities offered by AIA were dropped after 
that year (Source: Personal communication from CPF Board). The a(90) table refers to the UK a(1990) period life 
table for annuitants. It is based on UK annuitants’ experience from 1967-70, with mortality improvements projected 
to 1990. Because of lack of annuitant experience in Singapore, previous studies used the a(90) and with a two-year 
setback to account for lower mortality among annuitants. A two-year setback means that a 65-year-old is treated as 
having the same mortality rate as a 63-year-old has in the initial table. Money’s worth ratios are in decimals and 
adverse selection costs are in percentage points.  
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Appendix Figure 2.1: Density Function of the Age-at Death random variable 
 
This Figure plots ݌ହହ௧ ∙ ݍହହା௧  for a random male drawn from the population who 
purchases an annuity at age 55 in 2007. It shows the probability of death between month 
ݐ and month	ݐ ൅ 1 (conditional on living to month	ݐ). The function increases from age 
55 to about age 95 where the rise in ݍହହା௧  outweighs the decline in ݌ହହ௧ . In the 
advanced ages, the opposite occurs and the probabilities fall. The jags in the plot 
indicate that within each year, the probabilities are level consistent with the UDD 
assumption. Because the limiting age is set at 117, any remaining probability mass is 
assigned to the tail resulting in heaping at that outside age. 
 
 
Source: Authors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Beyond Age and Sex: Enhancing Annuity Pricing 
 
How annuities are priced is of central concern to retirement decision-planning 
for individuals, and also for defined contribution plans. Annuities offer valuable 
longevity insurance against outliving one’s assets by providing a periodic income for 
life in exchange for an upfront premium. But currently in U.S. and Canada, prices of 
standard retail annuities do not reflect buyers’ personal characteristics other than age 
and sex. This lack of information in prices generates two concerns. Firstly, because 
insurers do not account for individual economic or health status, people who anticipate 
living longer can self-select into annuities. Empirical studies have shown that adverse 
selection exists in annuity markets (Mitchell et al. 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba 2002). 
Secondly, it may lead to consumer perception that standard annuities are only priced for 
those in very good health (Stewart 2007; Brown and McDaid 2003). Negative consumer 
perception may frustrate policymakers’ efforts to expand the use of these lifetime 
income instruments in employer-sponsored or government-run defined contribution 
plans around the world.  
The notion of using more risk-classes to price standard retail annuities has 
gained support in recent years, largely motivated by an interest in growing the life 
annuity market. In an OECD study, Stewart (2007) suggests that annuity providers 
should be permitted to put people into different risk categories to allow for more pricing 
flexibility, reduce adverse selection, and increase consumers’ trust in the pricing of 
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annuity products. In fact, some major U.K. insurers have already begun using more 
personal characteristics such as client postcodes, marital status, and tobacco use, to 
price their standard payout annuities (Banking Times 2008). Nonetheless, these insurers 
are still struggling to define suitable pricing factors and work out the specifics (e.g. how 
to classify individuals who have two addresses). Given the precedence of risk-class 
pricing in life insurance and auto insurance, there is strong reason to believe that using 
more indicators of life expectancy, other than just sex and age, might be a natural 
evolution for retail annuity pricing. 
A large literature focuses on measuring the money’s worth of annuities and 
reports, in a voluntary purchase environment, that annuitants obtain higher money’s 
worth from annuity purchase than would the population if all were to purchase.50 This 
difference is quantified as the adverse selection cost. For example, Mitchell et al. (1999) 
estimates adverse selection cost to be about 54% of total loadings in the U.S. annuity 
market. In smaller annuity markets such as Singapore and Australia, estimates are also 
about 40 to 50% (Fong et al. 2011; Doyle et al. 2004). Researchers have also shown that 
the extent of adverse selection observed in actual annuity markets depends on market 
type and product line. In particular, adverse selection is lower in compulsory markets as 
compared to voluntary ones, and also for annuities with period-certain guarantees as 
compared to those without guarantees (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002). 51  Since 
information asymmetry arises because annuity buyers have “private” information about 
                                                            
50 See for example, Mitchell et al. (1999) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2002). 
51 In 1998, the U.K. compulsory annuity market was much larger than the voluntary market; there is less 
scope for adverse selection in the former because participants in defined contribution occupational, or 
personal, pension plans must annuitize their resources (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002). Less adverse 
selection is observed for annuities with longer period-certain guarantees primarily because of shorter-
lived individuals self-select into annuities with longer guarantee periods. 
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their mortality, the extent of adverse selection is likely to depend on pricing structures 
as well. It would seem that incorporating more personal characteristics in annuity 
pricing can help reduce adverse selection. Yet investigations of this kind are 
challenging for a number of reasons, including the need to construct plausible 
alternative pricing schemes, and having to model selection effects as pricing structures 
evolve. 
The primary contribution of this paper is to use longitudinal micro data from the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to develop alternative pricing structures and 
examine their impact on annuitization values accruing to different demographic groups. 
Using a proportional hazards framework, I show that several readily-measurable risk 
factors can significantly increase explained variability in mortality outcomes. Adding 
the ten best-ranked factors to age and sex increases explained variation from 6.7% to 
29.7%. Assuming one or more of these pricing factors are adopted, I then simulate 
annuity prices for a variety of pricing schemes and compute the annuitization value 
accruing to a given demographic group under each scheme. Both the financial value and 
utility value of longevity insurance are assessed. 
The impact of risk-class pricing on adverse selection is not straightforward. The 
need to collect more information may result in insurers imposing higher administrative 
fees. Even if a rating class is justified, insurers may not have the flexibility to introduce 
large disparity in prices in actual markets. Annuity purchase decisions are also 
influenced by many factors other than just the financial return from annuities. It is, 
however, widely believed that more detailed pricing reduces information asymmetries 
between the insurer and the insured and thus will reduce adverse selection. My paper 
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contributes to this discussion by highlighting two effects that may occur when more 
pricing factors are implemented: (1) shorter-lived groups will be sufficiently induced to 
buy annuities and enter the market, and (2) longer-lived groups will still be incentivized 
to stay in the annuity market. Overall, this will allow annuity markets to grow causing 
the extent of adverse selection to fall.52  
Compared to prior population-based studies on mortality, this paper is 
distinguished by its effort to understand how several less conventionally-used variables 
relate to retirement mortality. For instance, birth region is a truly exogenous 
demographic variable but it is seldom used in empirical studies. Recently, Sloan et al. 
(2010) find that being foreign-born is associated with lower mortality hazards. 53 
Cognition is another interesting variable to examine in relation to older adults. For 
example, Mehta et al. (2003) find cognitive function to be independently associated 
with mortality among elderly adults above age 70 in the Asset and Health Dynamics 
Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) study. This study is therefore informative regarding 
the potential for these less conventional variables to serve as suitable pricing factors for 
annuities. 
Section 1 outlines some possible impediments to risk-class pricing, and 
highlights recent efforts by commercial insurers to incorporate more personal 
                                                            
52  Point (2) is necessary because the co-existence of longer-lived and shorter-lived groups is what 
distinguishes the standard annuity market (which is the focus of this paper) from an impaired annuity 
market where detailed annuity underwriting is already in place. Impaired annuities are discussed later in 
Section 1.1. 
53  Several studies controlled for current residence instead, which is possibly endogenous to current 
mortality. For example, Dupre et al. (2009) controlled for whether a respondent lives in the South. Sloan 
et al. (2010) included dummies for whether a subject lives on a farm, and whether he is foreign-born. 
Glymour et al. (2008) study the risk of first stroke among the HRS participants and specifically 
incorporated an indicator for Southern birth-state (also known as the stroke belt). 
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characteristics in annuity pricing. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 3 presents results from the proportional hazards regressions, and demonstrates 
how risk-classification sharpens age-at-death predictions. Section 4 reports simulated 
annuity premiums and assesses the financial value of annuities accruing to various 
demographic groups under different pricing schemes. Section 5 examines the value of 
annuities on a utility-adjusted basis in an environment of mortality heterogeneity. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
3.1 Background 
Pricing Structure of Annuities 
The extent of underwriting varies across different types of annuities.54 At one 
end of the spectrum are pension annuities and the U.S. Social Security pension system. 
Job-based pension annuities are priced based on age (Brown 2002; US Supreme Court 
1988).55 Similarly, benefit payouts under the U.S. Social Security program are also 
purely based on the age of annuitization.56 Any differences along gender, racial, or 
education lines are disregarded. In contrast, the retail annuity providers are permitted to 
use gender-specific pricing. In U.S. and Canada, standard retail annuities are priced 
                                                            
54 Life insurance companies collect information about individuals before deciding at what price to sell 
insurance to them. Applicants for insurance are individually interviewed (often by means of a written 
questionnaire), and sometimes examined by a medical practitioner. This process is called “underwriting”. 
55 In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), it is ruled that section 703(a)(1) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 barred requiring women to contribute more than men to pensions to receive the same 
benefits. Later, a landmark Supreme Court decision in Florida v. Long similarly ruled that only unisex 
mortality lifetables may be employed in the pricing of pension annuities (US Supreme Court 1988). 
56 Social Security refers to the federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program, 
which is a comprehensive federal benefits program developed in 1935. The Social Security is a pay-as-
you-go defined benefit pension system funded through dedicated payroll taxes, and benefit payments are 
made monthly to eligible individuals.     
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based on age, sex, and the amount of money annuitized (Brown and McDaid 2003). 
Females typically pay a higher premium than males under this pricing structure because 
they are expected to live longer. In addition, Stewart (2007) reports that differential 
pricing policy between races is allowed in the European Union.  
At the other end of spectrum are so-called impaired or enhanced annuities. 
Impaired annuities were introduced in the U.K. around 1995 and since then, this market 
segment has grown in size and importance.57 Impaired annuities are sold to retirees with 
profiles of high mortality (e.g. those in poor health) or those in nursing home care. It is 
estimated that as many as 40 percent of U.K. annuity purchasers can qualify for 
impaired annuities (The Investors Chronicle 2008). Underwriting for impaired annuities 
is via a health questionnaire (mild medical conditions), and a medical report (for more 
severe medical conditions such as heart attack, or cancer). Individuals who qualify for 
such annuities enjoy lower premiums. In U.S. and Canada, impaired life annuities are 
available but the market is small (Rusconi 2008; Brown and McDaid 2003). Such 
annuities are only offered to individuals who can prove that they are in substandard 
health via a medical certificate. 
The focus of this paper is the pricing of standard annuities. Although impaired 
annuities represent a growing niche in the annuity markets, they are limited to people 
who are of substandard health and thus of less relevance to say, an average retiree of 
average health who wishes to annuitize. The current pricing structure of standard retail 
                                                            
57 Impaired annuities were introduced in the U.K. around 1995 by a company called Stalwart, which was 
later acquired by GE Capital (Bestwire 2010). Impaired annuity sales in the U.K. totaled £1.26 billion 
(€1.51 billion) in the first six months of 2010. The full-year sales figure for 2009 was £1.78 billion, up 
from £419.6 million in 2001. Companies currently active in this market segment include Aviva, Canada 
Life, and Legal & General.  
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annuities leaves much room for pause. This is because there are no obvious regulatory 
barriers to risk-classification (aside from using sensitive factors like race), and the 
insurance industry has a ready technology given their experience in the life insurance 
business. 
One possible impediment may be costs. According to a Deloitte 2008 
benchmarking study of 15 U.S. life insurers, an insurer typically spends approximately 
one month and several hundred dollars underwriting each applicant (Batty et al. 2010). 
While a few hundred dollars is not necessarily cost-prohibitive for life insurance 
products, it may be so for annuities. This is because annuities are relatively low-margin 
financial products, and insurers already view them as not very profitable relative to 
other product lines (Orth 2008). The underlying reason is due to very thin annuity 
markets. Existing research shows that the voluntary markets for individual immediate 
annuities in U.S., Australia, France, Germany, Italy and Japan are small (MacKenzie 
2006; Brown 2001; Knox 2000).58 In addition, underwriting can be costly in terms of 
buyer fraud. Brown and McDaid (2003) provide the analogy of an applicant who 
smokes cigarettes for a period of time to get better annuity rates. Likewise, an applicant 
may exaggerate her health problems to qualify for lower premiums. 
A second reason pertains to the lack of annuitant mortality data. To justify 
placing applicants into different pricing categories, there must be some actuarial basis 
indicating how mortality differs among those groups. Because the insured population is 
                                                            
58 Several reasons have been suggested to explain the lack of demand for annuities (or the so-called 
annuity puzzle). Among the explanations are the role of adverse selection and administrative load factors 
(Mitchell et al. 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba 2002), bequest motives (Abel and Warshawsky 1988), the 
ability of risk-pooling within families (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981), and precautionary savings. 
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not the same as the noninsured population, insurance companies typically collect 
mortality experience of their applicants over a long period of time to facilitate such 
analysis. A case in point is the smoker/nonsmoker rating class used in the life insurance 
markets. In the 1960s, U.S. life insurance companies still charged the same rates to 
smokers and nonsmokers (SOA, 1983), and it was only after two decades that sufficient 
mortality experience emerged allowing actuaries to construct smoker/nonsmoker 
mortality tables. These developments in turn led to cigarette smoking being adopted as a 
rating class in life insurance policies.59 Similarly, substantial information on annuitants 
needs to be collected before mortality differentials amongst risk-groups with different 
demographic characteristics can be analyzed. Thus far, this has been an uphill task 
because of the very thin annuity markets. Stewart (2007) reports that a surprisingly 
large number of developed countries still lack the demographic data necessary to 
construct accurate mortality projections for annuitants, and use lifetables from other 
countries with richer annuitant experience such as U.K. and U.S.60 
Regulatory restrictions may also play a role. For instance, sex has long been 
employed as a rating class in life insurance whereby women pay lower premiums than 
men because statistics show that women live longer. Yet in March 2011, the European 
                                                            
59  Smoker/nonsmoker rates for life insurance policies are also successfully introduced with new 
underwriting assistance such as blood tests (Brown and McDaid 2003). 
60  Stewart (2007) also suggests that segmented mortality data on annuitants can be collected by 
governments, or alternatively, by a cooperative arrangement among insurers willing to cost-share. 
Currently, U.S. insurers typically use the RP-2000 annuitant lifetable as a reference (McCarthy and 
Mitchell 2010). The RP-2000 annuitant life table is provided by the Society of Actuaries, and constructed 
based on actual annuitant experience from plan years 1990 through 1994. In U.K., pensioner and 
annuitant lifetables are available from the Continuous Mortality Investigation committee, and are 
prepared based on actual annuitant experience collected from U.K. insurance companies. Annuitant 
lifetables are distinct from actuarial tables used in valuing life insurance policies (e.g. the 2001 Valuation 
Basic Table). 
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Court of Justice ruled that the widespread practice of charging men and women 
different rates for insurance is illegal and has set out to overhaul the pricing of 
insurance policies across Europe by end 2012 (WSJ.com 2011). The U.S. prohibits 
using sex in job-based pension annuities although it is allowed as a rating class for retail 
annuities. 
Movement towards Risk-based Pricing  
The notion of using more risk-classes to price standard retail annuities is largely 
motivated by an interest in growing the life annuity market. In an OECD study, Stewart 
(2007) suggests that insurers should be permitted to risk-categorize annuitants to allow 
for more pricing flexibility and to increase consumers’ trust in the pricing of annuity 
products. Similarly, Brown and McDaid (2003) stress that workers will ideally want to 
annuitize at fair-market rates that reflect their personal mortality profiles. Evidence 
from other insurance markets suggests that effective underwriting can also alleviate 
adverse selection problems. For instance in life insurance, Cawley and Philipson (1999) 
present convincing evidence that life insurers may be better at identifying mortality risk 
than individuals themselves. Similarly, McCarthy and Mitchell (2010) find that U.S. 
and U.K. insurers’ screening of poorer risks in life insurance reduces asymmetric 
information held by policyholders. In auto insurance, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) 
conclude that “…the information at the [auto insurers] company's disposal is extremely 
rich and that, in most cases, the asymmetry, if any, is in favor of the company.” 
In the U.K., commercial insurers have begun using risk-based pricing for 
standard annuities. In 2008, Norwich Union – an insurer with about 10 percent market 
share – started using client postcodes, marital status, and tobacco use, to price its 
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annuities (Banking Times 2008). Other major insurers like Prudential, and Legal & 
General, have also justified using postal codes on the premise that those who reside in 
more affluent areas tend to be longer-lived. In fact, U.K. market players observe that the 
differentiation between impaired annuities and standard (non-impaired) annuities have 
started to blur (Bestwire 2010). These developments represent a positive step towards 
annuity risk-class pricing. Going forward, there is strong reason to believe that the 
movement towards risk-class pricing for standard annuities may be sustained and 
eventually extend to the rest of the world.  
Nonetheless, there is currently no consensus on which risk-classes may be most 
suitable. While insurers have experience in underwriting life insurance policies, it 
remains the case that some conventionally-used factors are difficult to verify, for 
example lifestyle habits or participation in hazardous activities like sky diving. Certain 
risk factors are also mutable, such as smoking, which leaves insurers susceptible to 
buyer fraud.61 In addition, there are factors not explored in other forms of insurance 
pricing that tend to help explain longevity; for instance, several studies have found that 
intelligent people live longer (Deary 2008; Hauser and Palloni 2010). Notably, Brown 
and McDaid (2003) identify 10 potential risk-classes, including education, income, and 
occupation, race, health behavior, and religion, based on a literature review of mortality 
studies.62 Among this list, however, several factors are possibly correlated while other 
                                                            
61 Mutable factors are those which can be modified by the individual, and thus hard to verify. This is in 
contrast to fixed factors. See Bond and Crocker (1991) for a detailed analysis of the implications of 
mutable risk classification characteristics. In the context of annuity policies, an analogy is a person who 
starts to smoke heavily in order to pass of as someone who is shorter-lived in order to qualify for a lower 
annuity premium.     
62 Base on a review of 45 empirical papers, Brown and McDaid (2003) highlight 10 factors that seem 
important in predicting mortality after retirement, in addition to age and sex. They are (in no particular 
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factors (e.g. health behavior) are not easily measurable. Also, the study did not give a 
sense of which variables are more important than others.  
The next section develops a risk-classification approach by picking out several 
“readily-measurable” risk factors that may explain longevity. “Readily-measurable” 
factors includes exogenous variables (like birth region, race, and parental factors), or 
predetermined factors (like education), or objectively-measured factors (like body mass 
index and cognition). These factors are desirable from an insurer’s standpoint because 
they are not too costly to collect, easy-to-verify, and also tend to be difficult to fake. 
This helps to address issues such as the costs of underwriting and buyer fraud.  
 
3.2 Data and Methodology 
To study predictors of mortality among adults near retirement, I use data from 
the Health and Retirement Study.63 The HRS is an ongoing panel study of Americans 
over the age of 50 conducted every other year since 1992, and it features questions on 
health, economic status, retirement plans, cognition, pensions, family structure, and 
expectations. The baseline birth cohort interviewed comprised respondents born 1931 – 
1941; other cohorts were added in later waves. This paper focuses on individuals in the 
baseline cohort who were surveyed biannually from 1992 through 2008, providing nine 
waves of panel data. 64  The initial response rate in 1992 is 82%, and subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                                              
order): race, education, income, occupation, marital status, religion participation, health behaviors 
(lifestyle and use of health services), smoking, alcohol, and obesity. 
63 See Juster and Suzman (1995) and HRS (2008) for details about the HRS multistage sample design, 
enrollments, implementation, and response rates. 
64 The HRS sample cohort (those first interviewed in 1992) comprised 12,521 respondents, including 
spouses (HRS Tracker 2009, p.19) After excluding 2,770 respondents not born between 1931 and 1941, 
and 470 proxy respondents, the reduced sample is 9,281. 
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reinterview response rates are well above 90% on average (HRS 2008). Out of a 
possible sample of 9,281 respondents, I exclude 11 persons because of faulty or 
incomplete information on survival status, and 223 respondents (2.4%) with no 
available follow-up data. The analysis sample is consequently restricted to 9,047 
respondents. Appendix Table 3.1 provides basic descriptive statistics.  
Measures 
Survival status and duration. All-cause mortality is the outcome of interest. 
HRS tracking efforts, along with a linkage to the National Death Index, allows mortality 
to be measured very accurately between survey waves. Death is defined as the “time-to-
failure” event, based on the reported month/year of death and respondents’ wave-by-
wave vital status in the Tracker 2008 (v1.0) file.65 No information on the cause of death 
was obtained. In the small number of cases where the exact date of death is unknown 
(݊=10 with no information and another ݊=5 with death year only), a death year is 
imputed based on the respondent’s specific wave-by-wave vital statuses, and a death 
month using a random integer from 1 to 12.66 If an individual is known to be alive in a 
given year, her survival status is carried back if it is missing in earlier waves. Subjects 
who cannot be identified as deceased, or who survived through 2008 are considered 
                                                            
65 For the 1,905 failure events, 88.2% (or 1,680 cases) of the death years are obtained from HRS records, 
11.3% (215) from NDI records, and 0.5% (10) imputed based on the wave-by-wave vital status. We rely 
primarily on the year/month of death obtained by HRS through interviews with surviving spouses, or exit 
interviews with surviving relatives. Where exit interviews are either not obtained, or incomplete, we use 
the NDI information also available from the HRS Tracker file. The procedure is consistent with HRS’ 
advice that both sources of information (namely HRS and NDI) should be used to classify vital status in 
any analysis (HRS Tracker 2009, p. 12). In addition, HRS also seeks matches to the NDI for persons who 
were reported as deceased or who are not known to be alive through contact during tracking. Accordingly, 
we rely on the NDI alive/deceased flags, and death match scores to verify respondent vital status in 2008.  
66 These respondents were assumed to have died in the year between the two-year interval where their 
vital status switched from ‘alive (or presumed alive)’ in one wave to ‘dead’ in the next wave. 
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censored. Event variables indicating failure by wave is coded “1” if the individual died 
in that wave, “0” if the individual was alive and responded to an interview, and 
“missing” otherwise.67 All time variables including interview dates and death dates are 
expressed in months. 
 Age and sex. The initial risk variables of interest are those currently used in 
annuity pricing: age and sex. Both are defined at baseline and available from Tracker 
2008. In particular, baseline age (representing birth cohort) is modeled as a continuous 
variable, and separately as categorical dummies, to test the difference in effects. Three 
sets of risk adjustments are then introduced to empirically determine their associations 
with mortality: conventional exogenous factors, less-conventional exogenous factors, 
and conventional endogenous factors.68 
Conventional, readily-measurable factors. These include race (white/nonwhite), 
education (≥12/<12 years), whether married (no/yes), prior health history, and BMI 
(underweight/normal weight (ref.)/overweight). They are so-called conventional 
because these sociodemographic variables are commonly used as controls. 69  The 
correlations between race and mortality, and education and mortality are well 
documented (Preston et al. 1996; Sorlie et al. 1992; Deaton and Paxson 2001; Kitagawa 
and Hauser 1973). In general, these correlations work in the direction that whites live 
longer than blacks, and more highly educated live longer than less educated individuals. 
                                                            
67 The event variable is coded “missing” as long as there was no response in a wave. This could be 
because respondents have permanently attrited from the study, or they failed to respond to interview 
during a particular wave but were known to be alive in a later wave. For the latter, their alive status is not 
imputed into the “missing” since I have no information on the time-varying covariates in that missing 
wave. 
68 These variables are all obtained from the RAND version J dataset (RAND 2010). 
69 For instance, Idler and Angel (1990), Hurd and McGarry (2002), Glymour et al. (2008), and Sloan et al. 
(2010). 
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For older individuals near retirement, it is posited that education and marital status are 
predetermined factors. Educational attainment is a reasonable proxy for lifetime 
financial resources, and appropriate since other social-economic status (SES) measures 
(current income, current wealth, and current occupation) are probably endogenous. 
Likewise, I control on prior health history instead of subjective self-assessments of 
current health.70 Health history is obtained from doctor-diagnosed disease conditions 
(whether a doctor ever told them they have chronic diseases such as hypertension, 
diabetes, arthritis, chronic lung disease, stroke, or heart attack). Prior literature suggests 
that such “ever-have” disease conditions are highly predictive of mortality.71 BMI is 
also included since it can be measured objectively and easily, and is highly relevant 
given that a current issue of interest is how obesity relates to mortality and morbidity 
among older adults.72   
Unconventional, readily-measurable factors. These include birth region 
(Northeast (ref.), Midwest, South, West, Foreign-born), cognition scores (0-40), 
parental education (≥12/<12 years), and parental longevity. Birth place/region is seldom 
                                                            
70 Some studies have shown that objective measures are better predictors of mortality than subjective 
measures. For example, using a broad-based sample of U.S. adults aged 25–74 years from the National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Idler and Angel (1990) find that age, race, smoking, 
unemployment, alcohol use, illness symptoms, and marital status, are more predictive of survival than 
either self-assessed health.  
71 Using waves 1 and 2 of the HRS, Hurd and McGarry (2002) find that ever-have disease conditions 
especially cancer, heart attack, stroke, and diabetes to be highly predictive of mortality among individuals 
age 46-65. The study also shows low/high BMI to be associated with increased mortality although both 
variables were not statistically significant in the logit regressions. Chronic illnesses and categorical 
variables for BMI are similarly used to predict mortality for the HRS sample in other studies (e.g. Dupre 
et al. 2009, and Siegel et al. 2003). Although these variables are self-reported in the HRS survey, they are 
still arguably objective since weight and height are anthropometric measures, and the ever-have disease 
condition question is phrased in terms of a doctor diagnosis.  
72 The three BMI categories are based on the widely-adopted World Health Organization definition of 
underweight (BMI<18.5), normal weight (18.5≤BMI<25), overweight (25≤BMI<30), and obese 
(BMI≥30). See SOA (2010) for an excellent review of empirical studies on obesity and its relation to 
mortality and morbidity. 
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investigated as a predictor of mortality possibly because it is not available in many 
datasets. Most studies using HRS data did not control for this variable; Sloan et al. 
(2010), however, find that being foreign-born is associated with lower mortality hazards. 
Similarly, parental SES factors are not commonly used by researchers perhaps because 
adult mortality is believed to be better predicted by personal factors. Nonetheless, 
parental longevity has been shown to affect subjective survival expectations which in 
turn predict mortality (e.g. Hurd and McGarry 2002). Thus I control for parental 
education as well as parental longevity since they are exogenous and may turn out to be 
suitable risk-classes.73  
Another explanatory variable of interest is cognitive ability, since it has been 
demonstrated that intelligent people live longer (Deary 2008). Among the various 
pathways proposed are that people with higher intelligence may be more well-
organized, conscientious individuals; they may also tend to be more educated, work in 
healthier environments, and engage in healthier behavior (do not smoke, exercise, better 
diets, avoid accidents). Thus, cognition is a plausible risk-class for annuitants (who tend 
to be older adults) and an added advantage is that cognition is objectively-measured in 
the HRS. 74 
                                                            
73 HRS contains information on the parents’ vital status and current age (age at death if deceased). I create 
a continuous variable using parent’s current age (or age at death) minus sex-specific life expectancy, 
divided by 10. The life expectancy used for fathers is age 65, which is an average of the life expectancies 
of a 15-year old male and 30-year old male in 1931 and 1941, weighted by the respondent sample 
composition. The life expectancy used for mothers is age 69. For example, mother’s longevity will be 
negative if the mother died before 69 but positive if the mother survived past 69. Parents’ vital status is 
not used directly because it is dependent on the respondent’s age at time of interview and thus not 
reflective of parental longevity. 
74 The HRS is one of the first national health surveys to measure cognitive health at the population level, 
and cognitive tests are administered based on well-validated measures developed from psychological 
research on intelligence and cognition (Herzog and Wallace 1997). In this paper, cognition scores are 
obtained from the Imputation of Cognitive Functioning Measures 1992-2006 (V1.0) dataset which 
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Conventional, endogenous factors. Prior research has emphasized the 
importance of self-ratings and self-assessments of health in predicting mortality (e.g. 
Idler and Benyamini 1997). Despite endogenous factors not being the focus of this 
paper, it is important to assess how their inclusion may affect the predetermined and/or 
exogenous covariates. Specifically, I use self-reported health (excellent (ref.), very good, 
good, fair, and poor), whether currently smoke (no/yes), ever smoked, and ever drink.  
Estimation Models 
 Proportional hazard (PH) regression analysis is used to (1) assess the bivariate 
relationship of each additional predictor variable with longevity, controlling for age and 
sex; and (2) construct a multivariate equation estimating the independent effects of the 
more detailed list of prognostic factors. An important strength of the hazard framework 
is its ability to properly treat right-censored data. Respondents who survived the entire 
observational window from baseline to 2008 were treated as censored after their 2008 
wave interview. For others not known to be dead but who attrited from the study at 
various time points, their data are censored as of the last interview date. Consider the 
general form of the PH function: 
݄൫ݐห࢞࢐൯ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻ ∙ exp൫࢞࢐ࢼ൯,       (1) 
where ݄൫ݐห࢞࢐൯	is the resultant hazard rate for the ݆th subject in the data, given survival 
time ݐ and the subject’s vector of covariates ࢞࢐. It is also called the mortality risk (or 
force of mortality). ݄଴ሺݐሻ  is the baseline hazard function (i.e. hazard when all 
                                                                                                                                                                              
contains imputations for cognitive functioning data for HRS 1992 through 2006 (Fisher et al. 2009). In 
1992 and 1994, only questions pertaining to a respondent’s memory skills (immediate / delayed word 
recall) were asked. As such, the cognition score defined at baseline is the 1992 memory status score 
(scale 0-40). From 1996 onwards, the HRS included additional questions pertaining to a respondent’s 
mental status (e.g. Serial 7s test, backwards counting etc.). 
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independent variables are set to their reference categories), and ࢼ  is the vector of 
regression coefficients to be estimated. Equation (1) states that the death hazard that 
subject ݆ faces is multiplicatively proportional to the hazard everyone faces, modified 
by his personal characteristics expressed as a vector ࢞࢐.  
Within the general class of PH models, I specifically estimate two types. First, 
the Cox (semi-parametric) model is employed because of its flexibility (it does not 
require assumptions about the underlying hazard function); the shape of the hazard 
function ݄଴ሺݐሻ  is unconstrained. Cox models have been widely applied in previous 
mortality studies using the HRS data (e.g. Sloan et al. 2010; Dupre et al. 2009; Lee et al. 
2008; Siegel et al. 2003; and Mehta et al. 2003). Second, I consider a parametric 
alternative by imposing a Gompertz form on the underlying hazard function. It is well-
documented that in past-middle adult ages (age 40 – 90) the mortality curve displays a 
regular and nearly exponential increase that can be represented by the Gompertz 
function (Gompertz 1825; Preston et al. 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 2002).75 Thus, the 
Gompertz form is suitable since the sample of HRS respondents is age 51 – 77 over the 
observational window. 76 
The Gompertz PH model is implemented with the following hazard and survivor 
functions: 
                                                            
75  The Gompertz model might actually underestimate mortality at ages under 40 and overestimate 
mortality at the oldest ages over 80 or 90. The Makeham-Gompertz and logistic models have been 
proposed to address these deviations. Nonetheless, for many purposes, the Gompertz model provides a 
satisfactory fit to adult mortality rates for ages between 40 and 90. I refer interested readers to Preston et 
al. (2001). 
76 Using Cox-Snell (Cox and Snell 1968) residuals, I also find that  the ‘Gompertz’ form fits the data best 
compared to other parametric forms (e.g. the ‘Weibull’, ‘Log-logistic’, and ‘Lognormal’). The cumulative 
hazard function (estimated with Cox-Snell residuals using the Gompertz form) lies very close to the 45-
degree reference line.  
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݄൫ݐห࢞࢐൯ ൌ expሺߛݐሻ exp൫࢞࢐ࢼ൯,                      (2) 
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ exp൛െe࢞࢐ࢼ	ߛିଵ	ሺeఊ௧ െ 1ሻൟ,                     (3) 
where ߛ is the additional parameter to be estimated from the data. Empirically, I find 
that the Gompertz function fits the survival function for both sexes exceptionally well in 
part because the sample respondents are all above age 50; most however have not 
reached the advanced ages of 80 or 90 by the 2008 wave. Results from the Cox 
regressions are nearly identical to those from the Gompertz approach (further evidence 
that the Gompertz function appropriately parameterizes the underlying baseline hazard); 
hence I present only the latter. Moreover, the parametric approach allows us to obtain 
more efficient estimates of the coefficients than the semi-parametric model, because it 
exploits all information in the data; the Cox model only compares subjects at failure 
times. Statistical analyses are conducted using STATA 11.0 software,77 and weighted to 
account for over-sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians in the HRS. 
One important issue to consider in the estimation is whether the hazard functions 
for males and females have different shapes. If the hazards for sexes are not 
proportional, then subsequent estimations need to be separated by sex. Results from 
fitting stratified models reveal that the hazards are proportional and thus a combined 
analysis is reasonable.78 Furthermore, hazard plots for both sexes are nearly parallel 
over the entire follow-up period. Another concern might be the nonlinearity of age and 
                                                            
77 See Cleves et al. (2010) for an overview of survival analysis using STATA’s STSET procedures. 
78 To test for differences in shape between the hazards for males and females, I include an ancillary 
gamma parameter in the Gompertz distribution to allow both the scale and shape of hazard to vary by sex 
(complete stratification). I find that coefficients do not differ, irrespective of whether we constrain the 
hazards to be of the same shape, or allow them to vary. This implies that the effect of sex on the shape of 
the hazard is not significant, up to a scale change. Stratification involving the Cox model leads to the 
same conclusion. 
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the interaction of age with analysis time.79 Nonetheless, analyses not reported in detail 
here show that higher order age variables and time-age interaction terms are not 
significant (p>.05). In order to properly estimate the baseline survivor function, the age 
variable is transformed so that the baseline hazard corresponds to a 50-year-old 
retiree.80  
In what follows, I first consider a specification (call it “M1”) with only 
information currently used by U.S. annuity providers i.e. age and sex. Then, the three 
blocks of additional prognostic factors are sequentially added to the PH model in the 
following order: “M2” adds the set of conventional, readily-measurable covariates; “M3” 
adds the block of less-conventional covariates; and finally “M4” adjusts for 
conventional, endogenous risk factors. In this way, any changes in the relation between 
the various control variables and mortality can be observed, while evaluating the fit of 
each specification.  
 
3.3 Results: Survival Analysis  
Of the sample of 9,047 HRS respondents, 6,547 survived, 1,905 died, and 595 
permanently attrited by the 2008 wave. The 16-year mortality rate is 21.1%;81  the 
attrited group is added to the denominator because it is observed that the bulk of 
                                                            
79 Age may interact with follow-up time; for example, a respondent who is older at enrollment may be 
more likely to die during follow-up (Dickman et al. 2004). If so, then the proportional hazards assumption 
is not appropriate for the age covariate since the hazard ratio will differ according to analysis time. In this 
model, the age*ݐ interaction term is not statistically significant, controlling for age and sex. 
80 I use baseline age minus 50. The origin from which the covariate is measured impacts the baseline 
cumulative hazard and survivor function because it changes how “all covariates equal zero” is defined. If 
age is unadjusted, the baseline hazard will correspond to a newborn.  
81 This mortality estimate (spanning Waves 1 to 9) appears reasonable given that the overall cumulative 
mortality for the HRS sub-sample up to Wave 7 is 15.9% (HRS 2008).  The confirmed mortality rate is 
22.5% (excludes the attrited group from both the nominator and denominator). 
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attriters had requested removal from the HRS survey in-person whilst alive. 82  In 
comparison, the 1992 lifetable mortality rate (weighted to reflect sample composition) 
is 23.5%. Mortality rates in the HRS sample are slightly lower than lifetable rates since 
HRS initially surveyed only the community-based population, which excludes long-
term care facility residents. Figure 3.1 shows that 70 percent of males and 78 percent of 
traced females survived the entire 16 years of follow-up. Also, the men’s survivor curve 
lies below that of the women’s, indicating that mortality risks are greater for males at 
every age. The observation that females have a better survival experience is consistent 
with observed longer life expectancies for women in the population at large. The 
survivor functions (Kaplan–Meier curves) in the Figure are also gently sloped which 
suggest that the increase in mortality risk over time is gradual.83 An important feature of 
the Kaplan–Meier curve is that it accounts for right-censoring, which occurs if a 
respondent withdraws from the study. The longest observation in this dataset survived 
201 months (16.75 years), and was ultimately censored.  
[Figure 3.1 here] 
Proportional Hazards Regressions 
Table 3.1 reports the results from fitting the Gompertz PH model for different sets of 
prognostic factors. The estimated hazard ratios (or odds ratios) give the partial effects of 
                                                            
82 The Tracker file records the detailed result of each interview attempt as of the close of the field period 
by wave, although the coding across waves was inconsistent. From the 2002 wave, it classifies 
respondents’ removal from the study according to these categories: respondent requests removal in person; 
request through informant, request through proxy, because tracking was exhausted, or because a proxy 
cannot be identified. I observe that a large percentage (above 93%) had asked to be removed from the 
sample in-person, and only a handful of cases were lost to tracking. As a result, the extent of unaccounted 
deaths among the attriters in the sample is minimal. 
83 One reason might be that the deaths observed over the time window are of individuals who die before 
their life expectancies (age 79-81). The average observed death age is 66. In other words, the subjects 
have not reached their ‘critical’ years by the end of 2008.    
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the explanatory variables on the odds of mortality.84  A hazard ratio larger than 1 
indicates that an increased hazard (probability of death) is associated with the 
explanatory variable, and a hazard ratio less than 1 indicates that a decreased hazard is 
associated with the explanatory variable. Accompanying 95 percent confidence 
intervals are also reported. It is apparent from Table 3.1 that probability of death is 
significantly higher for males and older people. Specifically in Column (M1), being a 
male is associated with a 62% higher mortality risk (p<.01) as compared to a female, 
and aging each year beyond age 50 is associated with 9% increased risk. In addition, the 
partial effects show that age and sex continue to be significant predictors of mortality 
even when more covariates are added in subsequent specifications. 
[Table 3.1 here] 
A better way to evaluate these hazard ratios is in the context of the baseline 
hazard function since the absolute increase in mortality risk depends on the size of 
baseline hazard. Figure 3.2 illustrates the hazard functions of four individuals of 
different attributes. The solid line is the baseline hazard depicting the hazard rates for 
our baseline case: a female age 50 in 1992. Her instantaneous probability of death starts 
low at age 50 and increases to about .0011 by the time she is age 66 (in 2008). Turning 
to consider the case of a male who is also age 50 in 1992, the Figure shows that his 
hazard function lies just slightly above the baseline hazard. This is because although he 
faces 1.62 times more risk than the female, the baseline hazard is small such that a 62% 
increase in risk does not create a large impact. In contrast, a 60-year old male has a 
                                                            
84 For a categorical variable, the hazard ratio compares the (mortality) hazard rate for respondents with 
the factor to the hazard rate for those without it. For a continuous variable, the hazard ratio represents the 
increase in hazard associated with a single unit of change in the explanatory variable. 
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hazard function that lies far above the baseline hazard. He faces about 3.84 times more 
the baseline case at any given point in time and has a hazard rate of .004 by the time he 
is age 76 (in 2008). More generally, the Figure shows closely parallel lines which 
support the proportionality assumption. The monotonically increasing functions are also 
consistent with the Gompertz parameterization. 
[Figure 3.2 here] 
Column (M2) adds race, education, whether married, prior health history, and 
weight – all of which are highly significant (p<.001). Lower mortality hazards are 
associated with respondents who completed high school (HR=0.73; 95% CI=0.66, 0.82), 
or who are married (HR=0.69; 95% CI=0.62, 0.77). On the other hand, people who are 
nonwhite, underweight, or had chronic diseases such as lung disease, diabetes, and heart 
attack face higher mortality risks.85 In particular, being underweight (symptomatic of an 
underlying disease) increases the risk of death by 2.9 times as compared to the reference 
normal weight group. It may appear surprising that obesity (BMI ≥ 30) is not associated 
with an excess risk of death. This is because the extent of obesity matters: several 
studies have shown statistically significant associations between all-cause mortality and 
BMI in severely obese groups (BMI ≥ 35), but not for the mildly obese group.86 Overall, 
                                                            
85 Our reported hazard ratios are consistent with those in prior studies. For example, using a sample of 
HRS male respondents, Sloan et al. (2010) report hazard ratios of 0.945 for with high school education, 
0.794 for married, 1.170 for blacks, 1.006 for baseline age, and 0.83 for foreign-born. 
86 Consistent with the findings here, prior studies that used HRS data did not find statistically significant 
differences in the mortality of overweight and mildly obese groups versus the normal weight group 
(Reuser et al. 2008; Mehta and Chang 2009). For example, Mehta and Chang (2009) find that respondents 
who are Class I obese (BMI 30-34.9) do not face excess mortality risk but those who are severely obese 
(Class II/III obesity with BMI ≥35) do. That study concluded that obesity is not a significant cause of 
mortality in the HRS population because there are relatively few people who are extremely obese. 
Applying finer classes of obesity in this present paper, I find that the ‘Class III obese’ variable has a 
hazard ratio above one but the effect is not significant (results not reported in detail here).  
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M2 has substantially better fit than M1: the Wald test statistic (ܩଶ) reported in the Table 
shows a six-fold increase and the difference is highly significant (1,287, 16 df – 191, 2 
df = 1,096, 14 df, p<.000).87  
Column (M3) adds the set of less conventionally used variables, including birth 
region, cognitive score, and parental factors. A ten-point increase in cognitive score is 
associated with a 26% lower mortality hazard (p<.01). Also significant is birth region: 
respondents not born in the US, or born in the West region, face 26 – 37% less mortality 
risk as compared to those born in the Northeast region of North America. Results also 
show that father’s longevity is predictive of mortality; a respondent whose father 
survives 10 years past age 65 faces 5% lower hazard. Interestingly, a stepwise 
procedure (not reported in detail here) reveals that the inclusion of cognitive score is the 
key reason for the diminished effect of race on mortality (odds ratio falls from 1.18, 
p<.01 to 1.14, p<.05). This suggests that nonwhite HRS respondents are likely to have 
lower cognitive scores and to die younger.88 If so, this enhances the attractiveness of 
cognition as pricing factor since not only is it objectively-measured, it also act as a 
proxy for an important demographic characteristic like race. The overall improvement 
in fit (Wald test statistic) is modest but statistically significant (p<.000). In essence, 
                                                            
87 The test statistic is based on the chi-square test that at least one of the predictors' regression coefficients 
is not equal to zero in the model. It is also a measure of model fit – a larger statistic indicates better fit. In 
nested models, the model with more parameters will always fit at least as well as the one with fewer 
parameters. Whether the fuller model fits significantly better and thus preferred, can be determined by 
deriving the p-value of the difference between the test statistics. The Wald chi-square statistic (a variant 
of the likelihood-ratio chi-square) is used as it accounts for the clustering across observations for the 
same subject.  
88 This is consistent with the findings in Rodgers et al. (2003). Using the 1993 and 1998 waves of the 
AHEAD sample in the HRS, their regression analysis on cognitive score show that being African-
American is associated with an estimated decline of about 0.49 points on the total cognitive score per 
year, while being Hispanic is associated with a 0.35 points decrease. 
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model M3 represents the complete specification with the proposed set of readily-
measurable factors that can be used to price annuities, in addition to age and sex. 
The set of endogenous controls are introduced in Column (M4) to test how their 
inclusion affects estimates of previously-controlled covariates. Results show that self-
rated health and smoking are significant (p<.01). In particular, a person who reports 
“poor” health faces triple the risk (HR=3.02; 95% CI=2.38, 3.81) of someone who 
reports “excellent” health. The inclusion of self-rated health also makes the race and 
education variables lose statistical significance. 89  Interestingly, pairwise correlation 
analyses reveal that respondents who rate their own health poorly tend to be better 
educated, and are white (rather than black or Hispanic). This observation concords with 
Dowd and Zajacova (2007) who find that individuals across SES strata differ in how 
they evaluate their health. In particular, lower health self-ratings are more strongly 
associated with mortality for adults with higher education and/or higher income. The 
useful takeaway here is that self-rated health is not likely to be useful as an additional 
pricing factor – it is subjective and its explanatory power is derived from existing SES 
factors. Current smoking increases hazards by 76%. While its strong independent effect 
on mortality enhances its usefulness as a risk-class, the need for blood tests to verify 
smoker status makes it less palatable than the set of readily-measurable factors already 
identified in Model 3. 
                                                            
89 A stepwise procedure (not reported in detail here) shows that the addition of self-rated health to the 
model has the greatest impact on existing covariates. In relation, the pairwise correlations are 0.19 (self-
rated health and nonwhite) and -0.32 (self-rated health and education). Both correlations are significant at 
1% level. 
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Table 3.1 reports the parameter ߛ , which controls the shape of the baseline 
hazard. The value of ߛ varies depending on the model specifications, but the key is that 
ߛ is a positive value indicating monotone hazard functions that increase exponentially 
with time.90 Because it has been verified in Section 3 that the male and female hazards 
have the same shape, a unisex ߛ will be applied in the subsequent pricing simulations. A 
related issue is then whether ߛ  differs significantly for the younger versus older 
respondents, since there is a maximum possible age gap of 12 years. To test for this age-
covariates interaction, I divide the respondents into two groups: ages 50-57 (two-thirds 
of the sample) and ages 58-62. The number of deaths in both groups is pretty similar. 
Results are shown in Appendix Table 3.2.  
Slight differences emerge: for the older group, the age covariate is not 
statistically significant (HR=1.04, 95% CI=0.97, 1.12, p>.10),91 and the negative effect 
of chronic diseases and low BMI on mortality seems less intense.92 For instance, an 
older person with cancer faces 1.7 times the mortality risk of someone without 
(compared to 2.3 for a younger counterpart). One possible explanation is that at 
advanced ages, physical conditions become less predictive of mortality (everyone 
eventually becomes frail and disease-ridden), whereas mental health emerges as a more 
significant determinant. Although the dataset we use precludes our validating this 
surmise, it appears that cognitive score and years of education (proxies of mental ability) 
                                                            
90 This is consistent with Figure 3.2. 
91 The magnitude of the odds ratio, however, is similar to that for the younger group. 
92 Our results show that the hazard ratios for six of the eight chronic disease conditions are lower for the 
older group. This is consistent with results in Lee et al. (2008). Using HRS data, that study finds that as 
age increases, the ability of chronic conditions to predict mortality declines rapidly. Chronic conditions 
are stronger predictors of death for younger participants (aged 50-59 years) than for older participants. 
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predict mortality slightly better for the older group. But overall, there are no substantial 
differences in the hazard ratios or ߛ between the two age groups; thus, I proceed with 
the combined sample. 
Improved Predictive Ability from Risk-class Pricing 
One of the objectives of this paper is to explore the possible impact of pricing 
annuity benefits using additional risk-classes vis-à-vis existing pricing factors (age and 
sex). To do so, I compare the values of adjusted ܴଶ  across the four models. 93 
Controlling only for age and sex in “M1” explain about 6.7% (SE 0.0093) of variance in 
mortality outcomes. In contrast, “M2” and “M3” have adjusted ܴଶ values of 29.7% (SE 
0.0139) and 30.6% (SE 0.0138) respectively. In other words, implementing the 12 to 18 
additional risk-classes will allow an insurer to explain about five times more variation 
in mortality, suggesting that much prognostic information is carried by the additional 
variables.   
To assess the relative contributions of individual predictors, I remove variables 
from “M3” one at a time – in the order that reduced ܴଶ the least at each step. For the 
given sample, diabetes is the most important predictor of mortality, followed (in this 
order) by lung disease, heart disease, sex, age, marital status, high blood, cancer, own 
schooling, BMI, psychiatric condition, cognition, birth region, stroke, father’s longevity, 
race, mother’s education, father’s education, arthritis, and mother’s longevity. This 
ranking suggests that prior health history (other than arthritis) and demographic 
                                                            
93 The values of adjusted ܴଶ are found at the bottom of Table 3.1. In the context of censored survival data, 
the adjusted ܴଶ measures how much of the variation in outcome in a PH model is accounted for through 
the prognostic index (ݔߚ), adjusting for the dimension of the model. See Royston (2006) for details. The 
Harrell’s ܥ  and Somers’ ܦ  statistics for Cox PH models are not suitable for use with our weighted 
analysis.  
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variables (particularly age, sex, and marital status) are important predictors of mortality 
for people close to retirement. Objectively-measured variables such as BMI and 
cognition also rank moderately well, which lends weight to their use in annuity pricing. 
Race does not rank highly on this list, probably because it serves as a proxy for SES, 
which in this case may have been largely captured by the education variable. Parental 
education is ranked low, which is not surprising since the mortality of older adults may 
no longer be strongly associated with parental SES.  
In what follows, the ten best-ranked additional risk-classes are combined with 
age and sex to form a “risk-class pricing” scheme.94 This new model specification with 
a total of 12 variables has an adjusted ܴଶ value of 29.7% (SE 0.0137). It is posited that 
this “risk-class pricing” scheme which is richer in information will allow insurers to 
derive more accurate mortality predictions than the “age-sex pricing” scheme. This 
paper proposes a novel approach to make this assessment by comparing age-at-death 
prediction intervals. To the best of my knowledge, this procedure has not been 
demonstrated in previous population-based studies of mortality. Studying age-at-death 
intervals is of interest since insurers will want to pinpoint, as accurately as possible, 
how long annuity payouts need to be made.  
Age-at-death probability density functions are derived from post-PH regression 
estimates. These density functions show the relative likelihood of the individual dying 
at each point in time, i.e. the probability of dying before month ݇ ൅ 1 given survival to 
                                                            
94 Results (not presented) show that this ranking using adjusted R2 is consistent with other variable 
selection methods. Stepwise and forward selection procedures both confirm that parental education, 
mother’s longevity, arthritis, and birth region are the least significant variables. A slight difference is that 
the forward selection method ranks ‘stroke’ as one of the top 12 factors in lieu of ‘own schooling’. 
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month ݇. Formally, let ሺ݀ሻ denote the age of a retiree who purchases an individual life 
annuity at time 0. A discrete random variable associated with her future lifetime is ܭሺ݀ሻ 
where discrete time periods are measured in months. 95  The survival function and 
density function of ܭሺ݀ሻ are, respectively: 
ܵሺ݇ሻ ൌ Prሾܭሺ݀ሻ ൐ ݇ሿ ൌ ݌௞ ௗ,																						݀ ൒ 50, ݇ ൌ 0, 1, 2, …,		                (4) 
ܲݎሾܭሺ݀ሻ ൌ ݇ሿ ൌ ݌௞ ௗ െ ݌௞ାଵ ௗ ൌ 	 ݌௞ ௗ	 ݍଵ ௗା௞,	                                               (5)       
where ݌௞ ௗ  is the probability that ሺ݀ሻ will attain age ݀	 ൅ 	݇ (or so-called cumulative 
survival probability), and ݍଵ ௗା௞  is the one-period mortality rate at age ݀	 ൅ 	݇ . The 
constraint of ݀ ൒ 50 is consistent with the minimum age of the given sample. The 
assumed terminal age that an individual can live up to is 120. Essentially, Equation (4) 
is the discrete-form equivalent of Equation (3). Fitted estimates of the survival function 
are derived for price simulations discussed in the next section. The focus here is the 
fitted estimates of the density function derived from Equation (5). 
It is also useful to introduce the notion of a ‘risk-group’. Individuals who share a 
common density function are called a risk-group. In the context of annuities, a risk-
group with a longer lifespan is ‘riskier’ than another. Given that the sample consists of a 
number of risk-groups, the objective here is to analyze how the density functions 
estimated under the two different annuity pricing schemes will differ, in the presence of 
such heterogeneity. In particular, consider four distinct risk-groups profiled as follows: 
                                                            
95 In actuarial terminology, this is called the curtate-future-lifetime of ሺ݀ሻ. See Bowers (1997). 
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(i) High longevity-risk: 55-year-old female, no disease history, slightly 
overweight, married, completed high school (HS-educated), above-
average cognition. 
(ii) Average risk: 55-year-old female, no disease history, normal weight but 
is not married, not HS-educated, average cognition. (Note that this 
mortality profile is obtained by setting all 10 additional risk variables at 
their reference categories.) 
(iii) Low risk: 55-year-old female, history of cancer, underweight, is not 
married, not HS-educated, below-average cognition.  
(iv) Very low risk: 58-year-old male, overweight, has heart disease, high 
blood and psychiatric illness, not married, not HS-educated, below-
average cognition. 
Figure 3.3 plots the density functions for each risk-group. For the first three 
subgroups, the density curves estimated from age-sex pricing alone (dotted lines) are 
identical; the benchmark is the density function for an average 55-year old female. In 
contrast, estimates obtained from “risk-class pricing” (solid lines) vary significantly 
across the three risk-groups; the subgroup with longer longevity is expected to die later 
than others. Overall, this enables readers to visualize exactly how incorporating more 
risk-classes improves predictive power: insurers are not only able to distinguish across 
risk profiles, but also obtain tighter age-at-death prediction intervals (narrower 
distributions). In addition, the solid line functions reveal higher peaks implying that the 
most probable ages of death are associated with greater weight (higher probability 
levels).  
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[Figure 3.3 here] 
The bottom-right plot in the Figure illustrates the density curves for a very low-
longevity risk-group; here we characterize this as an older male with a history of several 
diseases.  In such cases, substantial differences in mortality predictions can emerge: for 
instance, “risk-class pricing” predicts a most probable age-at-death at 64, whereas “age-
sex pricing” yields a prediction of age 83. Having selected suitable risk-classes and 
demonstrated how incorporating these additional factors will lead to improved age-at-
death predictions, the next step is to analyze how implementing these risk-classes 
affects the financial value of annuities for different demographic groups.  
 
3.4 Price Simulations on a Purely Financial Basis  
 This section briefly describes the actuarial valuation approach for life annuities 
and presents simulation results for a hypothetical cohort of 65-year-old potential 
annuity buyers.96 It should be noted that this pool of individuals is not related in any 
way to the earlier sample of HRS respondents. I first simulate the annuity benefit flows 
accruing to a variety of risk-groups, and then simulate the annuity premiums that would 
be charged under different actuarially fair pricing schemes. These results are combined 
to obtain the money’s worth ratio for various risk-groups under alternative pricing 
schemes assuming no loading.  
 
                                                            
96 Earlier studies that perform annuity value simulations have similarly focused on a cohort of same-age 
annuitants. For instance, Brown (2003) uses a cohort of 67-year-olds. Mitchell et al. (1999) and Turra and 
Mitchell (2008) focus on a cohort of 65-year-olds. Age 65 is selected here because it is closer to the 
expected retirement age of the sample of HRS respondents (mean=63.5, SD=3.65) used in the earlier 
regression analyses.  
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Benefit Flows to Annuitants 
Consider a standard, nominal, whole life annuity that pays $1 per month as long 
as the annuitant is alive. The first payout starts at time ݐ ൌ 0  when the annuity is 
purchased. This is the only product available to individuals in this simulation. The 
benefits to annuity purchasers in the same risk-group can be quantified as follows:  
ܧܲܦܸ ൌ෍$1	 ∙ ݒ௧ ∙ ݌ௗ௚௥௢௨௣௧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
,																																																																																			(6) 
where EPDV refers to the expected present discounted value of future annuity payouts. 
In addition, ݒ  is the discount factor, ݌ௗ௚௥௢௨௣௧  is the set of cumulative survival 
probabilities for a risk-group, ݀ is the age at which the annuity is purchased, and ݐ is 
time expressed in months. In actuarial terminology, the EPDV is called the actuarial 
present value of a life annuity and the upper bound of the summation is set to infinity by 
convention. Equation (6) captures the present value of the series of annuity benefits that 
an annuitant in a particular risk-group can expect to receive over her remaining lifetime. 
Risk-groups can be defined using any combination of risk factors. For instance, 
a broadly-defined risk-group might be ‘age 65, females’; their set of ݌ௗ௚௥௢௨௣௧  can be 
estimated from a PH regression that controls only for age and sex.97 Another example of 
a risk-group would be ‘married, high-school educated, age 65, females’ – and any 
female with these four characteristics would be in the group (even though some would 
                                                            
97 Robustness checks are performed to determine if the fitted estimates of ݌௧ ௗ  are reflective of rates 
reported in actuarial lifetables. Results (not presented) show that the fitted cumulative survival estimates 
generated from the PH regression controlling only for age and sex (i.e. Model 1) are close to the survival 
probabilities constructed from the Social Security Administration (SSA) birth cohort tables. The 1930 and 
1940 sex-specific SSA cohort tables are used since the HRS sample respondents are born 1931-1941, and 
are sourced from www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/as120/LifeTables_Tbl_7.html.  
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be suffering from a disease and some would not). Their set of ݌ௗ௚௥௢௨௣௧  is estimated 
from a PH regression that controls for age, sex, education, and marital status. In the 
simulations that follow, a nominal annual interest rate of 6% is assumed (this rate 
reflects the average 30-year Treasury bond yield for the last 20 years) and I also present 
sensitivity analysis using an alternative value of 4%.98 Further, the assumed terminal 
age of survival is 120.99 
Table 3.2 presents the simulated expected annuity benefits (or EPDV) for a 
variety of risk-groups. The row in the middle shows that a 65-year-old annuity 
purchaser, on average, can expect to receive $126 in annuity benefits. If the fact that 
females live longer than males is accounted for, then plugging sex-specific survival 
probabilities into Equation (6) reveals that the estimated EPDV for females is actually 
$16 higher than that for males. If we further account for the education level of the 
annuitant, then the EPDV of high-school educated groups will be larger than that of 
non-high-school educated groups. The top and bottom rows of the Table draws a 
contrast between a very long-lived group profiled by ‘females with no high blood, 
married, and high-school-educated’ (EPDV $152) and a very short-lived group profiled 
                                                            
98 The average 30-year Treasury bond yield from 1988 to 2010 is 6.3% (the bond was discontinued 
between 2003 and 2005 but re-introduced in 2006). In recent years, yields have been falling. As at end 
2010, the 30-year Treasury bond yield is 4.25%. Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release 
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm). Prior studies (e.g. Mitchell et al. 1999) have similarly 
used the 30-year Treasury bond yield to proxy a flat nominal term structure. The discount factor is 
computed using ݒ ൌ 1 ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ⁄ , where ݅ denotes the nominal interest rate. It is also assumed that the 
insurer always earns exactly this rate on the assets backing the annuity, and so any profit or loss stems 
solely from annuity pricing simulations and not from reinvestment risk.  
99 A terminal age (denoted ݓ) of 120 is appropriate for two reasons. First, it has been used as the limiting 
age in official cohort lifetables from the U.S. Social Security Administration. Second, it appears to be a 
reasonable choice for the sample here since the maximum death ages observed for deceased parents are 
105 (father), and 110 (mother) suggesting it is plausible that HRS respondents can potentially live to 120. 
In Equation (6), the upper bound of the summation can thus be alternatively expressed as ሺݓ െ ݀ሻ ൈ 12. 
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by ‘males with high blood, unmarried, and low-educated’ (EPDV $81). In essence, the 
Table reflects a spectrum of longevity profiles in a heterogeneous cohort, although one 
can easily imagine other forms of representative profiles.100  
 [Table 3.2 here] 
Premiums Charged by Insurers 
How premiums are set depends on the prevailing pricing scheme in the market. 
To simplify the analysis, zero-loading is assumed so the insurer is assumed to set 
premiums just sufficient to break-even for each benchmark group that it prices.101  
Table 3.3 illustrates the dollar premiums charged to the hypothetical pool of age 65 
individuals under different pricing schemes for a $1/month life annuity. In an ‘age-only’ 
pricing scheme, the insurer will set a price based on the average survival probabilities of 
65-year-olds. All annuity buyers will be charged the same premium of $126. Under 
‘age-sex’ pricing, the insurer no longer charges a single price but now has to 
differentiate between the sexes. The insurer uses the average survival probabilities of 
65-year-old females to derive a premium of $134, and all female annuity purchasers 
(whether they are married or unmarried, with disease or without) must pay $134. 
Because of their lower average survival probabilities, males are charged a lower 
premium of $117.  
[Table 3.3 here] 
                                                            
100 For example, ‘females with lung disease, underweight, and poor cognition’ will also fit the profile of a 
very short-lived group. 
101 Insurers typically add loadings to the insurance products they sell to cover administrative costs and to 
incorporate some profit margin. Such loadings are borne by the consumers. 
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Row 3 of the Table shows that if an ‘age-sex-education’ scheme is adopted 
instead, there will be a total of four distinct prices after accounting for the different 
permutations among the pricing factors; high-school educated females paying the 
highest premium of $145. It is also important to note from this analysis that risk-groups 
become more narrowly-defined when the pricing scheme becomes more detailed; for 
example, it is not possible to compute a premium for a risk-group of 65-year old 
females under ‘age-sex-education’ pricing. 
Risk-based pricing essentially allows insurers to price-discriminate more finely 
across different risk profiles. As pricing schemes incorporate more details, the schedule 
of possible premiums offered by an insurer grows exponentially. The Table shows that 
using six rating classes will result in 32 distinct prices ranging from $82-160. If all the 
top 12 pricing factors are used, then there are possibly more than 4,000 distinct 
premiums to account for the various permutations of 65-year old annuitants. All the 
results in the Table assume zero-loads. Loads can be factored into the analysis, for 
example, by assuming that they form a fixed percentage of the premium. If loads are 
say 10%, then all simulated premiums simply decrease by 10%, in which case, the 
relative prices charged to different buyers are unaffected. 
Money’s Worth Ratios Results 
To assess the financial value of annuities accruing to different demographic 
groups, a metric called the “money’s worth ratio (MWR)” is employed. The MWR 
measures the financial value of an annuity investment to the individual, and it is simply 
the ratio of the EPDV over the annuity premium paid. If the MWR is less than 1, then 
the individual is expected to receive less back in payouts than what she paid. If she 
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decides to buy the annuity, she would anticipate receiving a negative expected transfer. 
If MWR is greater than 1, then the annuitant would anticipate receiving a positive 
expected transfer.  
Table 3.4A presents the MWR values for different demographic groups under a 
variety of pricing schemes. These values are derived using the simulated EPDV and 
premium estimates discussed earlier. It is important to note that these are the values 
available to individuals if they should decide to buy the annuities; thus this analysis 
does not require the assumption that all individuals must annuitize. The key takeaway 
from this Table is that shorter-lived annuity purchasers will be made financially better 
off (and the longer-lived made worse off) when more detailed pricing schemes are 
implemented. This is evidenced by focusing on the ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ risk-groups in the 
Table which represents longer-lived and shorter-lived profiles respectively. Under age-
sex pricing, the MWR for the shorter-lived group is 0.693. MWR increases substantially 
to 0.893 when additional factors such as education and marital status are used – this is 
about a 29% increase in financial value for every dollar they invest in annuities. This is 
because when pricing incorporates more personal characteristics, shorter-lived 
individuals enjoy lower premiums that reflect their high mortality attributes. In contrast, 
the longer-lived are charged higher premiums causing their MWR to decline. The 
longer-lived risk-group has a MWR of 1.204 under ‘age-only’ pricing (scheme S1) but 
only a MWR of 1.047 under the more detailed pricing scheme S4.  
[Table 3.4 here] 
An interesting observation is that the incremental gains achieved by the shorter-
lived exceed the incremental losses experienced by the longer-lived group. Moving 
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progressively from scheme S2 to S4, the Table shows 13 to 15% gains in MWR for the 
shorter-lived. These gains are substantial as compared to the modest declines of 3 to 5% 
for the longer-lived. This suggests that the effect of adopting more factors in annuity 
pricing in a heterogeneous population of annuity purchasers is likely to be uneven; 
longer-lived groups will be made just slightly worse off but shorter-lived groups will be 
disproportionately much better off. The intuition here is that it is generally harder to 
increase one’s survival probability than to worsen it. Hazard ratios reveal that the 
combined longevity advantage of being married, HS-educated, female, and without high 
blood, decreases the risk of death by only 50% vis-à-vis the baseline individual. Yet, 
having the exact opposite attributes (all else equal) increases the mortality risk of an 
individual by 313%.102 In other words, the survival curve of the longer-lived will lie just 
slightly above that of the baseline individual but the survival curve of the shorter-lived 
will lie far below the baseline curve. This disparity in survival estimates results in the 
premium falling more for the shorter-lived than it rising for the longer-lived when a 
pricing factor is added. 
In sum, the MWR analysis suggests two important reasons why more detailed 
pricing may help reduce adverse selection in annuity markets. First, shorter-lived 
groups will be induced to buy annuities. Where they may have stayed out of the annuity 
market previously under simpler pricing, they may now decide to annuitize given 
decent MWR values of 0.8 to 0.9. Moreover, as pricing schemes become progressively 
                                                            
102  The computations are based on the hazard ratios in Column M2, Table 3.1. Death hazards are 
multiplicatively proportional. Assuming all other factors are set at their reference categories, a married, 
HS-educated, female without high blood has a mortality risk of 0.69*0.73*1*1=0.504 whereas an 
unmarried, non-HS-educated, male who ever-had high blood has a mortality risk of 1*1*1.92*1.63=3.13. 
 
106 
 
more detailed, the incremental gains in MWR (13-15%) accruing to these shorter-lived 
groups are substantial. Second, longer-lived groups still have an incentive to annuitize 
even when more detailed pricing is implemented. This is because the penalty that these 
groups bear through higher premiums results in only modest financial losses of about 3-
5%; moreover, they can still expect to enjoy positive expected transfers from 
annuitization as MWR > 1. Sensitivity analysis reveals that these results remain robust 
under a lower interest rate assumption (see Table 3.4B). 
While the MWR is a useful metric, it ignores the insurance value that 
individuals may derive from the elimination of longevity risk. The next section 
describes a utility-based model and quantifies the utility gains accruing to different 
demographic groups under the assumption of risk aversion. It assesses whether shorter-
lived groups may obtain utility gains from more detailed pricing schemes, and if so, 
whether they are as substantial as the financial gains. 
 
3.5 Price Simulations on a Utility-Adjusted Basis  
This section primarily builds on the work by Brown (2001, 2003) and Mitchell 
et al. (1999).103 In particular, I adopt the approach developed in these studies to quantify 
the welfare gains of annuitization to an individual using a metric called the “annuity 
equivalent wealth (AEW)”. Unlikely the MWR, the AEW is a utility-based measure of 
annuity valuation and it has been shown in prior studies that individuals may find an 
annuity to be welfare-enhancing even if MWR< 1.  
                                                            
103 I am especially grateful to Jeffery R. Brown and Olivia S. Mitchell for use of the code for generating 
utility-equivalent wealth values originating from Brown (2001). 
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Closest to this present paper, Brown (2003) studies the utility-adjusted value of 
annuitization for a cohort of 67-year-olds of heterogeneous mortality under two pricing 
scenarios. Mortality is differentiated using sex, education, and race.104  One pricing 
scenario examined is unisex uniform pricing (which corresponds to age-only pricing) 
and the other scenario is actuarially fair pricing for each and every separate 
demographic group. This present paper aims to extend the empirical analysis on two 
fronts: first, I consider intermediate pricing scenarios that lie between the two markers. 
Thus the pricing scheme prevailing at any point in time may be more than actuarially 
fair for some demographic groups and less than actuarially fair for other groups.105 This 
is perhaps a better reflection of reality since insurers are likely to adopt additional risk-
classes progressively as depicted by the intermediate pricing scenarios. Second, I 
examine a more diverse set of demographic groups. In particular, I differentiate 
mortality along more demographic lines, including education, marital status, and 
disease condition, which serves to broaden the analysis in useful ways.106 In what 
follows, I describe the multi-period, stochastic life-cycle model used to evaluate the 
insurance value of an annuity under uncertain lifetimes and simulate AEW results for 
the hypothetical cohort of 65-year-olds.  
                                                            
104 According to Brown (2003), education is selected in because it is a reasonable proxy for lifetime 
resources and is also a predetermined variable for most retired individuals. Race is selected because it is 
directly relevant to the politics of the Social Security debate in the U.S. This is consistent with the study’s 
objective of assessing the utility implications of mandating annuitization in an environment of 
heterogeneous mortality.   
105 The pricing scheme will be actuarially fair for groups which are identified as benchmarks in that 
particular scheme. These benchmark groups have been identified in Table 3.3 and have MWR values of 
1.000 in Table 3.4.    
106 Differentiating along more demographic lines increases the mortality heterogeneity between the ‘top’ 
and ‘bottom’ risk-groups, thus leading to a larger observed dispersion in MWR and AEW values. In 
addition, the choice of factors matters; selecting factors that are less correlated will create greater 
mortality heterogeneity between the risk-groups analyzed. 
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Analytical Framework for AEW 
At the posited retirement age of 65, the individual decides how much of her 
initial wealth to annuitize. The retiree is assumed to be solving an expected utility 
maximization problem. Formally, let ܷሺܥ௧ሻ  represent the one-period utility function 
defined over real consumption,	 ݌௧ ௔  is the probability that an individual survives to 
period ݐ (ݐ is expressed in years), ߩ the time preference rate, and ߱ the terminal age 
(assume 120). Then, assuming additive separability over time, the value function 
௧ܸሺ ௧ܹሻ is defined as: 
௧ܸሺ ௧ܹሻ ൌ 	ܯܽݔሼ஼೟ሽ 	൥ ෍
݌௧ ଺ହ 	 ∙ ܷሺܥ௧ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻ௧
ఠି଺ହାଵ
௧ୀଵ
൩ ,																																																										(7) 
subject to the following constraints: 
(i) ଴ܹ is given, 
(ii) ௧ܹ 	൒ 0, ∀ݐ,																																																																																															 (8)                  
(iii) ௧ܹାଵ ൌ 	 ሺ ௧ܹ െ ܥ௧ ൅ ܣ௧ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ. 
In this set of constraints, ௧ܹ is non-annuitized wealth in period ݐ, ܥ௧ is consumption in 
period ݐ , ܣ௧  is the annuity income she receives in period ݐ  if she had purchased an 
annuity, and ݎ is the real interest rate. There is no expectation operator because the 
survival probabilities have been explicitly accounted for, and there are no other sources 
of uncertainty in this problem. In addition, as in prior studies, I assume no bequests, no 
loadings, and no taxes in this setup. This value function at time ݐ  is the present 
discounted value of expected utility evaluate along the optimal path. Knowing the 
optimal decision in period ݐ allows one to find the optimal decision that maximizes the 
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value function in period ݐ െ 1. The problem is thus solved numerically using backward 
recursion from the final period, and may be expressed by the following recursive 
Bellman equation: 
ܯܽݔሼ஼೟ሽ	 ௧ܸሺ ௧ܹሻ ൌ 	ܯܽݔሼ஼೟ሽ	ܷሺܥ௧ሻ ൅	
݌௧ାଵଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻ	 ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵሻ,																									       (9) 
where ݌ଵ ௧ାଵ is the one-period probability of surviving in period ݐ ൅ 1.  
Consistent with prior studies, I apply standard methods of discretizing the 
wealth space, and adopt the standard assumption that individuals exhibit constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA).107 The CRRA utility allows the simulation results to be 
invariant to the level of wealth possessed by the individuals in the different 
demographic groups at retirement. In other words, the value of annuitization derived by 
each demographic group will be unaffected by the differences in wealth levels across 
groups. The CRRA utility structure is: 
ܷሺܥ௧ሻ ൌ 	 ܥ௧
ଵିఊ
1 െ ߛ 	,																																																																																																												(10) 
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. More risk-averse individuals will 
value annuities more highly than less risk-averse individuals. Consistent with earlier 
studies such as Hubbard et al. (1995), a γ parameter of 3 is used for the main analysis. 
Sensitivity analysis using an alternative value of γ ൌ 1 is also presented since a risk 
aversion of 1 corresponds to log utility, and has been found to be the average risk 
aversion in prior studies on consumption (e.g. Laibson et al. 1998).  
                                                            
107 See Turra and Mitchell (2008), Brown (2003, 2001), and Mitchell et al. (1999). 
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The analysis proceeds with a counterfactual exercise using two scenarios. 
Assume that an individual has initial financial wealth ܹ∗ . In the first scenario, 
individuals have full access to an annuity market where single-life, fixed-payout, 
nominal payout annuities are sold. Assume that the individual annuitizes all resources 
she has, i.e. ଴ܹ ൌ 0 . The annual income she obtains from the annuity  ሺܣ௧ሻ  is 
determined by the pricing scheme used by the insurer. For the special case in which the 
annuity is actuarially-fair for the individual, ܣ௧ is determined by: 
ܣ௧ ൌ 	 ܹ
∗
∑ ݌௧ ଺ହሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௧ሺ1 ൅ ߨሻ௧ఠି଺ହାଵ௧ୀଵ
	,																																																																														(11) 
where ݎ is the real interest rate, and ߨ is the inflation rate. The maximum utility ܸ∗ the 
individual attains in this first scenario can be found by solving the maximization 
problem subject to the constraints in Equation (2). 
Turning to the second scenario, assume now that no annuity market is available. 
That is, ଴ܹ ൌ ܹ∗ and ܣ௧ ൌ 0, ∀ݐ. I solve the maximization problem again and find the 
amount of additional wealth, ∆ܹ, which must be given to the individual (in the absence 
of annuities) so that she can achieve the utility level ܸ∗. Given this setup, the annuity 
equivalent wealth (AEW) is thus defined as: 
ܣܧܹ ൌ	ܹ
∗ ൅	∆ܹ
ܹ∗ .																																																																																																							 (12) 
In essence, the utility-based measure of AEW is similar to the Equivalent Variation 
measure in applied welfare analysis. Specifically, it quantifies how much an 
individual’s wealth needs to be multiplied by (in a scenario without annuities) in order 
to generate the same utility level as in the scenario where annuities are available. In a 
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multi-period life-cycle model with risk-averse individuals, the AEW is typically a 
number greater than unity since the option of annuitization is valuable. Following 
Brown (2003), the simulations here assume ߩ = ݎ = ߨ = 3%.108 Also, simulations only 
focus on annuity contracts that pay fixed, nominal benefit streams.109  
Annuity Equivalent Wealth Results 
Annuity prices (defined here as the annual annuity income for a given 
premium110) are constructed by replacing the ݌௧ ଺ହ in Equation (11) with the appropriate 
set of survival probabilities. For example, if annuities are priced based on age and sex 
only, then the annuity income for a married, or unmarried, 65-year old female is found 
using the average survival probabilities of 65-year old females. It is important to note 
that the mortality rates used as input to determine pricing are only averages and 
significant dispersion in mortality will exist among say, the group of 65-year old 
females. As such, annuities that are age-sex priced in an actuarially-fair manner for 65-
year old females will be more than actuarially-fair for a married 65-year old female with 
no diseases, and less than actuarially-fair for an unmarried, low-cognition 65-year old 
female. 
                                                            
108 Some important parameters adopted in this present paper are different from Brown (2003), for instance, 
mortality inputs, age of annuitization, and limiting age. While Brown (2003) considers mortality 
differentiated by age, sex, race, and education, this present paper differentiates risk-groups by age, sex, 
education, marital status, and disease conditions. The selection of risk-classes is important since 
correlations among the risk-classes affect the amount of mortality heterogeneity across the various risk-
groups, and in turn affect the dispersion in AEW results.  
109 The focus of this present paper is on the dispersion in annuity equivalent wealth ensuing across 
different pricing schemes, thus only one annuity type is illustrated. Readers who are interested in how the 
dispersion in AEW varies across annuity types can refer to Brown (2003).  
110 Annuity pricing can be expressed in two ways. The first is that the insurer determines the annuity 
premium as in the MWR analysis. This applies to a fixed-payout annuity (e.g. annuity pays $500/month 
for life). The second is that the insurer determines the quantum of payout for a given premium invested. 
This applies when the annuitant decides to invest, say $100,000, in an annuity. In both cases, the insurer 
sets the ‘price’ and annuitant is the price-taker. 
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Table 3.5 reports the annual annuity income for a $100,000 policy under various 
pricing schemes. If individual-life annuities are age-sex priced, a 65-year old male will 
receive $10,898 per year, while a female will receive a lower annual income of $9,492 
due to her longer life expectancy. Under pricing scheme S3, lowly-educated individuals 
will benefit from an increase in annuity income. In particular, the Table shows that 
lowly-educated males now receive $12,344 in annual income as compared to $10,898 
under scheme S2. In contrast, better educated individuals experience a decline in 
annuity income. A high school-educated female now receives only $9,036 (compare 
$9,492 under S2) since her premium educational level is now factored into the annuity 
pricing. In the very detailed pricing scheme S4, an unmarried, lowly-educated male will 
receive $5,527 more annually than a married high school-educated female for the same 
given annuity premium of $100,000. 
[Table 3.5 here] 
Table 3.6A presents the annuity equivalent wealth for different demographic 
groups under different pricing schemes. Results show that the utility gains from 
annuitization are substantial for both genders under the age-sex pricing scheme used in 
the U.S. annuity market today. This finding is consistent with previous empirical 
analyses (e.g. Brown 2003; Mitchell et al. 1999). In particular, females – on average – 
have an AEW of 1.474, meaning that they will be indifferent between $1 of annuitized 
wealth and $1.47 of non-annuitized wealth. Compared to average females, women with 
longevity-enhancing attributes such as being married, or being highly-educated, enjoy 
even higher AEW values (1.482 to 1.495) because they have higher survival 
probabilities and are thus more likely to be alive to consume the annuity.  
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[Table 3.6 here] 
Average males have an AEW of 1.644; this is comparable to Brown (2003)’s 
figure of 1.633 under age-sex pricing. The Table also shows that unmarried or lowly-
educated males have lower AEW values than the average male. These risk-groups find 
annuities less valuable since they are less likely to survive to consume the annuity. 
Nonetheless, even those with very poor mortality prospects benefit from the 
annuitization option. For example, even the ‘bottom’ risk-group of unmarried, lowly-
educated males with high blood disease has an AEW of 1.445.  
As with the money’s worth analysis, AEW results here show that shorter-lived 
groups find annuities more valuable as pricing becomes more detailed while longer-
lived groups find annuities less valuable. The ‘bottom’ group experiences a 30% 
increase in utility moving from age-sex pricing to scheme S4 and it should be noted that 
these utility gains are achieved by adding just a couple of pricing factors. In contrast, 
the ‘top’ group experiences a modest 8% loss in utility but still obtains a decent AEW 
of about 1.4 under the detailed pricing schemes. Sensitivity analysis shows that the 
AEW figures are generally smaller under log utility, i.e. ߛ=1 (see Table 3.6B). This is 
because individuals with lower degree of risk aversion value annuities less than those 
who are more risk-averse. Nonetheless, the finding that high-mortality-risk groups 
benefit the most from annuitization when annuity pricing becomes more detailed 
remains robust. 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Annuities provide valuable longevity insurance to individuals with uncertain 
lifetimes. The aging of the boomer generation in the U.S. and the global advent of 
individual retirement accounts will likely increase the demand for annuities. Yet in the 
U.S. as well as in many other developed countries, prices of most standard retail 
annuities do not reflect buyers’ personal characteristics other than age and sex. Some 
impediments to annuity underwriting may be costs and thin annuity markets. It may also 
be that insurers think underwriting is not profitable, which would be true if mortality 
differentials were not substantial.111 Nonetheless, the results in this paper suggest that 
mortality differentials are in fact substantial. Explained variation in mortality doubles 
from 6.7% to 12.6% just by using education and marital status, in addition to age and 
sex. Adjusted R2 increases further increases to 29.7% when the ten best-ranked factors 
are used along with age and sex. Moreover, these factors are readily-measurable and 
therefore not costly to collect. 
A main contribution of this paper has been to show that more detailed pricing 
may reduce adverse selection in annuity markets. This can be attributed to two effects 
that occur when more pricing factors are implemented. First, shorter-lived groups may 
be sufficiently induced to buy annuities. Where they may have stayed out of the market 
previously, they may now decide to annuitize since they are able to obtain decent MWR 
values of 0.8 to 0.9. Adding just one or two risk factors to age-sex pricing results in 
                                                            
111 The Appendix discusses one strategy that an insurer can use to benefit economically from annuity 
underwriting. Assuming a unilateral deviation, an insurer can possibly make a supernormal profit margin 
of about 12 to 14% from a cherry-picking strategy by selling annuities only to shorter-lived groups at the 
age-sex price. 
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substantial financial gains (13-15%) for these groups. In relation, the AEW analysis 
shows that shorter-lived groups can attractive utility gains of about 30% when more 
detailed pricing is implemented. The second effect is that longer-lived groups will still 
be incentivized to stay in the annuity market. Although more detailed pricing schemes 
results in higher premiums for the longer-lived groups, they are not severely penalized. 
These groups experience only modest financial and utility losses of about 3 to 5%. With 
the shorter-lived groups entering the annuity market and longer-lived continuing to 
consume annuities, annuity markets are likely to grow which in turn reduces adverse 
selection.  
Overall, these findings lend support to the movement towards risk-based annuity 
pricing for standard retail products, which has already begun in the U.K. and may 
possibly spread to other parts of the world. On the other hand, it implies that the 
European Union’s recent elimination of the use of sex in insurance pricing – should it 
be extended to annuities – represents a step backwards for the ongoing efforts towards 
risk-classification. Reducing the number of risk-classes will bring about greater 
dispersion in annuity values between the shorter and longer-lived risk-groups, which 
has possible redistributive implications in the event that all individuals purchase 
annuities, for example under a mandate.112  One limitation of this study is that the 
analysis is performed for a hypothetical cohort of 65-year-old individuals, without 
employing weights relevant to the HRS sample used for regression analysis. Future 
                                                            
112  Annuitization mandates have been actively considered by policymakers as a longevity risk 
management tool. For example, annuitization was compulsory in U.K. defined contributions plans for 
many years until recently. Singapore will implement an annuitization mandate in its national provident 
fund by 2013 (Fong et al. 2011). Mandating life annuity purchase may be one approach to limiting 
adverse selection in annuity markets, provided that appropriate regulation is in place (Bateman et al. 
2001). 
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research can extend the analysis to the nationally representative sample of HRS 
respondents. This will allow me to better model selection effects under various pricing 
schemes and also quantify the impact of more detailed pricing on adverse selection for a 
nationally representative mix of risk classes in the population at large. 
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Appendix: Case Analysis of a Unilateral Deviation Strategy 
This Appendix quantifies the approximate size of profits that an insurer can 
make when it collects more annuitant information, and uses that to earn supernormal 
profits through a cherry-picking strategy. To set up this case analysis, I assume a 
mandatory annuitization environment and everyone in the weighted HRS sample 
(described in Section 3.2) buys annuities. On the supply-side, assume there are only two 
annuity providers A and B. Since the prevailing pricing scheme in the market is ‘age-
sex’ pricing, both Insurers A and B set premiums using only these two factors. Further, 
assume zero-loads. Suppose Insurer A is the Government with no profit motive and is 
willing to sell annuities to any buyer as long as the system breaks-even on average. If 
Insurer A serves 100% of the market, it will collect total premiums of $3.396 billion 
(see Table appended). In addition, its estimated costs of payouts based on just age and 
sex is also $3.396 billion. It makes no profit and breaks-even. 
Now consider a unilateral deviation by Insurer B. First, Insurer B performs 
annuity underwriting and collects information on the top 12 factors (including education, 
marital status, some disease conditions etc., as outlined in Section 3.3) from all 
annuitants. Using a wider information set, it is able to estimate the expected costs of 
payouts for each individual more precisely. Insurer B then devises a cherry-picking 
strategy: it will only sell annuities to people whose expected cost of payout is below the 
age-sex price. Assuming that Insurer B gets to cherry-pick the annuitants, it will serve 
only 35.7% of the market. It will charge these annuitants the age-sex premium (as set by 
the prevailing pricing scheme) and collect $1.207 billion. The Table appended shows 
Insurer B’s costs estimate is only $1.059 billion, implying a supernormal profit margin 
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of about 12%. This analysis assumes a naïve market structure. Supernormal profits will 
not persist very long, and can be quickly competed away. Nonetheless, the figure of 12% 
represents a useful upper bound on the supernormal profits that can be achieved from 
annuity underwriting through a novel cherry-picking strategy. Since this upper bound is 
not too small, it suggests that annuity underwriting insurers can make abnormal profits 
through more detailed pricing.  
 High interest (6%) 
Low interest 
(4%) 
Insurer A 
Number of policies sold  22,729,947 22,729,947 
% of total market covered 100% 100% 
    
Premiums collected (age-sex price) $3.396b $4.195b 
Expected costs of payouts (using age & sex) $3.396b $4.195b 
“Supernormal” Profit $0 $0 
Insurer B 
Number of policies sold  8,108,301 8,501,370 
% of total market covered 35.7% 37.4% 
    
Premiums collected (age-sex price) $1.207b $1.563b 
Expected costs of payouts (using 12 factors) $1.059b $1.342b 
"Supernormal" Profit $0.147b $0.220b 
Profit as % of revenue (Profit Margin) 12% 14% 
Source: Author. 
Notes: Dollar amounts in $billions. The sample consists of 9,047 age-eligible HRS respondents first 
interviewed in 1992 and baseline sampling weights are applied. Assume there are only two annuity 
providers A and B. The prevailing pricing scheme in the market is ‘age-sex’ pricing, so both A and B set 
premiums based only on age and sex. Insurer A only knows the annuitants’ age and sex so it estimates its 
expected costs based only on these two factors. 
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Table 3.1: Hazard Ratios for Mortality in the HRS, 1992 – 2008, Gompertz 
proportional hazards model (N=9,047) 
 
 (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) 
  HR [95% CI] HR [95% CI] HR [95% CI] HR [95% CI] 
Age 1.09*** 
[1.07,1.10] 
1.07*** 
[1.05,1.09]  
1.07*** 
[1.05,1.08]     
1.08*** 
[1.06,1.09]  
Male 1.62*** 
[1.46,1.78] 
1.92*** 
[1.72,2.13] 
1.83*** 
[1.64,2.05]         
1.69*** 
[1.51,1.89]  
Nonwhite  1.18*** 
[1.05,1.33]  
1.14** 
[1.00,1.30]            
1.12* 
[0.98,1.27]     
Schooling ≥ 12 years  0.73*** 
[0.66,0.82] 
0.79*** 
[0.70,0.89]           
0.94  
[0.83,1.06] 
Married  0.69*** 
[0.62,0.77] 
0.70*** 
[0.63,0.79]        
0.81*** 
[0.72,0.91]   
BMI (ref=normal weight):    
   Underweight  2.93*** 
[2.18,3.93]  
2.97*** 
[2.18,4.03]      
2.16*** 
[1.56,2.99] 
   Overweight  0.83*** 
[0.73,0.94] 
0.83*** 
[0.73,0.94]           
0.87** 
[0.77,0.98]   
   Obese  0.85** 
[0.74,0.98] 
0.84** 
[0.73,0.97]            
0.89* 
[0.77,1.02]     
Prior health history:     
   Ever-have Cancer (=1)  1.99*** 
[1.62,2.44]  
1.99*** 
[1.62,2.44]           
1.82*** 
[1.49,2.23]   
   Diabetes  2.49*** 
[2.18,2.84]  
2.49*** 
[2.19,2.85]          
2.18***  
[1.90,2.50]  
   Heart disease / attack  1.63*** 
[1.42,1.87]  
1.61***  
[1.41,1.85]           
1.34*** 
[1.16,1.54]   
   High blood pressure  1.40*** 
[1.26,1.56]  
1.37***  
[1.23,1.53]           
1.30*** 
[1.16,1.45]  
   Chronic lung disease  2.28*** 
[1.93,2.69]  
2.19*** 
[1.85,2.60]           
1.62*** 
[1.37,1.91]   
   Major psychiatric 
condition 
 1.57*** 
[1.32,1.86] 
1.54*** 
[1.30,1.83]          
1.30*** 
[1.09,1.54]   
   Stroke  1.73*** 
[1.36,2.21]  
1.71*** 
[1.34,2.19]           
1.47*** 
[1.16,1.87]   
   Arthritis  1.06  
[0.95,1.18] 
1.05  
[0.94,1.17]          
0.93  
[0.83,1.04] 
Birth region (ref = Northeast region):    
   Midwest region   0.90  
[0.77,1.06]          
0.90  
[0.77,1.06] 
   South region   0.96  
[0.83,1.12]         
0.90  
[0.77,1.04] 
   West region   0.74*** 
[0.58,0.93]            
0.75** 
[0.59,0.94]   
   Not born in the US    0.63*** 
[0.50,0.80]            
0.64*** 
[0.51,0.81]  
Cognition (memory score)  0.97*** 
[0.96,0.99]           
0.98*** 
[0.97,0.99]  
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 (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) 
  HR [95% CI] HR [95% CI] HR [95% CI] HR [95% CI] 
Father education ≥ 12 years 1.08  
[0.93,1.24]          
1.13* 
[0.98,1.30]    
Mother education ≥ 12 years  0.93  
[0.81,1.07]          
0.94  
[0.82,1.08] 
Father’s Longevity   0.95*** 
[0.92,0.99]            
0.96** 
[0.93,0.99]    
Mother’s Longevity   1.00  
[0.96,1.04]          
1.00  
[0.97,1.04] 
Self-reported health (ref=excellent):     
   Very Good    1.27** 
[1.05,1.54]   
   Good    1.68*** 
[1.39,2.02]   
   Fair     2.29*** 
[1.85,2.82]  
   Poor    3.02*** 
[2.38,3.81]   
Currently smoke (=1)    1.76*** 
[1.56,1.99]  
Ever smoke (=1)    1.41***  
[1.23,1.62]  
Ever drink (=1)    0.94  
[0.84,1.05] 
     
Gamma (ߛ) 0.0063 0.0076 0.0077 0.0081 
     
# observations 58,467 58,467 58,467 58,467 
ࡳ૛ 190.78 1,287.06 1,336.73 1,622.97 
df 2 16 30 37 
     
Adjusted ࡾ૛  6.7%  29.7% 30.6% 36.7% 
     
Source: Author; see text.  
Notes: HR = hazard ratios (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01), CI = 95% confidence intervals in brackets.  
The sample consists of 9,047 age-eligible HRS respondents first interviewed in 1992. Analyses are weighted by base-
year respondent-level weights to account for over-sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians. M2 adds 
conventional, predetermined covariates (race, education, whether married, and weight), M3 adds less-conventional, 
predetermined risk factors (birth region, cognition scores, parental factors), and M4 adds conventional, 
endogenous variables (self-reported health, smoking, and drinking). ߛ  is the shape parameter of the 
baseline hazard. ܩଶ  is the Wald chi-square statistic which compares the log pseudo-likelihood of the 
fitted model against a null model. A model with more parameters will always have a higher statistic; 
whether it fits significantly better than a model with fewer parameters is determined by calculating the p-
value of the difference in ܩଶ between models, together with the associated degrees of freedom (df). The 
adjusted ܴଶ  for survival models measures how much of the variation in outcome in a Gompertz 
proportional hazards model is accounted for through the prognostic index (ݔߚ), adjusting the dimension 
of the model. Flags for missing, and imputed, values for these variables are included in the analysis: birth 
region, father’s education, mother’s education (p<.10), and parental longevity.  
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Table 3.2: Benefit Flows to Annuitants (for age 65 annuity purchasers; ݅=6%) 
 
Subgroups of 65-year olds Expected benefit flows 
Top: No high blood, Married, HS-educated, Females $152 
Married, HS-educated, Females 145 
HS-educated, Females 140 
Females 133 
65-year-olds 126 
Males 117 
Lowly-educated, Males 104 
Not married, Lowly-educated, Males 91 
Bottom: High blood, Not married, Lowly-educated, 
Males 81 
Source: Author.  
Notes: The benefit flows pertain to a standard, nominal, whole life, retail annuity that pays $1/month to 
65-year-old would-be annuity purchasers. Simulations are based on a nominal annual interest rate of 6% 
and a terminal age of 120. The risk-group of ‘No high blood, Married, HS-educated, Females’ is the 
longest-lived group analyzed in this Table and marked “Top”. Correspondingly, ‘High blood, Unmarried, 
Low-educated, Males’ is the shortest-lived group and marked “Bottom”. 
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Table 3.3: Annuity Premiums Charged under Different Pricing Schemes (for age 
65 annuity purchasers; ݅=6%; zero-loads) 
 
Different Pricing 
Schemes 
# pricing 
factors 
Prices ($) # distinct 
premiums 
Age-only  1 Single price: $126 1 
Age, sex  2 F: M: 
$134 
117 2 
Age, sex, education 3 
HS-educated F: 
Less-educated F: 
HS-educated M: 
Less-educated M: 
$140 
122 
125 
104 
4 
Age, sex, 
education, marital 
status 
4 
Married, HS-educated F: 
Unmarried, HS-educated F: 
Married, less-educated F: 
Unmarried, less-educated F: 
Married, HS-educated M: 
Unmarried, HS-educated M: 
Married, less-educated M: 
Unmarried, less-educated M:
$145 
129 
129 
111 
128 
110 
109 
91 
8 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
Age, sex, 
education, marital 
status, high blood, 
cognition  
6 : : $67-153 32 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
All top 12 factors: 
Age, sex, 
education, marital 
status, high blood, 
cognition, diabetes, 
lung disease, heart 
disease, cancer, 
BMI, psychiatric. 
12 : : $4-161 4,096 
Source: Author; see text.  
Notes: Only one of these pricing schemes is adopted by the insurer at any one time. Premiums are set by the insurer 
and offered to 65-year-old would-be annuity purchasers. Simulations are based on a single-life, nominal, standard 
retail annuity with fixed $1/month payouts, a nominal interest rate of 6%, and a terminal age of 120. The distinct 
number of prices in each row is obtained by multiplying the number of categories that is associated with each 
additional pricing factor. For example, ‘sex’ is associated with only two categories (male/female) but ‘BMI’ is 
associated with four categories (underweight / normal weight/ overweight/obsess). In addition, only a group of 65-
year old annuitants is considered here. In other words, age is fixed. If age is allowed to vary, as it would in a random 
pool of annuitants, the number of distinct prices that will be larger than that indicated here.   
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Table 3.4: Money’s Worth Ratios for Various Risk-groups under Different Pricing 
Schemes (age 65 annuity purchasers) 
 
A: Money’s Worth Ratios (݅=6%) 
 
Simpler Pricing More Detailed Pricing 
S1 
Age-only 
S2 
Age & sex 
S3 
+ Educ. 
S4 
+ Marital 
Top: No high blood, Married, 
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
1.204 1.133 1.081 1.047 
Married, HS-educated, Females 1.150 1.082 1.032 1.000 
HS-educated, Females 1.114 1.048 1.000 - 
Females 1.062 1.000 - - 
65-year-olds 1.000 - - - 
Males 0.931 1.000 - - 
Low-educated, Males 0.827 0.889 1.000 - 
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males 0.722 0.775 0.873 1.000 
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried, 
Low-educated, Males 0.645 0.693 0.780 0.893 
     
Decline in MWR (for Top) -6% -5% -3% 
Increase in MWR (for Bottom) +7% +13% +15% 
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B: Money’s Worth Ratios (݅=4%) 
 
Simpler Pricing More Detailed Pricing 
S1 
Age-only 
S2 
Age & sex
S3 
+ Educ. 
S4 
+ Marital 
Top: No high blood, Married, 
High-school (HS)-educated, Females 
1.254 1.166 1.102 1.059 
Married, HS-educated, Females 1.184 1.101 1.040 1.000 
HS-educated, Females 1.138 1.059 1.000 - 
Females 1.075 1.000 - - 
65-year-olds 1.000 - - - 
Males 0.918 1.000 - - 
Low-educated, Males 0.801 0.872 1.000 - 
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males 0.686 0.747 0.857 1.000 
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried, 
Low-educated, Males 0.605 0.659 0.756 0.882 
     
Decline in MWR (for Top) -7% -6% -4% 
Increase in MWR (for Bottom) +9% +15% +17% 
      
Source: Author; see text.  
Notes: These calculations are the MWR values available to 65-year-old would-be annuity purchasers. The 
dashes indicated cases where the premium for that risk-group cannot be defined under the prevailing 
pricing scheme. Simulations are based on a single-life, nominal annuity with fixed $1/month payouts, a 
nominal interest rate of 4% or 6%, and a terminal age of 120. S1 denotes a pricing scheme using 1 risk-
class (age-only); S2 denotes a scheme using 2 risk-classes (age and sex), and so on. For example, the S4 
scheme uses four pricing factors: age, sex, education, and marital status. The risk-group of ‘No high 
blood, Married, HS-educated, Females’ is the longest-lived group analyzed in this Table and marked 
“Top”. Correspondingly, ‘High blood, Unmarried, Low-educated, Males’ is the shortest-lived group and 
marked “Bottom”. Moving from left to right, the relative change in MWR for both of these groups is 
shown at the end of the Table.  
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Table 3.5: Annual Annuity Income from $100,000 Policy under Different Pricing 
Schemes (for age 65 annuity purchasers; ݎ ൌ ߨ ൌ 3%; zero-loads) 
 
Simpler Pricing More Detailed Pricing 
S1 
Age-only 
S2 
Age & sex
S3 
+ Educ. 
S4 
+ Marital 
Top: No high blood, Married, 
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
$10,109 $9,492 $9,036 $8,742 
Married, HS-educated, Females 10,109 9,492 9,036 8,742 
HS-educated, Females 10,109 9,492 9,036 - 
Females 10,109 9,492 - - 
65-year-olds 10,109 - - - 
Males 10,109 10,898 - - 
Low-educated, Males 10,109 10,898 12,344 - 
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males 10,109 10,898 12,344 14,269 
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried, 
Low-educated, Males 10,109 10,898 12,344 14,269 
      
Source: Author; see text.  
Notes: These calculations are based on a single-life, nominal, standard retail annuity that charges a lump-
sum premium of $100,000 in exchange for fixed annual payouts. Additional parameters include a real 
interest rate of 3%, an inflation rate of 3%, an annuitization age of 65, and a terminal age of 120. S1 
denotes a pricing scheme using 1 risk-class (age-only); S2 denotes a scheme using 2 risk-classes (age and 
sex), and so on. For example, the S4 scheme uses four pricing factors: age, sex, education, and marital 
status. The dashes indicated cases where the annuity payout for that risk-group cannot be defined under 
the prevailing pricing scheme; for example, it is necessary to determine the educational status of the 
annuitant under Scheme S3 since low-educated annuitants will receive higher annuity income. The risk-
group of ‘No high blood, Married, HS-educated, Females’ is the longest-lived group analyzed in this 
Table and marked “Top”. Correspondingly, ‘High blood, Unmarried, Low-educated, Males’ is the 
shortest-lived group and marked “Bottom”.  
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Table 3.6: Annuity Equivalent Wealth for Various Risk-groups under Different 
Pricing Schemes (age 65 annuity purchasers; ݎ ൌ ߨ ൌ 3%; zero-loads) 
 
A: Annuity Equivalent Wealth (CRRA utility with ߛ=3) 
 
Simpler Pricing More Detailed Pricing 
S1 
Age-only 
S2 
Age & sex 
S3 
+ Educ. 
S4 
+ Marital 
Top: No high blood, Married, 
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
1.592 1.495 1.421 1.374 
Married, HS-educated, Females 1.583 1.488 1.415 1.368 
HS-educated, Females 1.577 1.482 1.411 - 
Females 1.568 1.474 - - 
65-year-olds 1.552 - - - 
Males 1.527 1.644 - - 
Low-educated, Males 1.471 1.586 1.791 - 
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males 1.406 1.512 1.709 1.972 
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried, 
Low-educated, Males 1.342 1.445 1.633 1.882 
     
Decline in AEW (for Top) -6% -5% -3% 
Increase in AEW (for Bottom) +8% +13% +15% 
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B: Annuity Equivalent Wealth (CRRA utility with ߛ=1) 
 
Simpler Pricing More Detailed Pricing 
S1 
Age-only 
S2 
Age & sex 
S3 
+ Educ. 
S4 
+ Marital 
Top: No high blood, Married, 
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
1.535 1.441 1.372 1.328 
Married, HS-educated, Females 1.509 1.419 1.351 1.307 
HS-educated, Females 1.492 1.402 1.336 - 
Females 1.466 1.377 - - 
65-year-olds 1.429 - - - 
Males 1.376 1.483 - - 
Low-educated, Males 1.289 1.388 1.571 - 
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males 1.192 1.279 1.447 1.671 
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried, 
Low-educated, Males 1.127 1.198 1.346 1.554 
     
Decline in AEW (for Top) -6% -5% -3% 
Increase in AEW (for Bottom) 6% 12% 15% 
      
Source: Author; see text.  
Notes: These calculations are based on a single-life, nominal annuity that charges a lump-sum premium of $100,000 
in exchange for fixed annual payouts (as illustrated in Table 3.5). Additional parameters include a real 
interest rate of 3%, an inflation rate of 3%, an annuitization age of 65, and a terminal age of 120. S1 
denotes a pricing scheme using 1 risk-class (age-only); S2 denotes a scheme using 2 risk-classes (age and 
sex), and so on. For example, scheme S4 uses four pricing factors: age, sex, education, and marital status. 
The dashes in the Table represent cases where annuity pricing cannot be defined for that risk-group, thus 
AEW is not computed for that group. 
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Appendix Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This Appendix provides basic descriptive statistics of the sample of 9,047 respondents 
in the baseline HRS cohort. Age distribution is pretty even across the range of 51 – 61; 
average age is 56. Approximately 79% of the respondents are white, 95% have a 
religion, and 90% are born in the US. Average education is about 12.1 years of 
schooling. About a third of the individuals are normal weight, 1.3% is underweight, and 
the rest are overweight or obese. In terms of parental factors, father’s years of schooling 
is slightly lower than that of mother’s years of schooling, and more respondents’ 
mothers are alive at baseline than are their fathers.  
 
Variable Mean 
  
Individual demographic characteristics 
    Male 45.4% 
    Average age at interview 56.0 (3.18) 
    Race: nonwhite 21.2% 
    Married 72.7% 
    Born in the US 90.3% 
    Has religion 95.3% 
    Place of birth (by region): 
1. Northeast 17.6.% 
2. Midwest 25.3% 
3. South 38.7% 
4. West 7.9% 
5. Not in the US  10.5% 
Socioeconomic factors  
    Own years of schooling 12.1 (3.20)  
    Father's years of schooling 8.8 (3.81) 
    Mother's years of schooling 9.1 (3.52)  
Parental longevity 
    Father alive 16.4% 
    Mother alive 42.2% 
    Father's age at death (if deceased) 68.0 (13.85) 
    Mother's age at death (if deceased) 68.5 (14.93) 
    Father's current age (if alive) 80.9 (5.62) 
    Mother's current age (if alive) 79.3 (5.85) 
Health & Cognition 
    BMI:  
Underweight (BMI < 18.5) 1.3% 
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Variable Mean 
  
Normal weight (18.5 ≤ BMI <25) 33.6% 
Overweight (25 ≤ BMI <30) 40.8% 
Obese (30 ≤ BMI ) 24.3% 
    Ever-have Cancer 4.8% 
    Ever-have Diabetes 9.6% 
    Ever-have Heart condition 10.6% 
    Ever-have High blood pressure 34.7% 
    Ever-have chronic lung disease 5.3% 
    Ever-have major psychiatric condition 7.1% 
    Ever-have Stroke 2.4% 
    Ever-have Arthritis 34.5% 
    Cognition: Memory score only (scale 0 – 40) 12.8 (5.24) 
N 9,047 
Source: Author.  
Notes: Percentages are shown for dichotomous variables, and means with standard deviations in 
parentheses are shown for continuous variables and some categorical variables (e.g. years of schooling). 
Statistics shown here are solely for baseline 1992 variables. The baseline cognition measure features only 
the memory score (based on word recall items) as the rest of the cognition test questions were not asked 
until wave 3. Missing values for these variables are flagged: parental education, parental longevity, birth 
region, BMI, and cognition scores. The birth regions are organized as follows: the Northeast Region 
comprises New England and Middle Atlantic divisions; the Midwest Region comprises East North and 
West North divisions; the South region comprises South Atlantic, East South, and West South divisions; 
the West region comprises Mountain and Pacific divisions.  
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Appendix Table 3.2: Comparing Hazard Ratios for Mortality in the HRS by Age 
Groups (1992 – 2008, Gompertz proportional hazards model, N=9,047)  
 
 (M3) (M3) By Age Group 
  All Ages 
HR [95% CI] 
Age 50-57 
HR [95% CI]  
Age 58-62 
HR [95% CI] 
Age  1.07 [1.05,1.08]***    1.05 [1.02,1.08]*** 1.04 [0.97,1.12] 
Male 1.83 [1.64,2.05]***     1.78 [1.54,2.05]*** 1.89 [1.59,2.25]*** 
Nonwhite 1.14 [1.00,1.30]**       1.13 [0.95,1.34] 1.12 [0.91,1.37] 
Own schooling ≥ 12 years 0.79 [0.70,0.89]***     0.81 [0.68,0.95]*** 0.77 [0.64,0.93]*** 
Married 0.70 [0.63,0.79]***     0.71 [0.61,0.82]*** 0.69 [0.58,0.83]*** 
BMI (ref=normal weight):    
   Underweight 2.97 [2.18,4.03]***     3.15 [2.16,4.60]*** 2.59 [1.55,4.33]*** 
   Overweight 0.83 [0.73,0.94]***     0.82 [0.69,0.97]** 0.84 [0.70,1.02]* 
   Obese 0.84 [0.73,0.97]**       0.87 [0.72,1.04] 0.80 [0.64,1.01]* 
Prior health history:    
   Ever-have Cancer (=1) 1.99 [1.62,2.44]***     2.25 [1.72,2.93]*** 1.72 [1.26,2.36]*** 
   Diabetes 2.49 [2.19,2.85]***     2.61 [2.18,3.13]*** 2.38 [1.95,2.90]*** 
   Heart disease / attack 1.61 [1.41,1.85]***     1.72 [1.43,2.07]*** 1.48 [1.20,1.83]*** 
   High blood pressure 1.37 [1.23,1.53]***     1.40 [1.21,1.62]*** 1.33 [1.13,1.58]*** 
   Chronic lung disease 2.19 [1.85,2.60] ***    2.01 [1.60,2.53]*** 2.60 [2.03,3.33]*** 
   Major psychiatric condition 1.54 [1.30,1.83]***     1.56 [1.25,1.95]*** 1.44 [1.08,1.91]** 
   Stroke 1.71 [1.34,2.19]***     1.81 [1.27,2.57]*** 1.61 [1.16,2.22]*** 
   Arthritis 1.05 [0.94,1.17]         1.00 [0.87,1.16] 1.11 [0.94,1.31] 
Birth region (ref = Northeast):    
   Midwest region 0.90 [0.77,1.06]         0.84 [0.68,1.03]* 1.00 [0.78,1.27] 
   South region 0.96 [0.83,1.12]         0.91 [0.74,1.10] 1.06 [0.84,1.33] 
   West region 0.74 [0.58,0.93]***     0.66 [0.49,0.91]** 0.83 [0.59,1.18] 
   Not born in the US  0.63 [0.50,0.80]***     0.64 [0.47,0.86]*** 0.63 [0.44,0.89]*** 
Cognition (memory score) 0.97 [0.96,0.99]***     0.98 [0.96,0.99]*** 0.97 [0.95,0.99]*** 
Father education ≥ 12 years 1.08 [0.93,1.24]         0.97 [0.81,1.16] 1.26 [1.00,1.59]** 
Mother education ≥ 12 years 0.93 [0.81,1.07]         0.91 [0.76,1.08] 0.96 [0.77,1.19] 
Father’s Longevity 0.95 [0.92,0.99]***     0.93 [0.89,0.98]*** 0.99 [0.94,1.05] 
Mother’s Longevity 1.00 [0.96,1.04]         0.99 [0.94,1.04] 1.01 [0.96,1.07] 
    
Gamma (ߛ) 0.0077 0.0077 0.0078 
    
# observations 58,467 40,525 17,942 
۵૛ 1,336.73 771.327 555.9522 
df 30 30 30 
    
Source: Author; see text.  
Notes: HR = hazard ratios (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01), CI = 95% confidence intervals in brackets. 
The sample consists of 9,047 age-eligible HRS respondents first interviewed in 1992. Analyses are 
weighted by base-year respondent-level weights to account for over-sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and 
Floridians. ߛ is the shape parameter of the baseline hazard. ܩଶ  is the Wald chi-square statistic which 
compares the log pseudo-likelihood of the fitted model against a null model. Flags for missing, and 
imputed, values for these variables are included in the analysis: birth region, father’s education, mother’s 
education (p<.10), and parental longevity.  
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